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ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES 
I. SUMMARY. 
-c 
Richard M. Nixon challenges the constituionality ... 
of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act 
(Reproduced in J.S. App. 11Oa). The Act directs the 
Administrator of General Services to take custody of appellant's 
presidential papers and tape recordings, and to promulgate 






such materials for the purpose of returning to appellant such 
of them as are personal and private in nature, and of determining 
the terms and conditions upon which public access may eventually -
be had to those remaining in the Government's possession. 
The questions presented are whether Title I of the Act is 
unconstitutional on its face as a violation of (1) the separation 
of powers doctrine; (2) presidential privilege doctrines; (3) 
appellant's right to privacy; (4) the First Amendment; (5) the 
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment; or (6) the Bill of Attainder Clause. 
The DC (in a 100-page opinion) concluded that there was no --constitutional infirmity in the Act on its face requiring its 
enforcement to be enjoined. (J.S. App. la-104a). 
II. BACKGROUND 
1. The Materials: Appellant resigned as President 
effective August 9, 1974. When he left office a large quantity 
of documents, files, and other materials, which had been 
accumulated by him and his staff during his term as President, 
remained in the White House. These materials include 
approximately 42 million pages of documents and more than 800 
reels of taE.,e recordings of conversations. 
Personal and official materials are comingled. Appellant 
estimated that he had personally prepared or reviewed 200,000 
of the documents, including staff memoranda, preliminary drafts, 




correspondence. The DC found that private materials comprise 
a small fraction of the total (J.S. App. 71a). 
2. The Initial Arrangements: After appellant's resignation, 
government archivists began to collect the materials for shipment 
to California, in accord with appellant's instructions. But when 
the Special Prosecutor indicated a continuing need for the 
materials, President Ford halted shipment and asked the Attorney 
General for advice about the ownership of the materials. The 
Attorney General concluded that most of the materials were owned 
by appellant by virtue of historical practice and the absence of 
any statute to the contrary, but added that ownership of the 
materials might not control their disposition, given the public 
interests at stake. 
At about the same time negotiations commenced between 
the new administration and appellant, culminating in an 
agreement between appellant and Arthur Sampson, Administrator 
of the General Services Administration. (JS App. 134a). Under 
the terms of the agreement, appellant retained title to all of 
his presidential historical materials but agreed to donate a 
substantial portion of the materials to the United States at 
a future date so that they would "be made availabl~ with 
For the time being the materials were to be deposited with 
appropriate restrictions, for research and study." /GSA under 
the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. 2101, et~-, and transferred 
to California, where they would be stored in locked areas. 
Neither appellant nor GSA could gain access to the materials 
'without the consent of the other. 
\ 
4. 
For a period of three years or, in the case of tape 
recordings, five years, access to the materials would be limited 
to appellant or persons authorized by him. No original materials 
could be withdrawn during this initial stage, but appellant 
could reproduce any document and, with the agreement of GSA, 
any tape recording. After the three-year period had expired 
appellant could withdraw from deposit any documentary materials 
he wished and dispose of them as he saw fit. As of September 
1, 1979, appellant made a gift to the United States of the tape 
recordings, subject to the conditions that he could direct 
destruction of such tapes as he wished and that all of them 
were to be destroyed after ten years or upon appellant's death, 
whichever occurred first. 
When implementation of this agreement was delayed at the 
request of the Special Prosecutor, appellant brought suit for 
its specific performance. The case was consolidated with actions 
seeking to enjoin transfer of the materials and to gain access 
to them under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. (Supp. 
IV) § 552. 
3. The Act. While thPse consolidated actions were pending, 
I Congress passed and the President signed the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (J.S. App. 110a), 
abrogati£!g a£eellant's agreement with GSA, and directing the 
w:= ~ 
GSA Administrator to obtain and retain possession and control 
5. 
the 1 
of all/presidential historical materials and tape recordings 
from appellant's administration. (Section 101). 
Section 102(b) provides that these materials and recordings 
shall be made available for use in any judicial proceeding, 
"subject to any rights, defenses, or privileges which the Federal 
Government or any person may invoke. '·' . . . . Section 102(c) 
and (d) provides that appellant (or his designee) and the 
Executive Branch shall have access to the materials, subject to 
,,,,-,,._..,--,,-, zww -
the Administrator's regulations. 
I 
Section 103 requires the Administrator to issue regulations 
to gov~rn c:stc:iy of and access to the materials. Section 104 
requires the Administrator to issue regulations providing for 
"public access" to the materials; these regulations must "take -----~ 
into account" seven factors: 
"(1) the need to provide the public with the full 
truth, at the earliest reasonable date, of the abuses 
of governmental power popularly identified under the 
generic term "Watergate"; 
~ ......--
(2) the need to make such recordings and materials 
available for use in j~ic~al p~ings; 
I 
(3) the need to £ revent general access, except 
in accordance with appropriate procedures es t ablished 
for use in judicial proceedings, so information relating 
to the Nation's securit; 
(4) the need to protect every individual's right 
to a f_a_i_r_ a_n_d_ i_n:p..__a_r_t_1._~al; 
1. Section 10l(b)(2) incorporates by reference the definition 
of "historical materials" given in 44 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970), 
which includes "books, correspondence, documents, papers, 
, pamphlets, works of art, models, pictures, photographs, plats, 
maps, films, motion pictures, sound recordings, and other 
objects or materials having historical or commemorative 
value." 
. . 
• tr. -- . 
( 
1\..,,,_ 1.- "· -=;-.. - _ _ _ 
.,.c~ -t,)Y 
~~~~~ 
(5) the to protect any party's opportunity 
to assert an ally or constitutionally based right 
or privilege which would prevent or otherwise limit 
access to such recordings and materials; 
(6) the need to provide public access to those 
materials which have general historical significance, 
and which are not likely to be related to t he need 
described in paragraph (l); and 
6. 
(7) the need to give to Richard M. Nixon, or his ~ 
heirs, for his sole custody and use, tape recordings, / 
and other materials which are not likely to be related , 
to the need described in paragraph (1) and are not 
otherwise of general historical significance." 
Section 104(b) requires the Administrator to submit the "public 
access" regulations and any subsequent changes in them to both 
Houses of Congress and provides that the regulations or changes 
can be disapproved by a resolution of either House within 90 
legislative days of submission. 
Section lOS(a) provides for eepedited judicial r..aview in 
the D.D.C. of the Act and any regulations issued under its 
authority. Section lOS(c) provides for "just compensation" 
to any individual who may have been deprived of private property 
by the Act. 
Title II of the Act establishes a National Study Commission 
to study and recommend procedures regarding the control, 
disposition, and preservation of the records of all federal 
. _J))- , executive judicial, and legislative officers. The National 
V.~Jl'-1~ Commission has been appointed but has not yet submitted 
~~~s report; it is not involved in this litigation. 
Vk r_/ 4. The regulations. The Administrator has submitted to 
~~Congress three sets of "public access" regulations. The first 
v{ ~ set was disapproved by the Senate. S. Res. 244, 94th Cong., 
7. 
1st Sess. (1975); 121 Cong. Rec. Sl5803-S15808 (daily ed., 
September 11, 1975). The second set was withdrawn; the Senate 
disapproved seven provisions of those regulations, believing that 
the Administrator lacked power to withdraw them. S. Res. 428, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); 122 Cong. Rec. S5290-S5291 (daily 
ed. April 8, 1976). The third set was submitted on April 13, 
2 
1976, and is pending. (SG's Motion to Affirm at 9 n. 4). 
Regulations to assure preservation of the materials in 
custody and to prevent unauthorized access, which Section 103 
of the Act does not require to be submitted to Congress, were 
published on January 14, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 2669; 41 C.F.R. 
105-63. The DC has enjoined the effectiveness of some of 
these regulations (J.S. App. 107a-108a), and has clarified 
appellant's right under the Act to have access to the materials 
and to copy any documents, pending disposition of this appeal. 
(J.S. App. 13a n.7, 107a). 
5. The DC proceedings: One day after the Act became 
effective appellant commenced this action for declaratory 
and injunctive relief. Although the complaint sought the 
convening of a three-judge ~ourt, the single judge (Richey) 
(\ 
declined to rule upon the request, proceeding iptead to file 
an opinion in the consolidated cases growing out of appellant's 
I 
2. The SG be[ieves that the provision for a "one-house veto" 
in§ 104(b) of the Act is an unconstitutional attempt by 
Congress to participate in the detailed administration of 
the Act (citing separation of powers and Art. 1, § 7, cl. 3). 
But the SG says that that provision is not in issue here, 
since appellant does not challenge it and claims no right 




agreement with GSA. Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.DC.. l<i75)~ 
CADC stayed entry of judgment on that opinion, however, to 
enable a three-judge district court to proceed with priority 
in accordance with§ 105 of the Act. 
F.2d 427, 430 (CADC 1975) (per curiam) 
Nixon v. Richey, 513 
3 
(J.S.App. 139a-202a). 
The three-judge DC convened and, having permitted the parties 
4 
in the consolidated actions to intervene, independently 
considered appellant's arguments. 
III. HOLDINGS, CONTENTIONS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Separation of powers 
1. Holding: The DC held that the Act on its face does 
not violate the principle of separation of powers (J.S. App. 
31a-35a). The court understood appellant to ~e asserting that 
the three branches of government must be "airtight"' and No 
dismissed that view as archaic, citing United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)("the separate powers were not intended 
to operate with absolute independence"). It observed that the 
only injury to the executive branch that appellant was claiming 
3. The recent enactment repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2282 does not 
apply to actions commenced before August 12, 1976. P.L. 94-381. 
4. Intervenors included the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, et al., which has filed a motion 
to affirm, and Jack Anderson and Lillian Hellman, et al., 





was one involving the confidentiality of communications. Since 
the need to protect such confidentiality had been recognized 
in United States v. Nixon, in the form of a qualified privilege 
for executive communications deriving from the separation of 
powers, the court proceeded to consider appellant's arguments 
within the framework of the executive privilege doctrine. 
(See B infra). 
2. Contentions. Appellant appears to contend that 
privilege doctrines are inadequate to deal with the Act's 
"unprecedented invasion of the autonomy of the Executive Branch." 
He relies on Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 
629-630 (1935) for the principle that each of the three branches 
of the federal government must be "free from the control or 
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the 
others." He claims that by directing control over every paper 
and recording of appellant's administration, Congress has made 
uncertain the confidential status of communications of current 
employees of the Executive and Judicial Branches: 
"If Congress may, immediately upon termination of 
a President's tenure in office, impound his documents 
and other materials and prescribe the terms of their 
public disclosure, the effect on the President and 
his advisors is the same as if their communications 
were currently open to public inspection. The 
inevitable posturing for sake of appearance, and 
the reluctance to advance unpopular or novel 
positions, will diminish the President's ability 
to make the informed decisions vital to his role 
under the Constitution." 
The SG responds that far from invading the automony of 
the Executive Branch, the Act places the materials in the custody 
of the Administrator , an executive official responsible to -- ...., 
10. 
/ 
the President; provides that Executive Branch employees have ------access to the materials "for lawful Government use, subject 
to the [Administrator's] regulations" (Section 102(d)); and 
ensures that there will be no disclosure of the materials to 
persons outside the Executive Branch in violation of any defenses 
or privileges asserted by appellant or the Executive Branch. 
(Section 104 (a) (5 ).,(7)). 
The SG argues that presidential materials are a proper 
subject of legislation, since they are affected by a public 
interest from their creation, see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Gas. 
342 (No. 4, 901) (C.C.D. Mass. 184l)(Story, J.); and that 
Congress can provide for their acquisition under the eminent 
domain power, and for their disposition under the Property 
Clause (Article IV, Section 3) power to "make all needful Rules 
and Regulations respecting ... Property belonging to the 
United States." 
The SG adds that the Act would be open to question if it 
so threw open the process of decision-making in the Executive 
Branch that it became difficult for the President to obtain 
candid advice, or for Executive Branch officials to speak frankly 
to each other; but thaj-~e Act does not create this kind of 
hazard. ~ ~ .. . 
3. Discussion. Appellant does not meet the DC's point 
that his separation of powers argument adds nothing to his 
claim of executive privilege. In Nixon the Court spoke of the 
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications as 
11. 
"fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably 
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." 
418 U.S. at 708. Although appellant insists on presenting 
the two arguments separately, they really present different r di~ensions o~ ame claim, and should be considered together. 
I 
But to the extent that resort to the underlying principle is 
necessary, I think the SG is right that this Act is consistent 
with the separation of powers. 7 ? 
' 
B. Presidential privilege 
1. Holding: The DC held that there was no violation 
presidential privilege because the public interests served 
the Act far outweighed the need to prevent the very limited 
~~intrusion on whatever interest in presidential confidentiality -
VV~y if any - appellant was entitled to assert. (J.S. App. 35a-67a). 
,,,,.,_ IN" ~. The court declined to hold that appellant, as a former 
President, could not claim executive privilege. Instead, 
assuming that appellant could assert the privilege, the court 
observed that a claim by a former President carried much less - - ~ 
weight than a claim asserted by the incumbent: the incumbent 
alone is subject to the restraints of office in asserting the 
privilege; he alone has the requisite knowledge of all facets 
of the p:-oblem and the unique perspective necessary to a decision; 
and he alone has a continuing, vital interest in encouraging 
candid presentation of views by his advisers and in protecting 
them from burdensome requests for information. Moreover, 
appellant could only assert this weakened privilege with respect 
\ 
1·1, ..,... ·.-."-~- __ 
12. 
to some of the materials; i.e., communications related to the 
discharge of presidential duties for which appellant had not 
himself waived the privilege by prior disclosure. 
The court found appellant's privilege, so defined, to be -
outweighed by the publi.c interests served by the Act. The 
court considered the two most important of these interests to 
be (1) maintaining a complete and accurate historical record, 
and (2) assuring the availability of the materials potentially 
needed for continuity in executive policymaking. The court also 
pointed to the need to inform the public about Watergate and to 
insure the availability of materials that might be relevant to 
• 
overbroad 
The Act contemplates initial 
of the materials by trained archivists, and authorizes 
only of those materials having historical significance. 
court found screening by archivists to be both necessary, 
given the intermingling of materials and the need for dis-
interestedness and expertise, and minimally intrusive, given 
the use of discreet and disinterested archivists for this 
purpose by every President since Hoover. --------- -- ---------· JI The court declined to consider the possible effect on its 
analysis of public access to the materials after processing. 
The court believed such consideration to be premature, since 
•t regulations within the authority of the Act might well restrict 
public access for a period of years or until the death of 
appellant and others participating in the communications 
(J.S. App. 18a-3la). 
13. 
2. Contentions: Appellant claims that the Act is 
contrary to the principles set down in United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. at 705-708, 713-714, because it involves a greater 
intrusion, is not confined in scope to "a limited number of 
conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on. 
pending criminal cases," and has the effect of shifting the 
burden to appellant to defend Presidential confidentiality. 
Appellant suggests that the Act will have a chilling effect 
on the candor of advice given by a Presidential adviser (1) by 
requiring screening by archivists who, unlike prosecutors and 
grand juries, are not sworn to secrecy, and (2) by holding open 
the possibility that the public may be given future access 
after the President has left office. 
Appellant says it was wrong for the DC to decline to 
consider the impact of public access on grounds of ripeness, 
since the mere possibility of such access is detrimental, and 
since it is unrealistic to expect appellant to challenge and 
litigate possible public disclosures on a piecemeal basis. 
He relies on Buckl~ v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612, 666 n. 113 
(Question 7(a)), 693 n. 177 (Questions 8(c), 8(d), 8(e)) (1976). 
The SG believes that a former President's materials -concerning the communications essential to the conduct of his 
office are p..E__esump~ly privileged, and that the privilege -is one that the former President can assert. But he argues that 




the business of government requires tha1/ ~
/ the President and executive officials have access to the papers ? 
of a former President and submits that no claim of privilege 
can hinder this access. 
The SG claims that public access is not imminent; only 
appellant, officials of the Executive Branch, and archivists 
whom the Act contemplates will perform the screening will have 
access. He suggests that screening by archivists is not 
meaningfully different from screening by a court in camera, and 
asserts that in any event only a small portion of the materials 
could be subject to a legitimate claim of privilege by appellant. 
The SG contends that questions concerning particular 
screening techniques and eventual public access are premature, 
and finds no support for appellant's apparent belief that his 
legitimate interests will be overlooked when he seeks judicial 
review of the regulations that ultimately become effective. 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, et al, 
adds the contention that under the rule of United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953), the fact that the executive 
branch has not only refused to endorse appellant's "separation 
of powers" and "executive privilege" claims, but is actively 
opposing them as well, precludes him from advancing such 
contentions as a private citizen. 
3. Discussion: The DC ruled narrowly, insisting that 
the question be resolved by analyzing with particularity the 
• extent to which the Act prevents the Executive Branch from 
performing its assigned functions and whether such impact 
on the executive as exists is justified by the need to pursue 
' 
..,...,,... '.-.,•,:;.--- -
complete historical record seems sound. 
In asking this Court to reverse, appellant ignores the 
I 
DC's observations that he is the former President and that the 
incumbent supports this Act. But the values he urges upon the 
Court, particularly the value of candid and even blunt discus-
sion within the executive branch, are values that the present 
administration has a continuing interest in asserting . In the 
course of reiterating its duty to "say what the law is," the 
Court in Nixon said: "In the performance of assigned 
constitutional duties each branch of the Government must 
initially interpret the Constitution and the interpretation of 
its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others." 
418 UoS. at 703. That principle seems especially appropriate 
here, where no clash between branches of government is involved. 
The asserted problem here is that the incumbent President is 
being too generous with Congress in the disposition of his 
predecessor's papers; appellant is in the position 0f asking 
the Court to save the President from himself. There might be 
circumstances, as the SG suggests, where the Court would be 
persuaded that the President was giving away too much to 
Congress, but I doubt that this is the case for drawing such 
'a line. 
16. 
The DC addressed the ripeness for consideration of public 
access to the materials in a lengthy introduction to its 
discussion of appellant's claims (J.S. App. 18a-31a), but 
appellant raises it primarily within the context of his claim 
of executive privilege. The DC rested its refusal to consider 
the effect of public access on two grounds: (1) that appellant's 
objections might well be mooted by regulations within the 
authority of the Administrator; and (2) that judicial review 
was available under§ 105(a) of the Act in the event that a 
particular regulation or an entire set of regulations might be 
constitutionally defective. This approach seems valid, and is 
in one way favorable to appellant, since it effectively invites 
regulations more solicitous of his interests. It is entirely 
consistent with Buckley, see 96 S.Ct. at 665, 680-81. 
C. Privacy 
1. Holding: The DC held that the Act does not on its --
face violate appellant's constitutional right of privacy. The 
court viewed that right as one governed by the Fourth Amend-
ment (J.S. App. 67a-89a). It found that intermingled in the 
. ~ ~rials were so".1" - incl ·1ding correspondence between 
r~~ppellant and his family, physician, lawyer, clergyman and 
~ close friends - with respect to which appellant had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy, but held that the intrusion into those 
materials that was authorized by the Act was reasonable. 
Considering the warrant requirement inapplicable, the court 
17. 
tested reasonableness by balancing the need for the intrusion 
against the invasion which the intrusion entails. See Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
The court found that while precise estimates were impossible, 
. appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a very 
large percentage of the materials, and the public interests 
served by the Act affected a very large percentage of the non-
private materials. The court compared the Act's imposition on 
the private documents and conversations that are interspersed 
among the materials to the imposition on privacy caused by 
wiretapping under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act. Conceding that the Omnibus Act requires a 
warrant detailed with some specificity, the court nonetheless 
cited statistics to show that the "percentage of total intrusions 
related to statutory objectives" was strikingly higher under 
the Omnibus Act than under the Act before the court. 
The court observed that the infringement of privacy caused 
by review by archivists was less wide-ranging than that resulting 
from ordinary criminal investigation, and that use of information 
derived from archival processing in criminal prosecutions might 
well be prohibited, either by the "public access" regulations 
or by judicial construction of those regulations, "were it 
thought constitutionally compelled". 
~ 
The court reiterated, however, that it was considering 
on-2:z t~2:_;:;,!:_on~- qu;_st.!;,'.'._ns raised w7th ~spect ~ the -------
process by which the screening would be performed, since any 
r---- -
I 
claim of infringement of privacy by possible public access 
was premature. (J.S. App. 68a-69a). 
2. Contentions: Appellant claims that it was wrong to 
limit the measure of the Act's invasion of privacy to 
"reasonableness." He cites such decisions as Roe v. Wade, 
l.O • 
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), to demonstrate that even where the warrant requirement 
is inapplicable the Constitution protects privacy from infringe-
ment by legislative enactment. He cites Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41 (1967), to demonstrate that the wiretapping analogy 
relied on by the DC is in fact favorable to him; Berger struck 
down a New York statute for failure to impose "precise and 
discriminate" standards, standards which appellant contends 
pervade the Safe Streets Act but are missing from the 
Act he contests here. 
Appellant claims that the DC undervalued the privacy 
interest at stake. He notes that the materials encompass "all 
the papers and effects of [his] life covering a five-and-one-
half year period" embodying his "entire personal, political 
and official life." Focusing on the recorded conversations, 
he argues that he reasonably expected all of them to be private. 
Citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 708, he complains 
that the court unfairly distinguished between "official" and 
"personal and family" conversations in defining the ratio of 
private to nonprivate conversations. 
Appellant claims that the DC also underestimated the 
intrusion on privacy worked by the Act. He argues that the 
19. 
court's reliance on the professionalism and discretion of 
government archivists is unwarranted both by Fourth Amendment 
principles and by practical realities; the commitment of govern-
ment archivists to public access, demonstrated by their member-
s 
. ship in the organizations contesting appellant's claims, is 
signj_ficar).ce. 
such that they cannot be neutral in deciding what has historical I 
The SG expresses doubt whether any constitutionally 
generated or protected privacy interest exists in the materials. 
Cf. Paul v. Davis, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1.167 (1976). Even assuming 
such an interest, the SG goes beyond the DC in minimizing it. 
He contends that the President is the quintessential "public 
figure" and has no privacy interest in the way he conducted 
his office, see Unifor:lsanitation Men v. Sanitation Commissioner, 
392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968). Any privacy interest he might have 
would pertain to only a few of the materials in issue, and 
would be outweighed by the strong public interest in preserving 
the others, which Congress reasonably perceived might be 
jeopardized if appellant had the sole right to screen out the 
"private" from the "public." 
The SG claims that Congress took pains to mitigate the 
problems raised by appellant: it recognized the need to return 
to him all materials not related to theabuses of power known 
as Watergate and not of general historical significance 
(§ 104(a)(7)), and contemplated screening by disinterested 
, 6. The American Historical Association was among the intervenors 
in the DC proceedings. 
y 
20. 
archivists that would be no more intrusive than in camera 
inspection by a court, see Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 
No. 74-489 (April 21, 1976). 
Finally the SG agrees with the court that more particularized 
claims can be made once the regulations have become effective. 
3. Discussion: The DC found this to be the most trouble-
some aspect of the case, but it is hard to see how it could have 
done otherwise than reject appellant's contentions. Appellant 
probably has a legitimate privacy interest in many of the 
materials, but I think the DC is right that, at least so far as 
screening requires, appellant's privacy must yield to the public 
interests in preserving historically significant materials. 
There is a danger that government archivists will err on the 
side of historical preservation in deciding what materials are 
deserving of continuing public custody. But the danger that 
appellant would, if entrusted with the screening, err the other 
way is at least as great. Appellant can still challenge any 
over-expansive definition of "historical significance" when 
regulations become final, and particular classifications when 
t~~ screening occurs. 
D. Free Speech and Association 
1. Holding: The DC found no basis whatsoever for 
upholding appellant's challenge to the Act on First Amendment 
grounds (J.S. App. 89a-93a). The court took the gravamen of 
appellent's challenge to be the harm to appellant's associa-
tional privacy caused by disclosure of the materials. 
\,.__,/ 
,\ . ..,.... ~--~, ........ -~- - -
21. 
Using analysis similar to that with which it has approached 
the privacy claim, the court reasoned that although the great 
bulk of the materials appeared to be unrelated to appellant's 
constitutional interests, he probably had a legitimate 
expectation that he would be able to remove some of the 
sensitive political documents before government screening took 
place. Again refusing to explore the effect of possible public 
access, the court held that any burden to appellant's right of 
free association arising solely from archival screening was not 
significant, and certainly not significant enough to ou~weigh 
the countervailing government interests. 
2. Contentions: Appellant says that the DC holding 
establishes the principle that Congress, for the sake of 
preserving the historical record and informing Congress and 
the public about "abuses of power", may seize all records 
of the President's political activities and communications, 
have them reviewed and classified by government personnel, and 
place upon the individual the burden of contesting, as to each 
and every document or recording, whether it shall be made public. 
He relies on Buckley v. Valeo, 96 Sup. Ct. at 656, for the 
proposition that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously 
infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by 
the First Amendment", and argues that the governmental interests 
that the DC relied on cannot survive the "exacting scrutiny" 
, required by Buckley. 
22. 
The SG also cites Buckley - for its recognition that 
"particularly when the 'free functioning of our national 
institutions' is involved," the need for disclosure may outweigh 
the First Amendment interests. Id. at 657. He agrees with 
the court that the initial screening of the materials by govern-
ment archivists will not prevent other individuals from associating 
with appellant or deter him from expressing himself on public 
issues. He adds that the Act will only allow public access to 
materials related to Watergate or having general historical 
significance. 
The brief for Lillian Hellman, il aL, appellees, characterizes 
the First Amendment claim as "bizarre," and argues that an 
ex-President has no First Amendment right to hide his conduct 
in office from the people; rather, the people have a First 
Amendment right to an accounting from him, see Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
3. Discussion: Appellant. has not made it clear how his 
rights of association are burdened by the Act. But the fact 
that appellan~'s privacy interest in some of the materials may 
have its roots in the First as well as the Fourth Amendment 
does not tip the balance in his favor. Whatever its source, 
the privacy interest is limited to materials with which appellant 
had personal contact, and among those, to materials which do not 
pertain to appellant's use or abuse of his public trusts. The 
intrusion on the privacy of those materials seems fully justified 
by the public interest in preserving all the rest. 
23. 
E. Equal protection 
1. Holding: The DC held that the Act does not deny 
appellant equal protection by singling out the papers of his 
presidency for its coverage (J.S. App. 93a-97a). The court 
believed that appellant's unique status as the only President 
who had terminated his service but had not established a 
presidential library justified treating his papers differently. 
2. Contentions: Appellant claims that whatever legitimate 
interests apply to appellant's papers apply equally to his 
predecessors' and to the incumbent's, and that by singling 
appellant out by name for different treatment Congress has 
violated the longstanding rule that "all persons similarly 
circumstanced shall be treated alike." Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). 
The SG says there is nothing tothis claim: because 
appellant is the only President to resign, and the only one 
whose papers pose an immediate problem with which Congress can 
grapple, the classification is rational and responds to the 
nature of the problem presented. He relies on City of New 
Orleans v. Dukes, No. 74-775 (June 25, 1976). 
3. Discussion: The DC and the SG are right. Appellant's 
equal protection claim is frivolous. 
F. Pains and penalties 
1. Holding: The DC found no evidence in the legislative 
record or in the provisions of the Act to support the claim that 
the Act was designed to impose, or constitutes, punishment 
within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause. (J.S. 
App. 97a-103a). The court found instead ample evidence that 
Congress cared about regulating how the materials would be 
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treated in the future in order to assure that such treatment would 
be consistent with the congressional perception of the public 
interests. The court considered this conclusion to be reinforced 
by sections of the Act creating or taking into consideration 
the right of appellant to contest legal process directed at the 
materials, to obtain eventual custody of all materials unnecessary 
to further legislative ends, to have interim access to all the 
. materials, to have expedited judicial review of any claimed 
infringement of rights, and to receive full compensation for 
any deprivation of private property. (§§ 102(a),(c), 104(a), 
105 (a)/c)) 
2. Contentions: Appellant argues that the Act was plainly 
devised to impose unique disabilities on a single individual 
as the culmination of an extraordinary series of events. By 
limiting coverage of the Act to the period of appellant's 
term of office and by naming appellant specifically, appellant 
claims, the Act violates the rule of United States v. Brown, 
381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965), that Congress can enact "a generally 
applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain 
acts or possesses certain characteristics" is subject to the 
statute, but cannot "designat[e] the persons who possess the 
feared characteristics." 
25. 
The SG agrees with the DC that there is no evidence of 
punitive intent, and that the Act's protection of appellant's 
right to purely personal materials and its assurance of just 
compensation negate the claim that the Act is a bill of pains 
and penalties. 
The SG finds support for this position in Flemming v. Nestor, 
363 U.S. 603, 614 (1960), and United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 
at 441-446. 
3. Discussion: The Act is plainly not punitive. 
Appellant's reliance on United States v. Brown, which involved 
an Act making it a crime for a Communist to serve as an officer 
or employee of a labor union, is misplaced. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I think this Court should affirm summarily, for the 
following reasons: (1) As the above comments indicate, I think 
the DC was correct in each of its holdings. (2) The issues 
involved in the case are, despite appellant's efforts to state 
them in sweeping terms, limited to a unique 
to meet a unique problem; they are unlikely ,, 
enactment designed 
. ~ to recur again. 
,'-
(3) The DC has given appellant royal treatment and has all 
but promised him a similar reception once the "public access" · 
regulations become effective. (4) A summary affirmance here 
does not foreclose plenary review by this Court of many of 
appellant's contentions in a more concrete controversy after 
regulations become effective. 
~ blt-Ul-~ ~ ~(Pv#W-~ ~ ) 
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There are motions to affirm from the SG and from the 
motions to dismiss or affirm fro 
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June 16, 1977 
Re: 75-1605 - Nixon v. Administrator, GSA 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
When the "returns" are all in, I will be making some 
changes. Among others will be an insert along the 
following lines: 
"Assuming, arguendo, that Congress by statute 
can assume control of Presidential work papers, 
over objection, without trespassing separation of 
powers principles, that can be done only by 
legislation consistent with this Court's holdings 
in Cummings, Garland, Lovett and Brown, especially 
the latter two cases. The National Study Commission 
on Records and Documents of Federal Officials 
proposes such legislation under Title II of the Act. 
I can see no rational accommodation between what 
the Court holds today and what Justice Black stated 
for the Court in Lovett and what Chief Justice Warren 
stated in Brown. 
"That some members of the Court disagree 
with Lovett and Brown does not render those 
holdings less binding on us if we pay more than 
lip service to stare decisis. If a majority 
disagrees with the Black-Warren view of the Bill 
of Attainder issue, we should frankly overrule 
those cases, not brush them 'under the rug.' 
What the Court does today is analogous to what the 
Court said Congress could not constitutionally 
do in Lovett and Brown. Perhaps this is holding 
a 'ticket' good for one day and one way only --
and for but one man. Here the Court elects to 
join Congress to 'punish' one man by a 
legislative judgment for misdeeds, without notice, 
without hearing, or without trial." 
- 2 -
Depending on how the tension between Bill's view 
and Byron's is resolved, I may wind up concurring in 
part and in the judgment -- that is on a sharply 











To: The Chier Justice 
Ur. Justice Brenn~ 
l!r. Justice Stew-ar 
Hr. Justice Whit0 
Mr. Ju:,tice Marshall 
Mr. Just1ce Blaokraun 
Mr. Justice PoweH/ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
The statute before the Court does not .apply to all 
Presidents or former Presidents. It singl~s out one, by 
name, for special treatment. Unlike all other former 
Presidents in our history, he is denied custody of his 
own Presidential papers; he is subjected to the burden of 
prolonged litigation over the administration of the statute; 
and his most private papers and conversations are to be 
scrutinizeo. .by government_archivists. The statute implicitly 
condemns him as an unreliable custodian of his papers. 
Legislation which subjects a named individual to this 
humiliating treatment must raise serious questions under 
the Bill of Attainder Clause. 
Bills of Attainder were typically directed at once 
powerful leaders of government. By special legislative acts, 
Parliament deprived one statesman after another of his repu-
tation, his property, and his potential for future leadership. 
The motivation for such bills was as much political as it 
was punitive--and often the victims were those who had been 
the most relentless in attacking their political enemies at 
t' 















the height of their own power. In light of this history, 
legislation like that before us must be scrutinized with 
great care. 
Our cases "stand for the proposition that legislative 
acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named 
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in 
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial 
trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution." 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314. The concept of 
punishment involves not only the character of the deprivation, 
but also the manner in which that deprivation is imposed. It 
has been held permissible for Congress to deprive Communist 
deportees, as a group, of their social security benefits, 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, but it would surely be a 
bill of attainder for· Congress--to deprive a single, named 
individual of the same benefit. Id., at 614. The very 
specificity of the statute would~mark it as punishment, for 
1/ 
of 
At the debate on the impeachment of the Earl of Danby, 
Carnarvon recounted this history: , 
My Lords, I understand but little of Latin, but a good deal 
of English, and not a little of the English history, from which 
I have' learnt the mischiefs of such kind of prosecutions as 
these, and the ill fate of the prosecutors. I shall go no farther 
back than the latter end of Quern Elizabeth's reign: At which 
time the Earl of Essex was run down by Sir Walter R:ilcigh, 
and your Lordships very well know what became of Sir Walter 
Raleigh. My Lord Bacon, he ran down Sir Walter Raleigh, 
and your Lordships know what became of my Lord Bacon. 
The Duke of Buckingh:im,29 he ran down my Lord Bacon, 
and your Lordships know what happened to the Duke of 
· Buckingham. Sir Thomas Wentworth, afterwards Earl of 
Strafford, ran down the Duke of Buckingh:im, and you all 
know what became of him. Sir Harry Vane, he ran down the 
Earl of Strafford, and your Lordships know what became of 
Sir Harry Vane. Chancellor Hyde, he ran down Sir Harry 
Vane, and your Lordships know what became of the Chancel-
lor. Sir Thomas Osborne, now E:irl of Danby, r:in down Ch:in-
cellor Hyde; but wh:it will become of the Earl of Danby, your 
Lordships best can tell. But let me sec that man that d:irc run 
the Earl of Danby down, and wc shall soon sec what will be-
come of him. 







there is rarely any valid reason for such narrow legislation; 
and normally, the Constitution requires Congress to proceed 
by general rulemaking rather than by deciding individual 
cases. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-445. 
Like the Court, however, I am persuaded that "appellant 
constituted a legitimate class of one. II Ante, at 44. 
The opinion of the Court leaves unmentioned the two facts , 
which I consider decisive in this regard. Appellant resigned 
2/ 
his office under unique circumstances and accepted a pardon-
for his offenses committed while in office. By doing so, he 
placed himself in a class different from all other Presidents. 
Cf. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 90-91. Even though un-
mentioned, it would be unrealistic to assume that historic 
facts of this consequence did not affect the legislative 
3/ 
decision.-
If I did not consider it appropriate to take judicial 
notice of those facts, I would be unwilling to uphold the 
power of Congress to enact special legislation directed only 
at one former President at a time when his popularity was at 
its nadir. For even when it deals with Presidents or former 
'!:._/ See Burdick v. United Stat es, 236 U.S. 79, 94. 
i/ Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390: 
"That Charles 1st. king of England, was beheaded; 
that Oliver Cromwell was Protecter of England; that 
Louis 16th, late King of France was guillotined; are 
all facts, that have happened; but it would be non~ 
sense to suppose, that the States were prohibited 
from making any law after either of these events, 
and with reference thereto." 
- 3 -
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Presidents, the legislative focus should be upon "the calling" 
rather than "the person." Cf. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 
277, 320. In short, in my view, this case will not be a pre~ 
cedent for future legislation which relates; not to the Office 
of President, but just to one of its occupants. 
Without imputing a similar reservation to the Court, I 
join its opinion with the qualification th~t these unmentioned 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
~u:pum:t ~trttd trf flrt 'Jlinitth ~ta.ttg 
~aa!pnghttt, J. ~. 20f)l.~ 
June 17, 1977 
Re: 75-1605 - Nixon v. Administrator, GSA 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
/ 
To amplify the last point of my memorandum of 
June 16 I may concur on the privacy issue, depending 
on how the tension between Bill's view and Byron's 
is resolved over the immediate return of appellant's 
personal materials -- selected out by him or his 
representatives. Even if the Act is not 
unconstitutional on its face, as I believe it is, 
it is so as applied -- if we are to give heed to all 
the things we have been saying about privacy. In 
short, I would join that part of a Court opinion to the 
effect that the purely personal papers must be returned 








JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
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'Jll!rrurfyi:nghm. tB. <!J. 2ogrJ.1~ 
June 17, 1977, 
Re: No. 75-1605, Nixon v. Administrator 
of General Services 
Dear Bill, 
The changes that you propose to make in 
response to Byron's suggestions are all accepta-
ble to me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr o Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,§upr tm:e ~o-ttrl .crf tltt ~f:tb- .:§mf:tg 
~ag-.qmghtn, to. ~. 2llffe.l!.;l 
June 17, 1977 
Re: 75-1605 - Nixon v. Administrator 
Dear Bill: 
Although I am not yet completely at rest in 
this case, the enclosed draft represents what I 
presently contemplate filing. 
Enclosure 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 17, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-1605 Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services 
I have sent to the printer the attached footnote, 
which will appear at the end of the first sentence of 




No. 75-1605 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services 
Footnote to appear at the end of the first sentence 
of the first full paragraph on page 2. 
I am not unmindful of the excesses of Watergate, and 
of the impetus it gave to this legislation. However, the 
Court's opinion does not set forth a principled distinction 
that would limit the constitutionality of an Act such as 
this to President Nixon's papers. Absent such a distinction: 
"The emotional aspects of a case make it 
difficult to decide dispassionately, but 
do not qualify our obligation to apply the 
law with an eye to the future as well as 
with concern for the result in a particular 
case before us." Brewer v. Williams, 
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I concur in the judgment and, except for Part VII, 
in the Court's opinion. With respect to the bill of attainder 
issue, I concur iq the result reached in Part VII; the statute 
does not impose "punishment" and is not, therefore, a bill of 
attainder. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462 (1 965) 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). I also append the following observa-
tions with respect to one of the many issues in this case. 
It is conceded by all concerned that a very small portion 
of the vast collection of presidential materials now in posses s i on 
of the Administra t or consists of purely private materials, such as 
diaries, recordings of family conversations, private cor respon -
dence -- "personal property of any kind not involving the actua l 
transaction of government business." Tr. Oral Arg. 55. It is als o 
conceded by the United States and the other respondents that t hese 
private materials, once identified, must be returned to Mr. Nixon . 







Government, without awaiting a court order, should promptly 
disclaim any interest in materials conceded to be appellant's 
purely private communications and deliver them to him." Ante, 
at 31-32 n. 22. I agree that the separation and return of these 
materials should proceed without delay. Furthermore, even if 
under the Act this process can occur only after the issuance of 
regulations under§ 104 that are subject to congressional ap-
proval, surely regulations covering this narrow subject matter 
need not take long to effectuate. 
Also, § 104(a)(7) suggests the private materials to be 
returned to Mr. Nixon are limited to those that "are not otherwise 
of general historical significance.'' But, as I see it, the 
validity of the Act would be questionable if mere historical sig-
nificance sufficed to withhold purely private letters or diaries; 
and in view of the other provisions of the Act, particularly 
§ 104(a)(5), it need not be so construed. Purely private materials, 
whether or not of historical interest, are to be delivered to 
Mr. Nixon. The United States and the other respondents conceded as 
*I 
much at oral argument. 
Similarly, although the Court relies to some extent on the 
statutory recognition of the constitutional right to compensation 
in the event it is determined that the Government has confiscated 
, 
Mr. Nixon's property, I would question whether a mere historical 
Nixon 
- 3 -
interest in purely private communications would be a sufficient 
predicate for taking them for public use. Historical consider-
ations are normally sufficient grounds for condemning property, 
United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); 
Roe v. Kansas, 278 U.S. 191 (1929); but whatever may be true of 
the great bulk of the materials in the event they are declared to 
be Mr. Nixon's property, I doubt that the Government is entitled 
to his purely private communications merely because it wants to 
preserve them and offers compensation. 
< 
,· .. ' 
No. 75-1605 - Nixon v. Administrator of General Services 
FOOTNOTE 
·k/ 
"QUESTION: Well now, suppose Mr. Nixon 
has prepared a diary every day and put down 
what, exactly what he did, and let's suppose 
someone thought that was a purely personal 
account. Now, I can just imagine that someone 
might think that it nevertheless is of general 
historical significance. 
•J> 
"MR. McCREE: May I refer the Court to need 
No. 5? 'The need to protect any party's op-
portunity to assert any legally or constitutionally 
based right or privilege which would prevent or 
otherwise limit access to such recordings and ma-
terials' . 
"And I submit that this Act affords Richard 
M. Nixon the opportunity to assert the contention 
that this ~iary of his is personal and has not the 
kind of general historical significance that will 
permit his deprivation; and that would then have 
to be adjudicated in a court. 
"QUESTION: Well, do-
"MR. McCREE: And ultimately this Court will 
answer that question. 
"QUESTION: Well, how do you-so you would 
agree, then, that 104 must be construed-must be 
construed to sooner or later return to Mr. Nixon 
what we might call purely private papers? 
"MR. McCREE: Indeed I do. 
"QUESTION: Can you imagine any diary-thinking 
of Mr. Truman's diary, which, it is reported, was a 
result of being dictated every evening, after the 
day's work-can you conceive of any such material 
that would not be of general historical interest? 
Nixon 
fn. page 2 
fn. continued/ 
"MR. McCREE: I must concede, being acquainted 
with some historians, that it's difficult to con-
ceive of anything that might not be of historical 
interest. But-
" [Laughter. ] 
"QUESTION: Yes. Archivists and historians, 
like journalists,-
''MR. McCREE: Indeed they are. 
"QUESTION: -think that everything is. 
"[Laughter.] 
"MR. McCREE: But this legislation recognizes 
that a claim of privacy, a claim of privilege must 
be protected, and if the regulations are insufficient 
to do that, again a court wi ll have an opportunity 
to address itself to a particular item such as the 
diary before it can be turned over. 
"And for that reason, we suggest that the attack 
at this time is premature because the statute, in 
recognizing the right of privacy, is facially adequate. 
And the attack that was made the day after it became 
effective brought to this Court a marvelous opportunity 
to speculate about what might happen, but the regula-
tions haven't even been promulgated and acquiesced in 
so that they have become effective." Tr. 38-40. 
"[Mr. HERZSTEIN, for the private respondents:] 
"But there's just no question about the return of 
personal diaries, Dictabelts, so long as they are not 
the materials involved in the transaction of government 
business. 
"Now, the statute, I agree, could have been drafted 
a little more clearly, but we think there are several 
points which make it quite clear that his personal ma-




.• r •:, 
Nixon 
fn. page 3 
fn. continued/ 
"One is the fact that statute refers to the 
presidential historical materials of Richard Nixon, 
not to the person [sic] or private materials. 
"The second is that, as Judge McCree mentioned, 
criterion 7 calls for a return of materials to him, 
and if you read those two in conjunction with the 
legislative history, there are statements on the 
Floor of the Senate, on the Floor of the House, and 
in the Committee Reports, indicating the expectation 
that Nixon's personal records would be returned to 
him. 
"QUESTION: Could you give us a capsule summary 
of the difference between what you have just referred 
t o as Nixon's personal records, which will be return-
ed , and the matter which will not be returned? 
"MR. HERZSTEIN: Well, yes. Certainly any personal 
letters, among his family or friends, certainly a diary 
made at the end of the day, as it were, after the event-
"QUESTION: Even though the Dictabelt was paid for 
out of White House appropriations? 
''MR. HERZSTEIN: That's right. 
us. I think it's incidental now. 
different view on the tapes, which 
transaction of government business 
on government time and so on. The 
heard so much about. 
That doesn't bother 
But we do have a 
actually recorded the 
by government employees 
normal tapes that we've 
"The Dictabelts, Mr. Nixon has said, are his personal 
diary . Instead of writing it down, in other words, he 
dictated it at the end of the day. And we think that's-
"QUESTION: I want to be sure about that concession, 
because this certainly is of historical interest. 
"MR . HERZSTEIN: That ' s right, it is, but we do not 
f eel it ' s covered by the statute. We have acknowledged 
t hat from the start. 
., 
Nixon 
fn. page 4 
fn. continued/ 
"QUESTION: Is this concession shared by the 
Solicitor General, do you think? 
"MR. HERZSTEIN: We believe it is. 
"QUESTION: What about that? 
"MR. McCREE: About the fact that the paper 
belongs to the government and so forth, we don't 
believe that makes a docun1ent a government docu-
ments [sic]. We certainly agree with that. 
"Beyond that, if the Court please-
"QUESTION: What about the Dictabelts representing 
his daily diary? 
"MR. McCREE: I would think that's a personal 
matter that would be-should be returned to him once 
it was identified. 
"QUESTION: Well, is there any problem about, 
right this very minute, of picking those up and giving 
them back to Mr. Nixon? 
"MR. McCREE: I know of no problem. Whether it 
would have to await the adoption of the regulation, 
which has been stymied by Mr. Nixon's lawsuit, which has 
been delayed for three years,-
"QUESTION: How has that stymied the issuance of 
regulations, Mr. Solicitor General? 
"MR. McCREE: One of the dispositions of the 
district court was to stay the effectiveness of regulations. 
Now, I think it held up principally the regulations for 
public access. The other regulations are not part of this 
record, and I cannot speak to the Court with any knowledge 
about them." Tr. 57-58. 
~u.puuu <!Jottrl cf tfyt ~th ~taug 
jlrrurfriu:gtctt, IO. QJ. 2llffe~2 
CHAM BER S O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 20, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-1605 Nixon v. GSA 
I plan to make fairly substantial revisions in my 
present dissenting opinion in this case in response to 
John's separate opinion, circulated on Friday, and Lewis' 
separate opinion, which I saw for the first time today. 
I will attempt to have the entire revised draft circu-











June 22, 1977 
No. 75-1605 Nixon v. GSA 
Dear Bill: 
In accordance with our telephone conversation, I was 
happy to review your fine opinion again, and compare it with 
what I have written. 
As you now have a Court for all of your substantive 
parts, I hope you will not mind my not joining you in Parts 
IV and V. While I agree with most of what you have written, 
there are some points of minor tension when compared with 
what I have written with respect to privilege and privacy. 
A second draft of my opinion is being circulated today. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
~·· .. . . 
Rider, p. 13 , n. 5, before Youngstown citation: 
__J__)' In a proper case under Article III this 
Court has recognized its obligation to decide 
whether Congressional actions comply with the 
specific limitations of Articles I and II regardless 
of the position taken by the Executive Branch. See 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); cf. Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). It is another 
matter for this Court to enforce Bresidential 
privileges not specified in the text of the 
Constitution when the President evidently believes 
that the interests of the Executive Branch lie 
elsewhere. Had President Nixon, for example, voluntarily 
surrendered the tapes at issue in Nixon I, I doubt 
that it seriously could have been argued that the 
Judicial Branch was without power to accept them. 
The same would be true of voluntary Presidential 
<?foe vwit ,,dr f 

































Moore v. City of East Cleveland and Nixon Tapes Case 
The attached draft of a letter of January 7, 1980, 
to Justice Brennan was never sent. It was written when he 
was commenting on what was said in The Brethren about these 
two cases. Bill apparently writes a summary each Term of 
what happened in cases considered to be most important. I 
have ne ver seen his current "memoirs", but his letter of 
January 3 - though substantially accurate with respect to my 
role in Moore - was inaccurate in several particulars with 










~/-~ 4 ~ ~ 
-~~- ~4' ~~ 
~ ~ -~'~Jl/1J~~,.✓/ 
 January 7, 1980 -· ~ 
,._,,/ /-h..t_ j A---/: /_A . ~
~// ~---: Moore-v;·eitv · of·East-eleveland 
 ~ ~1-~ ~-----~-----------
Dear Bi 11: ~ ;1A../ T ~ ~ 
~1-s~ 
1-v ~-
;(___ r. r/. 
Thank you for your full letter of January 3, that 
contains a complete record of how the opinions in the~ 
~ 
case were developed. 
I\ 
Although the caTe is hardly important enouqh to be 
of any interest to future historians who write about the 
Court, I think it is just as well that our respective files 
document the facts. 
\ 
I am also glad that you included in your letter the 
final two or three paragraphs. Although they were quite 
I 
unnecessary so far as I am concerned, again it is prudent -
..~ ...... ~ ~ 
·,-, r . 
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for the benefit of whoever may look into these matters in the 
distant future - ' for youf to record the facts.jrncidentally, 
Woodward's description of my role in the T5pes~ease, 
including his account of what transpired between you and me, 
also is far from the truth. You were entirely supportive of 
the memorandum I circulated except we did differ as to how to 
s~ 
describe the qualified privilege of a President. Memoranda 
I\ 
that I pr~?ared well before the argument (~e-ed, I had 
commenced worked on the case the preceding summer following 
~ 
Johnny Sirica's decision), make clear ~ -in my view~t-h~ 
presidential privilege could not defeat the need for evidence 
in a trial such as the Tapes~ease.frndeed, we were all of 
one mind about the result, and the precise language adopted 
in describing the privilege - though not ideal from my 
viewpoint - reflected a reasonable accommodation of the views 
of all of us. 
- _·;e 
-·- - -. . ' 
3. 
I was proud of the way the Court ' functioned in the 
Tapes-ease, and thought then - and still do - that each 
member of the Court participated responsibly and 
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No. 75-1605 2 Nixon v. Administrator, General Services 
1. Separation of Powers/Privilege: 
For Unconstitutionality: The Act works an 
unprecedented invasion on the autonomy of the Executive 
Branch. By throwing open the papers of a past president 
to any agency of the Executive Branch, (§l02(d)), the 
Act effectively assures release to the public of precisely 
those kinds of communications that the Presidential Privilege 
is designed to keep confidential. It endangers the 
free working of government by making clear to those 
who speak with the president or his close advisors that 
what they say may in the future be released to the press. 
The precedent may not be confined to the case of Richard 
Nixon's papers, but may reach the papers of any 
former pr esident, congressman, or Justice. 
Against Unconstitutionality: (1) Such intrusion 
on Executive Branch autonomy as is worked by the Act is 
no more than the Executive could accomplish by executive 
order. As the President signed this Act, defended 
it in the District Court, and defends :it in this Court, 
the effect of this Act of Congress is no more an invasion 
of executive autonomy than would be an equivalent executive 
order. The President may have a privilege that would 
defeat a similar provision if he chose to assert it, but 
in this case any privilege has been waived. This Court, 
while it may doubt the wisdom of the President's actions, 
is in no position to save the president from himself. 
(2) The prece~ent is exceedingly narrow. Based as it is 
on a waiver principle, and on the inability of this Court 
to declare the joint efforts of the other branches 
violative of presidential privilege, this decision will 
not bind the Court in a case where a president asserts 
the privilege against Congress or a court. Also, the Court 
passes now only on the facial validity of the Act, and not 
on any instance of its application or administration. 
2. 
2. Privacy: 
For Unconstitutionality: This Act is a 
quantum leap from any previous privacy case we have 
encountered in the degree of intrusion it works both 
into the liie of the individual focused on (Nixon) and 
into the lives of perfectly innocent people, including 
foreign diplomats, memb~es of congress, and advisors 
of government both official and private. While the 
Act may be aimed at legitimate goals, i t sweeps far 
too broadly in virtually assuring the release to the 
public of any information that has broad public interest. 
The Act's failure to assure the preservation of confidentiality 
makes it invalid. 
Un-
Agai nst/constitutionality: The vast majority 
of the papers do not involve confidential communications. 
The Act provides for screening by archivists whose 
reputation for cmfidentiality is impeccable, 
and it provides for regulations to further assure 
the protection of privacy interests. Private documents 
of the former president are to be returned to him. 
If confidentiality is not maintained there will be time 
enough to strike down the Act as it is administered. 
If the standards generally applicable to privacy intrusions 
are applied, the intrusion on Nixon's privacy -- like 
the intrusion worked by an extensive grand jury investigation 
is clearly permissible in light of its legitimate goals, i.e., 
to preserve important papers for the executive; and to 
preserve the historical record on Watergate. 
C.A. 
¾.~ a.f/,,,Jll..A.. ~1-.~~-<tC,c~ 
~ 
~ t,G- S/4 "6 ...... ;'. ,_ #kr; ~ 
~-- ~-L ..... -i• Jy ..,t. 0;.: 4' ,~~ ' 
' 
a. .e.C&--.A --✓ ~ 1-o ~ $ 
~ ,M,c .... J ~ ~/-o 4/c.·1 .A 44A¾'-r"<'~. 
7Z.·;,1 '', ~S ~-{-e 
~ ~ /~- (:s~~~fa•':'J..,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
,§uµumt QJllllrl .of flrt ~ilih .§Wt$ 
JD'iu,lpttgtan, 1I). QJ. 211ffe'1'~ 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN,.JR. May 5, 1977 
RE: No. 75-1605, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your note of May 3 regarding the 
assignment of the above. I have decided to assign it 
to myself. 
The Chief Justice 
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CHAMBERS O F 
JU S TI C E WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~u:p-umt Qiourt of tqt ~nittb ~tattg 
~aslp:ngton. ~ . QI. 20~J!.~ 
June 3, 1977 
-
Re: No. 75-1605 Nixon v. GSA 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFEREN'CE 
I am circulating this draft "hot off the presses" so that 
you may have it for the weekend. It has not yet been proof-
read. In addition, I have just acquired a copy of the recently-
released Report of the National Study Commi_ssion on Records and 
Documents of Federal Officials, the body created by Title II 
of the Act before us to study the general problem of the dis-
position of federal documents. Because this Report is largely 
supportive of the conclusions reached in my opinion, I may wish 
to refer to it and therefore anticipate making some minor changes. 
W. J.B. Jr. 
'-,/ 
.:§ttprttttt <!Jcnrl af tltt ~t~ ~taftg 
~asfyittgfott, J. ~- 2IlffeJ!J . 
CHAMBERS OF / 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 6, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1605 - Nixon v. GSA 
Dear Bill: 
In the parlance of the shop, "in due course" I 
l 
will circulate a separate dissent addressing only the 
separation of powers and the just compensation clause 
as affected by the delay in the promulgation of the 
regulations. I will circulate it in Xerox form to speed 
things up. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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to: Justice Powell date: June 6, 1977 
from: Charlie 
/~~ -
Nixon .h../- J~ ~ l--0 
~;_;(- ck~ 
I have written extensive notes in the ~
margins of the attached opinions by Justice ~~ . 
Brennan and the Chief Justice. This memo will~. 
add a capsule summary of the positions taken 
by each of those opinions, and by the DC, on 
each of the major issues. 
I 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The first issue is whether the Act 
violates the separation of powers as a coercive 
intrusion by Congress on Presidential autonomy 
or independence. This question has essentially 
two parts: (i) whether the Act represents a 
forbidden intrusion by Congress into a field in 
which only the President can act under the 
Constitution; (ii) whether the Act represents 
a violation by Congress of the Presidential 
privilege to withhold confidential information 
from the other Branches. 
A. Presidential Independence. 
1. The DC: The DC held that the 
degree of presidential independence required by 
the Constitution, where the only claim of 
interference related to the disclosure of 
communi_cations, was to be measured by the 
doctrine of Presidential privilege. It 
held that if the Act did not violate the privilege, 
which was inextricably bound up in the separation 
of powers, it would not be invalid as a violation 
of Presidential independence. 
2. Justice Brennan: Justice Brennan takes 
a different approach, which suggests that the 
Act might violate separation of powers even if 
it did not violate Presidential privilege. The 
2. 
test, in Brennan's view, is whether the Act threatens 
to disrupt the Executive Branch by interfering 
with Executive functions and, if so, whether the 
disruption is justified by an overriding need to 
promote legitimate Congressional objectives. P. 
15. 
Applying this test Justice Brennan holds 
that the Act is not unduly disruptive of Executive 
Branch functions on its face, for two reasons: 
(i) The Act represents a joint effort by Congress 
and the Executive, having been signed by President 
. ,( vf',(' Ford and defended by both President Ford and 
f~'/. II/~ President Carter; it is thus a product of cooperation , 
J/ C.... -- .<1. UV vv' 
v,~ • y: ' rather t~ .'.::.;'~ercion in any sense. (ii) The ? I~, 
Act places the Executive Branch in full control; ) r,,.,IJ' ~ 
it makes no papers available to Congress, as opposed Jt, 




' . • 
executive power by Congress. The opinion 
leaves open the possibility that the public 
access regulations may violate separation of 
powers principles. P. 16. 
3. The Chief Justice: The Chief 
Justice holds that the Act violates separation 
3. 
of powers because it compromises the "constitutional 
autonomy of the Executive Branch" through the 
exercise of Congressional compulsion. He views 
the case as presenting issues no different than 
if the Act had been passed over a Presidential 
veto. P. 8. In his view the separation of 
powers is an absolute principle when it comes to 
a President's papers. The only exception is 
"narrowly limited" and relates to judicial inspection 
of particular documents when a constitutional 
need to inspect those documents arises. The 
Chief Justice views it as irrelevant that the 
Act is supported by the present incumbent and 
bears the signature of his immediate predecessor. 
He evidently believes that with respect to the ) ~ 
papers of past Administrations the former President ) 
continues to ho~d the power to speak for the ,,-~ · •~ 
"'vf.1/V"' ;I 
Executive Branch. P. 14 & n. 17. Nor does it • ;t;J--bl 
matter that the papers, so far as the Act's faci~l l,v,-
validity is concerned, remain in the Executive ("'YwJ..ti 
Branch, since the inferior departments of that 
Branch are "legislatively created". p. 7. 
4. Comment: The Chief is way off base. 
accept his 
Regardless of whether you/absolutist view of 
separation of powers, his view that cooperation 
between the Executive and the Legislative Branches 
can be enjoined by the Judicial Branch at the 
bequest of a former President is nonsense, so 
far a, separation of powers principles are con-
cerned. His logic would also invalidate a 
4. 
Presidential order or directive transferring Nixon's 
White House papers to GSA. 
Justice Brennan's opinion is limited to 
the situation where a former President qposes 
cooperation between the Presidency and Congress 
whose effect is to retain control by the Executive 
Branch over the former President I s papers, / J ~ 
_7- ,,,(-
Separation of powers does not call for Judie al ~~ 
.,) _j.,;r interference in this situation. 
.,, J,Y'-/' 
~ivv"~-~ ·~ B. Presidential Privilege. - -
/? ~ 
The DC held tra t there wa s ~ 1. The DC: 
no violation of the qualified Presidential 
privilege 
by the Act 
because the public interests served ~ 
9 b If, • 
outweighed the limited intrusion ~ ~-on whatever interest in Presidential confidentiality 
a former President was entitled to assert. 
2. Justice Brennan: Justice Brennan's 
opinion follows the DC's holding and reasoning. 
It assumes, without deciding, that a former 
President may assert Presididential privilege 
after he leaves office, but states that the 
5. 
assertion is severely undercut when the incumbent 1 :4- • · -rw:. , 
opposes it as in this case. P. 19. Following ...,Jwtj 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 706-707, trf,/4.;-;,;.-~_A 
~1~ 
the opinion states that the test is whether the .~ 
cost to Presidential confidentiality is outweighed 
by the impediment that recognition of the privilege 
would place in the way of legitimate constitutional 
duties of Congress. Because the Act keeps 
the documents within the Executive Branch, so far 
as the screening process is aoncerned, and because 
the incumbent and his immediate predecessor support 
the Act, the cost to Presidential confidentiality 
must be viewed as minimal, and is justified by 
the legitimate interests of Congress in preserving 
the materials for historic and investigative 
purposes. The opinion presumes that the archivists 
charged with the screening function will carry 
out their duties and preserve the confidentiality 
'. 
~J 
3. The Chief Justice: The Chief rejects 
the view that the needs of Congress should be ba 
against an assertion of Presidential privilege. 
In his view Presidential privilege is absolute, 
subject only to the exception recognized 
Nixon for narrow judicial inquiries. In 
view the former President is "the holder of the 
privilege" with respect to the papers of his 
own administration. P. 12. Thus Congress can 
no more enact this legislation than i t could 
6. 
force a former President to testify over his objection 
at a Congressional hearing. P. 15, & n. 18. 
4. Comment: The critical point, in my 
~ {hi'.~~~~ view, is tl:It: Ford and Carter have signed and 








r-t--... t.~ ),...,_,., I 
~~ 
-i, ~ 
defended the Act. I do not see how Nixon, under 
the banner of Presidential privilege, can stop ~~ 
his successors from following a policy o~i~h ~ ,/..1:-
Nixon disapproves ~ Nixon is in the position of~~ 
an attorney who asserts the attorney-client privil~ +,, 
lit· · !4-:,r 
,,..,,t,• ~. --..,_·6 
/<l·~~ ... 
J,.,4,rt-,i 
after his client has waived the privilege. It 
would be a different case if the Act had passed 
over a Presidential veto, or even if the President ~ ~~~~i(, 
~ had signed the Act but expressed the view that 
~,,,,..- -see, ~.c;,, l3ut'k r." v. V"'(eo 
~ it was a violation of Presidential privilege. J_ It 
~~-• 's would also be a different case if Nixon, being called 
~( ~ ~• _..,,., upon by Congress to testify to the contents .of the 
~~'"JtM 
~~~) papers (or to produce them), refused on the ground 








I· ' ,. 
would think that in that situation the 
former President would be presumed to speak 
( 
for the Executive Branch, absent an explicit 
waiver by the incumbent. 
interest of incumbent and -------is at stake, I think it is 
But since it is the 3 
future Presidents that 
clear that the incumbent, 
not the former President, should be regarded 
expressing 
aslthe views of the Executive Branch where the 
two diverge as in this case. And where the 
President and Congress agree on a joint course 
of action as in this case, I think this Court is 
without authority to intervene because the former 
President disapproves. 
What Justice Brennan has written is 
wholly consistent with these views, but he goes 
fu:ther and says that to the extent that the former 
Presidmt can assert the privilege in this situation, 
the claim is weak and the intrusion justified by 
valid interests. This has the effect of leaving 
a less rational 
open the possibility that/amcaxkxxxaxJ plan for 
disclosure of a past President's papers might 
be struck down even if the incumbent supported 
it. The precedent is thus limited not only -by the fact that Nixon is at odds with his two 
immediate successors, but by the historical cJi'hcu~stance ~ 
of a President resigning under the charge tha 





1. The DC: The DC held that the Act 
on its face does not violate Nixon's right to 
privacy under the First, Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. Considering only the screening 
process, the Court held that the intrusion on 
was 
8. 
privacy worked by screening the materials/outweighed 
by the need. 
2. Justice Brennan: Justice Brennan 
takes the same approach. Noting that only a 
fraction of the materials are truly private given 
Nixon's status as a public figure, he holds that 
the screening of t he materials is necessary to 
serve ·overriding governmental interests. He 
...,_ 
repeats that the archivists must be presumed to 
stresses 
perform their duty in a discrete manner and/that 
the Act -- as he construes it for the Court 
requires the return to Nixon of his private materials. 
P. 32. (lljJw-~- ~~~r-....,. •. ~ y ~~~-) 
3. The Chief Justice: The Chief views this 
as a case of compelled disclosure, like Buckley, 
and would hold that the government interests are 
not of overriding importance. He also analogizes 
the screening by archivists to a criminal search 
and states that the Act is invalid as a general warrant. 
,.,.. 
4. Comments: I do not expect you will 
have any trouble with this aspect of the case. 
The Chief's arguments are, in my view, silly. 
Compelled disclosure is not at issue here any 
more than it was in Whalen v. Roe, where the 
Court similarly presumed that public officials 
would perform their duty in a discreet manner. 
9. 
If the regulations provide for public disclosure 
of any private materials there will be time enough 
to decide their consitutionality on that basis. 
Since the purpose of the screening is to return 
private materials to Nixon that he left in the 
government's custody, the analogy to a general 
criminal warrant is inapplicable. 
III 
BILL OF ATTAINDER 
1. The DC: The DC found that the Act 
did not constitute punishment and therefore held 
that it was not an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. 
2. Justice Brennan goes into this issue 
in greater depth. Like the DC, he holds that 
the test is whether the Act constitutes the legislative 
imposition of punishment. He rejects the argument 
,~~½-
that legislation is a Bill of Attainder~if its 
effect is limited to an individual or class of 
identifiable individuals, a view that ''would 
cripple the very process of legislating." P. 42. 
Specificity of legislation is not in itself 
unconstitutional, and in this case "appellant 
constituted a legitimate class of one." P. 44. 
Turning to the punishment issue, Justice Brennan 
either 
finds that the Act is not within/the historic 
or the functional definitions of punishment. 
He says that historically the Bill of Attainder 
10. 
clause has been applied only to executions, imprisonment, 
banishment, confiscation of property, and 
exclusion from certain types of employment. Since 
the Act provides for "just compensation" for any 
deprivation of property it is not within the historic 
meaning of punishment under the Bill of Attainder 
Clause. Functionally, the Clause has been limited 
to legislative impositions that serve exclusively 
punitive purposes, i.e., deterrence, retribution 
and prevention or to impositions intended as punishment . 
Since the Act serves the independent purpose of 
preserving the historical record, and was not designed 
or intended to punish Nixon, it is not within the 
functional definition of punishment. 
3. The Chief Justice: The Chief Justice 
holds that the Act is a Bill of Attainder because 
it applies to Nixon alone among Presidents and 
deprives him of the ownership of his papers. The 
Chief says that by tradition, President's attain 
•, 
"' 
private ownership of their papers accumulated 
while in office. The deprivation of that 
ownership interest, out of fear that Nixon 
would destroy incriminating documents, is in the 
Chief's view enough to make the Act a Bill 
of Attainder. P. 31. 
4. Comment: I agree with Justice Brennan 
and the DC that the Act is not "punitive" in any 
established sense. Legislation may legitimately 
single out a class of one, see New Orleans v. Dukes, 
427 U.S. 297, overruling Morey v. Dowd , as long 
11. 
as the classification is permissible and serves reasonable 
nonpunitive goals. That test is plainly met here. 
The Chief gains some support from language in 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, where the 
Court held that it was a Exi:mexxa Bill of Attainder 
for Congress to punish communists by eisqualifying 
them, on pain of criminal penalties, from holding 
union office. But Brown's holding is consistent 
with Justice Brennan's approach, see his p. 47 n.39, 
and the case should not be read as dispensing with 
the requirement of punishment under the Clause. 
IV 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
The Chief holds that the Act violates 
Due P~ocess because it does SR not on its face 
provide for Nixon's participation in the screening 
process. This issue was not discussed by the DC, 
was not presented in the Jurisdictional Statement, 
and is not addressed by Justice Brennan. Since 
only the facial validity of the Act is presently 
before the Court, I believe the Chief's discussion 
of this issue is premature. If Nixon chooses to 
assert a right to participate in ·the screening 
process, there will be time enough for judicial 
consideration of that claim in the DC. 
******** 
For the reasons stated, I recorrnnend 




JUSTICE WM.J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~uµmttt Qflllttt .itf ±4t 'Jlnitdt ~taks 
Jniullpngfon. ~. <lt• 2.0ffe'l.;J 
June 6, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 75-1605 Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services 
I propose to add the following footnotes at appropriate 
places as a response to the dissent of the Chief Justice. 
1. The dissent's view of the separation of powers 
doctrine as an absolute prohibition against exercise of 
"coercive influence" by one branch over another, and against 
any interference with Presidential papers, see post at 7-10,was 
explicitly rejected in United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 
U.S., at 707, where it was said thai "In designing the 
structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the 
sovereign power among the three co-equal branches, the Framers 
of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, 
but the separate powers were not intended to operate with 
absolute independence." (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, 
United States v. Nixon recognized only a qualified executive 
~-
- 2 -
privilege in Presidential papers, which negates the dissent's 
view of an absolute Presidential privilege with a "narrowly 
limited exception." Post, at 9. In any event the dissent 
offers no explanation why the "narrowly limited exception" 
permits "coercion" of the Executive by the Judicial Branch 
but not "coercion" of the Executive Branch by the Legislative 
Branch, however slight and however subject to stringent judicial 
safeguards. In addition, in recognizing that Congress has 
exercised in numerous ways a conceded authority to limit, de-
fine, and deal with the activities and papers of the Executive 
Branch, the dissent offers no explanation for its proffered 
constitutional distinction between such regulations affecting 
Presidential papers and similar regulations affecting the 
papers of other Executive Branch agencies or officials, post 
at 4, a distinction at odds with the very cases on which the 
dissent relies. See,~-, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 
52, 117 (1926). Finally, virtually all of the dissent's argu-
ments are now premature, for it essentially ignores the fact 
that the §104 public access regulations designed to effectuate 
the Act while preserving appellant's privileges have yet to 
be promulgated. 
- 3 -
2. The dissent's understandable concern for appellant's privacy 
interests nonetheless rests on a faulty premise and on facts 
that are refuted by the record. The dissent acknowledges that 
the overwhelming majority of the materials in issue are entitled 
to no privacy protection. The dissent argues, however, that be-
cause archival screening entails interference, however minimal, 
with materials that are undeniably private, the Act therefore 
is subject to the "most searching kind of judicial scrutiny, 11 
post, at 17. This argument, of course, was expressly rejected 
by a unanimous Court earlier this Term, at least in the absence 
of likely public dissemination of such private information. 
See Whalen v. Rose, supra. The dissent therefore argues that 
"no one knows 11 if the government archivists will be 11 reliably 
discreet," post, at 24, although it offers no basis for dis-
agreement with the factual finding of the District Court that 
the archivists have 11 an unblemished record for discretion." 
408 F. Supp., at 365. Finally, the dissent fails to recognize 
that, unlike the computerized information network upheld in 
Whalen v. Roe, the Government will not retain long-term posses-
sion over appellant's private information, but must return all 
such papers and records to him or his family following archival 
screening. §104 (a) (7). 
- 4 -
3. The dissent's bill of attainder argument rests on the 
view that appellant is being punished because he "owns" his 
papers and the Act constitutes their confiscation by the 
Government. This is without merit. Our cases establish that 
whatever property interest inheres in appellant is nonpunitive-
ly taken when provision is made for the payment of "just com-
pensation." United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970). 
Appellant's corollary interest in preserving access to the 
materials is expressly assured under the Act~ §102(c). For 
similar reasons, the dissent's procedural due process argu-
ment has no merit. Appellant's rights of ownership can be 
procedurally and judicially vindicated simply by commencing 
an action for "just compensation." Indeed his rights and 
privileges receive far more.procedural protection than in any 
previous case, for the Act expressly provides for complete and 
expedited judicial consideration of all such claims. §l0S(a). 
W.J.B.Jr. 
"' lfp/ss 6/7/77 
MEMO FOR FILE 
No. 75-1605 Nixon v. GSA 
Having read the Court opinion circulated by WJB and 
the dissent of the CJ, and also Charlie's memo, I record these 
preliminary reactions. I am not inclined to join either of 
the circulated opinions. While I agree with a good deal of 
what is said in both, I would not go as far as WJB in one 
direction and the CJ in the other. 
My primary concern focuses on presidential privilege, 
although the privacy issue is not frivolous - especially in 
view of the intermingling of concededly private papers that 
will be reviewed by scores of archivists with a high likelihood 
that the "juciest" items will end up in the media. At the 
moment I view my options broadly as follows (subjecs, of~ 
course, to further thought, discussion and consideration): 
1. Join in the judgment. If so, I would write to express 
certain reservations. Without attempting here to identify 
all of these, I would certainly say that the precedent should 
be limited (as Charlie suggests) to the situations where (i) 
the incumbent President has approved the Act, and (ii) there 
is a public interest, rooted in some extraordinary circum-
stances (~.g., Watergate) strongly supportive of the drastic 
step of impoundment. 
2, 
2. Dissent in part. I could hold the Act invalid as 
failing adequately to protect the privilege of a former 
Presidento 
I now voice some of my concerns that tend to support 
the second option. But I am not thinking in terms of 
"absolutes" as even an incumbent President's privilege is 
not absolute. Nixon I made this clear, although the presumption 
in favor of it is strong. Nixon I involved the right to a 
fair trial - a constitutional right without a counterpart in 
this case. 
The CJ states correctly (p. 15) that the SG agrees "the 
privilege survives the individual President's tenure". I had 
not previously seen the quotation from Truman (p. 15, CJ's 
dissent), but it is supportive and sensible.~ 
A former President's interest is twofold: (i) though 
out of office, one (even a Nixon) who has held the highest 
office in our country must be presumed to have a continuing 
concern for the public interest in the confidentiality of 
presidential conversations and papers emphasized in Nixon I; 
and (ii) there also is a personal interest and duty which I 
now elaborate upon briefly. 
In a strictly private sense, a President - based on the 
history of the Republic - has the right to assume that his 
conversations and papers with respect to certain matters are 
confidential. Proceeding on this assumption - and it is an 
' * ~ u~,,..{...c,, .H,w,w.~v /a>'~-L- ~C~L4 J 
w.- *~ "1 /!,,..,,,.,4,.., .... ,, .. ....., & J 




assumption necessary to the adequate fulfilling of presidential 
duties - it is a certainty that Nixon said and wrote things 
that would not have been said or written absent this assumption. 
As a Justice of this Court, I frequently write and say things -
sometimes frivolously but usually pursuant to my duties - that 
I would not dream of saying publicly or recording for the 
curiosity of others. As a matter of ordinary fai rness and 
decency, I view it as little short of outrageous to allow per-
sons over whom Nixon has no control or supervision to examine 
his most private papers & thoughts and make their own subjective 
judgments (at least initially) as to what ought to be classified 
as "personal" and what may "go public". 
The interest of a former President also includes a duty 
of the highest order to protect the confidences of those who 
talked and wrote to him about certain matters. A simple and 
actual example illustrates this point: I have a friend - a 
well-known lawyer - who was consulted frequently by Nixon 
with respect to judicial and other appointments. The friend 
told me early in the Watergate affair that he spoke with the 
utmost candor, detailing - as he saw them - the strengths 
and weaknesses of the persons under consideration. Usually 
these were persons whom my friend knew fairly well; occasionally 
they were good friends. Nixon has an obligation to protect 
the confidentiality that was implicit in every such 
conversation. 
4. 
The same obligation exists with respect to what was said 
and written by staff personnel and others who thought they 
were serving their country in speaking freely to the President 
of the United States. No successor in office should be 
allowed to waive this obligation. 
Although I have been speaking in terms of the impact on 
individuals, the ultimate concern is for the public interest. 
WJB answers that if Ford and Carter aren't concerned about the 
public interest, why should Nixon be. My answer is that we 
are talking about Nixon's conversations and papers; not Ford's 
or Carter's. At least they will be on notice (if this Act 
is upheld) not to tape the White House and to be cautious 
and discreet in what they write. Also, with the benefit of 
forewarning, they can do what Nixon should have done: destroy 
the most sensitive and confidential papers as they go along, 
or in any event before Congress can impound them.* 
Moreover, although Ford was of the same political party, 
and a friend of Nixon's, he was under the heaviest political 
pressure - in light of his experience with the pardon - to 
approve this Act. And as Carter campaigned against Watergate 
and the pardon, it would not have been politically feasible 
for him to oppose the Act. History is replete with examples 
of disagreements and discord between incoming and outgoing 
Presidents. What if Eisenhower (who, I believe, had the 
*But if Congress impound, I suppose it could make it a crime 
to destroy papers pertaining to official duties. 
5. 
only Republican majority in the Congress since 1930) had 
decided to confiscate Truman's papers? The two were not 
speaking when Ike took office. And what about Johnson and 
Grant, to pick another random example. If Grant had failed 
to veto an act of Congress seizing Johnson's papers, would 
WJB argue that the Act was the combined product of the 
Executive and Legislative branches and that therefore Johnson 
had no interest? 
The other justification is that Nixon was a rascal, and 
that the public interest in being sure it knew the full extent 
of his rascality justified this unprecedented intrusion into 
presidential confidentiality. I do think there is something 
to this point. Although I personally have reservations as to 
whether this justification is one of public interest substance 
rather than a combination of curiosity and vindictiveness. 
We must assume that the Congress acted in good faith and 
according to its perception of the public interest. 
Thus, if I decide to dissent on this issue I would reach -
as Brennan does - a balancing of interests. I suppose largely 
subjective judgments are inescapable. One can set the stage 
by using familiar termso If the state interest is viewed as 
"overriding" this answers the question. But I would have 
difficulty accepting this view. I suspect that relatively 
little remains undisclosed that would have any practical 
utility to the Congress or to historians in avoiding future 
6. 
Watergates. The . litigation in this area already has been 
extensive; the impeachment proceedings before the House Judicial 
Committee were televised nationally; large segments of the 
tapes and the documents deemed most relevant by the courts 
and the Committee have been disclosed. But I am willing to 
assume that some public interest justifies an impoundment 
statute, although in view of the history of presidential 
privilege upon which Nixon and countless others relied, the 
privacy interests of Nixon and others that are implicated, 
and the general public interest mentioned above, I would 
think that nothing less than a compelling or overriding interest 
would justify an Act as intrusive as this one. Again, I 
recognize that if I adhere to this view, the answer is 
foreordained. 
WJB's opinion refers, as I recall, frequently to the 
Act providing "the least intrusive" means of screening 
presidential papers. See, ~.g., p. 28, 39. This conclusion 
would be difficult to support. If we assume that impoundment 
is justified, the method of screening becomes of vital 
importance. What seems to me to be a serious defect in the 
prescribed method is the failure to afford Nixon an opportunity 
participate in it at the critical time. It would have been 
r easonable and fair - as well as protective of the interest of 
all concerned - to provide that Nixon's representatives could 
participate on a joint basis with the screening by the 
archivists, with appropriate provision for resolving 
disagreements. 
L.F.P o, Jr. 
ss 
P.S. I should have referred above to WJB's argument that, 
7. 
in effect, Congress really did not impound or seize Nixon's 
papers: Congress concededly took the tapes and papers away 
from Nixon, but rather than retain possession itself, Congress 
directed that the papers be placed in the custody of GSA -
anf agency of the Executive Branch. It is argued that since 
we are talking about "executive" (presidential) privilege, 
tiR'l!K the papers really have not been removed from one branch 
of government to the other. Although this argument has some 
surface plausibility, it has little substance. The legislative 
branch took the critical action: it effected a legislative 
seizure of the papers sufficiently to deprive Nixon of 
control, and to prescribe elaborate provisions for the screening 
and ultimate public release of many of the papers. It is 
said that GSA is subject to presidential control. There are 
two answers to this: if the incumbent President is hostile 
to the former President or succumbs to political pressures, 
the fact that the papers are lodged with an executive agency 
8. 
is little comfort to the one claiming both a privilege and a 
privacy interest in them. 
In a more practical, realistic sense, the GSA cannot be 
controlled by the incumbent President except within the frame-
work of the Act - which prescribes broadly exactly what the 
GSA must do, subject to regulations that also must be approved 
(i.e., not vetoed)by Congress . In any event, GSA is an 
amorphous agency with hundreds - if not thousands - of 
personnel. If my papers were turned over to it, I would not 
be surprised to see them in public print - if anyone were 
that interested - in due course of time. 
Having said all of the foregoing, and despite my personal 
conviction that the Act is a regressive step in terms of 
enabling a President (or, for that matter, any responsible 
official in government) to function effectively, I recognize 
that at this time we have before us only the facial validity 
of the Act. I therefore am especially interested in the extent 
to which genuine safeguards can be provided that would assure 
Nixon a contemporaneous opportunity to participate in the 
screening process. If that opportunity were provided, together 
with appropriate procedure for resolving differences of opinion 
as to what papers come within presidential privilege and personal 
privacy, I may be able to join an affirmance.t>j ~
- /4/-wiD-ir u/(~ f_, rf 
to: Justice Powell 
from: Charlie 
Nixon 
June 8, 1977 
As I begin to read the cases relied on 
CJ and WJB, I have in mind these tentative 
draft opinion: 
1. Bill of Attainder: On this issue 
join WJB. 
2. Privacy: I would propose to write 
in a way that would be designed to assure 
the screening process and the disclosure 
ontemplated by the Act are carried out in a 
ranner that meets your concerns for confidentiality 
~~in communications with the President. The 
~ Act is valid on its face, because as written it 
' 
nly calls for the return of private materials 
Nixon and for the disclosure of other materials 
t the earliest reasonable date. It would be 
premature to pass on either the mode of screening 
-S \ ' the timing of disclosure. Nonetheless, it is appropriate 
· J ~ i ro ~ te the importance of the privacy interests 
~ } ~ "'h.~ ake -- not just to Nixon, ?ut to those Ji!lio 
:--...... ~ communicated with him in his official capacit); and 
ultimately to the Nation -- and to suggest the 
kinds of safeguards that might reconcile the per-
ceived interests in retention of materials in 
government custody and in eventual disclosure 
with the privacy interests that may be asserted. 
Such safeguards might include provisions for 
{f) Nixon's participation in the screening process 
subje<}.:---;o judicial review of any disputes 
and f"b-Pa e1.ay of public disclosure of any 
confidential communications until, say, Nixon's 
death. It is because the Act on its face 
may be read to authorize such safeguards that 
you can vote to uphold its constitutionality 
in this case. 
3. Separation of Powers: I would 
w'I'"B 
propose to agree with Ninef\ 1 s conclusions on 
this aspect of the case, but would seek to 
narrow the precedential effect of approving 
the facial validity of the Act. I would stress 
- =--
that Presidential privilege survives a President's 
term in office, and that a former President may 
be presumed to speak for the Executive Branch 
when he invokes the Privilege to resist requests 
by the other branches for information concerning 
his term of office. But I would reiterate that 
the Privilege derives from the principle of 
Separation of Powers and point out that under the 
Constitution the incumbent President ultimately 
must speak for the Executive Branch. Where as 
in this case two incumbent Presidents have taken 
affirmative steps to support such intrusion on 
Executive prerogatives as is worked by the Act, 
and where the present incumbent opposes the 
former President's assertion of privilege, this 





JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
;§upumt <!J1mrt nf tfyr 'J_'uriu21 ;§tatr.s 
~aglftngto-n, tt}. QJ. 2DpJ}_;J 
June 8, 1977 
75-1605, Nixon v . GSA 
Dear Bill, 
/ 
Upon the understanding that you are 
willing to give favorable consideration to the 
stylistic changes I have suggested, and per-
haps additional ones to come, I am glad to 
join your Ol)inion in this case . 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 








JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
,j1tpum.e Q}ourt of tfr.e ~tilth $5taf:cg 
'llasfringto1t, ~. Q}. 20bP1~ 
June 9, 1977 
/ 
Re: No. 75-1605, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services 
Dear Bill: 





Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
'• 
> 
June 10, 1977 
No. 75-1605 Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services 
Dear Bill: 
I write to say that I am not yet at rest in this 
troublesome case. 
Although you and the Chief have both writteJine 
opinions (and seemingly have left little for anyone to 
add), I am trying to write something as aabeans of 
formulating my own conclusion. , -
In view of the unprecedented volume - by number and 
pages - of opinions that have circulated recently, together 
with some other writing that I have undertaken, I am running 
somewhat behind with my work. It may be about a week before 
I circulate anything in Nixony if indeed this is my final 
decision. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
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Charlie, Dave, Gene 
and Tyler 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Status Report 
DATE: June 14, 1977 
After taking stock as to where we are "at", the situation 
is as follows: 
1. Uncirculated opinions: Concurrences in Bradley and 
Nixon; dissents in Arizona Bar and Zacchini. These are our 
priority concerns, and our schedule is rather tight. 
2. Court opinions that are ready. Brown v. Ohio and 
Morris v. Gressette. All votes are in, and our responsive 
footnotes have been added. Also, I think we have cleared the 
syllabi and line-ups. Both may come down on Thursday. 
3. Court opinions requiring responsive footnotes. The 
abortion "trilogy" - Maher, Beal and Poelker. Although the 
votes are in and all writing circulated, I think two - perhaps 
three - additional footnotes are indicated. We should circulate 
these no later than midday on Wednesday, so that these cases 
can be cleared at Thursday's Conference. 
4. Continental TV v. GTE. We have a Court, and Tyler 
is doing the final review for stylistic polishing and cite 




4. Other opinions. If my count is correct, our only 
remaining opinions are the dissents we have circulated in 
McDonald and Coker. We have joins from White and the Chief 
in McDonald. I do not recall whether Rehnquist participated. 
If not, I believe all votes are in, and the case possibly could 
be ready for announcement on Thursday. Tyler should do the 
cite checking and final polishing with this possibility in 
mind. I believe we are all set with our little dissent in 
Coker, but Dave should keep an eye on this. 
* * * 
As a general observation, it is especially important to 
follow promptly all circulations and recirculations. We don't 
want anything to "slip by us". 
Also, in view of the unprecedented backlog in the print 
shop, it is more important than usual to double check opinions 
and changes therein. 
Wednesday, June 22, remains the final target date for 
all circulations, with the hope to bring down the final 
opinions on Monday, the 27th. In cases where our opinions 
will be lengthy (Bates, perhaps Nixon and Bradley) circula-
tions should be made no later than Monday, June 20. 
Finally, as a proxy for the CJ, I am scheduled to leave 






on Wednesday, the 22nd. I am to participate in the judges' 
conference on the 23rd and make a brief appearance on the 
morning of the 24th, returning to Washington that afternoon. 
I will leave my votes with one of the other Justices for the 










JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
/) ~ 
UL, 
j;uvrtmt ~ourt of tqt J.!lnittb ~mtts 
~as-l1ington. ~- ~- 2Llc?'~~ 
' I 
June 15, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1605 - Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services 
Dear Bill: 
As I have already indicated, I Join the judgment and 
most of your opinion, my reservations being indicated in the 
following connnents. 
Page 11: You say that we need not resolve questions 
of standing with respect to separation of powers and presi-
dential privilege (I note that your first circulation said 
we need not resolve "all" of these questions). But on page 
21 you appear to resolve the major issue of standing--that 
with respect to presidential privilege. It seems to me that 
if there is otherwise any substantial doubt about standing, we 
should resolve it to avoid the possibility that much of what 
you say will be a series of extended and unwarranted dicta on 
important constitutional issues. 
Page 14, fn. 5: I would not purport to draw support 
for this opinion by reference to the British system, which is 
hardly a model for anyone interested in separating executive 
and legislative powers. 
Page 16: You take comfort from the fact that i · l s 
the executive branch itself that has possession of and LS in 
control of the pap~rs. But it is not the President not t he 
presidency that is in charge. The Administrator is carrying 
out legislatively-imposed duties and his regulations are sub-
ject to rejection by either House of Congress. What is 
challenged here is the very existence of and the content of 
the restraints and duties placed on the presidency by this 
legislation. Because this thought appears more than once, 
you may not be interested in modifying your opinion, in 
which event I would indicate that you overemphasize what is 
at best a make-weight argument. 
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Page 17, fn. 8: You infer the irrelevance of the 
title issue--at least you say that you see no reason to 
engage in the title debate but later in the footnote you 
indicate that if the Government has title to the materials 
now in the custody of the Administrator, the property clause 
would justify most if not all of what is done here. Thus, 
if the title question were decided for the Government, a 
great deal of the opinion would apparently be beside the 
point. 
Page 17, also fn. 8, page 53: I do not see how the 
compensation clause provides any support with respect to the 
purely private papers and tapes that may be involved in this 
case. They surely do not belong to the Government and their 
retention is not necessary to the public business. I would 
not think the compensation clause would authorize the Govern-
ment to seize a private diary as long as it was willing to 
pay for it. Even if the diary were of "historical interest," 
I doubt that this section would furnish the necessary 
public purpose for the seizure of the diary. 
As long as I am on the subject, I should say that if 
return of the purely private materials to the former Presi-
dent must await and is subject to the issuance of regula-
tions under§ 104, as the reference to these materials in 
§ 104(a)(7) would indicate, then I think the act, while not 
unconstitutional on its face, is being unconstitutionally 
applied at this point since there is no excuse whatsoever, 
other than obstinacy, for not having identified and returned 
at least some of the private materials. Even if the return 
of the papers may be effected independently of§ 104 regu-
lations--and if this is the case, the opinion should be very . 
clear on the point--! suggest that the opinion should also 
say that the mere fact that private materials may be of 
historical interest does not warrant their retmti.on. As I 
recall it, the Solicitor General himself indicated that even 
if private materials, once identified, were thought to be 
of historical interest, they could not be retained but should 
be returned. 
Page 31: You say that purely private materials will 
be returned to the former President. But again is this 
subject to the condition that they not be of historical 
interest, as§ 104(a)(7) would indicate? 
Page 31: I do not subscribe to the statement, as a 
general proposition, that once something has been published, 
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there can be no longer any privacy interest in preventing 
its further dissemination. 
Pages 38-39: The screening process permits archi-
vists to read even private papers even though they might be 
identified as private without reading them line by line. 
Page 46: I was in dissent in Brown and still think 
it was a disaster. I doubt that I shall join this part of 
your opinion although I shall join the result. In any 
event, doesn't it go pretty far to say as you do at the 
bottom of pages 46-47 that bills of attainder include "any 
legislative enactment that bars specified individuals or 
groups from participation in certain types of employment or 
vocations, a mode of punishment corrnnonly employed against 
those legislatively branded as disloyal"? (Emphasis added.) 
If this is true we have been spinning our wheels in the 
alien cases. 
Page 53: You indicate that the former President has 
ready access to the materials. But as you indicate on 
page 6, his right of access under§ 102(c) is "su~sequent 
and subject to the regulations" issued by the Administrator. 
I take it these access regulations have already been issued. 
Should not there be said that the regulations themselves are 
unexceptionable, if they are? 
It is likely that I shall write briefly in concur-
rence. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to Conference 
CH AMBERS O F 
JU STICE WM.J . B RENNAN, JR. 
§uµumt QJ.onrl llf tqt 'Jlnitth ~fates 
JD'a.s !rutgfon. g). <!J. 21lgiJ.l.~ 
June 15, 1977 
RE: No. 75-1605 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services 
Dear Byron: 
I am pleased that you can join the judgment and most of my opinion. 
I find your remaining suggestions helpful and am willing to make the fol-
lowing changes to meet your concerns. 
Page 11. I will delete the sentence beginning 11 As shall be seen 11 
etc. In its place I will substitute something along the following lines: 
11 We reject the argument that only an incumbent President may assert such 
claims and hold that appellant, as a former President,may also be heard 
to assert them. We further hold, however, that neither his separation of 
powers claim nor his claim of breach of constitutional privilege has merit. 11 
Page 14. I'll delete the reference to the British system. 
Page 16. I have not made clear the purpose of my argument. I do 
not mean to imply that merely placing the function ir. the Executive Branch 
by itself answers the separation of powers argument. The core of the 
separation of powers inquiry is the extent of interference with the function 
of the Executive Branch. In this light it is clearly less intrusive to 
place custody of the materials within the Executive Branch itself rather 
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than having Congress or some outside agency perform the screening function. 
I would be happy to add a footnote to make this clarification if you think 
it would be useful. 
Page 17 n. 8. I will substitute in line 4 for "private property is 
taken" the words "economic interests are invaded. 11 I will then delete the 
last paragraph of that footnote and substitute: 11 0n the other hand, even 
if legal title rests in the government appellant is not thereby foreclosed 
from asserting under Sec. 105(a) a claim for return of private materials 
retained by the Administrator in contravention of appellant's rights and 
privileges as specified in Sec. 104(a)(5): 
As for your concern for government obstinancy, this no doubt is 
attributed to the fact that the district court enjoined the government 
from 11 processing, disclosing, inspecting, transferring, or otherwise dis-
posing of any materials which might fall within the coverage of ... 
the Act •.•. 11 408 F. Supp. 375. I have tried to correct this deficiency 
in footnote 22. 
Page 31. Concerning your questi~n as to construction of Sec. 104(a)(7). 
It seems to me to be unwise to attempt to resolve this issue in the abstract. 
It is sufficient for me that the Act qualifies the general requirement that 
the Administrator retain materials of general historical significance with 
the provision that any constitutional or other privacy interests of Nixon 
must be safeguarded. Section 104(a)(5); see footnote 23. Obviously there 
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may be disagreement over the precise contents of those privacy interests 
as they will be asserted in subsequent litigation concerning particular 
materials claimed to have general histori cal significance. See, for example, 
the possible area for dispute discussed below as to pages 38-39. Some may 
think there's no merit whatever in the privacy claims. Obviously you see 
considerable merit in them. Therefore I 0 t tempted {and still think it is 
wise) not to anticipate prematurely quest ions that may arise from actual 
application of the regulations. 
Page 31. I do not fully understand you r argument with respect to prior 
publication since I had thought that Katz s~ttled this. However, if it will 
meet your concern I'd be glad to change t e ~entence preceding the Katz cite 
to limit it to materials appellant disclosed to the public. 
Page 38-39. Your concern here is t s~bject to easy solution. Some 
might say that the privacy interests at ~c es to the content of materials. 
Detection ofthesematerials would of c ecessitate screening. I under-
stand that you believe that privacy prot tion relates to the form {i.e., 
diaries, personal letters, etc.) irres 1\'e of the content of the materials 
contained therein. I've already sugges tat this is the kind of problem 
we should avoid. Isn't it wise to avo1 r . ~l ving these matters until a 
concrete dispute arises under Sec. 105 T c- 0p inion already states that 
materia 1 s that are concededly private ~ •· ~ ;y definition should be im-
mediately returned. See footnote 22 . 
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Page 46. I find your reaction surprising since I had thought that my 
Bill of Attainder section undercuts a broad reading of Brown and indeed em-
braces many points found in your dissent. As for the objectionable sentence 
I will happily redraft it. Would substituting "a" for "any" suffice? 
Page 53. I will certainly mention that the regulations under Sec. l02(c) 
guaranteeing appellant's unrestricted access to the materials have been 
promulgated and have not been challenged. See 41 C.F.R. 105-63.3. 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
1 
/7) c l ( 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
~ 
Richard M. Nixon, Appellant, l !. 1--f v On Appeal from the United 
. . · States District Court for the 
Adm11nstrator of General 0 . t . t f C 1 b' a_ ~ 
S 
. al 1s nc o o um 1a. ..-i\ 
erv1ces et . ,._ 
No. 75-1605 
[June -, 1977] ~ 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. J _ -~···~ Title I of Pub. L. 92-526 (1974), 44 U.S. C. §2107, the 
"Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act," I-~, J 
directs the Administrator of General Services, an official of the 
Executive Branch, to take custody of the Presidential papers l/'1j,e, J..,it 
and tape recordings of appellant, former President Richard M. 11 , 
Nixon. and P.!}?ffiU,lgate regulations that ( 1) provide for the .,,- ~ f-
o~dterlyf proc
1
essintg ~alna fscretehnmg by Exefcutitve ~rantch arch1i- ~ ~ vis s o sue 1 ma en s or e purpose o re urmng o appe - - "-
lant such of them as are personal and private iu nature, and /:J _ -I- ~- . J-
(2) determiue the terms and conditions upon which public ~ ~ 
access may eventually be had to those materials that are J ~
retained. The question for decision is whether Title I is un- .I. -. • 
constitutional .Q!l its face as a v10lat10n of (IJ m\\para£10trof rt-,  
powers; (2) :ri;;{dentiiil privilege doctrines; (3) appellant's/~ .L L .. • 'Y ~ 
privacy interests; (4) appellant's First Amendment associa-{_
1 
~
tional rights; or ( 5) the Bill of Attainder Clause. ~ A 9 '~ IJ 
On December 19, 1974, four months after appellant resigned ~~ 
as President of the United States, his successor, President 
Gerald R. Ford, signed Pub. L. 93-526 into law. 88 Stat. 4,LH . . -,.~1 
1965 (1974). The next day, December 20, 1974, appellant ~ ~
filed this action in the District Court for the District of Co-  
lumbia which under § 105 (a) of the Act has exclusive juris~ • 
diction to entertain complaints challenging the Act's consti • 
.J·~~~~~~M.I. 
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tutional validity. Appellant's complaint challenged the Act's 
constitutionality on a number of grounds and sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief against its enforcement. A three-
judge District CoJJrt was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 
§§ 2282, 2284. 1 Because regulations required by § 104 of the 
Act ~overning -~publicJ ccess to the materials are not yet 
effective, "the District Court held that questions going to the 
possibit'ity of future public release under regulations yet to be 
published were not ripe for review: that there was " ... no 
ueed and no justification for this court now to reach consti-
t utional claims directed at . .. regulations ... the promulga-
1t10u of I whichJ might eliminate. limit or cast [the constitu-
tional claimsJ rn a different light," 408 F. Supp. 321, 336 
(1976) . Accordingly, the District Court limited review "to 
consideration of the pro wiet - of 111 unctive relief agai; st 
th e ed cia unconstitution ·ty of t e statute." Id., at 
335, and. holding that the challenges to the facial constitu-
tionality of the Act were without merit, dismissed the com-
plaint. Id. , at 374-375. We noted probable jurisdiction, - -
F . ~, - ( Hl76) . vVe affirm. 
I 
The Backyruund 
The materials at 1sSU(' cousist of some 42 million pages of 
documents and some 850 tape recordings of conversations. 
Upon his resignation. appellant directed government archivists· 
to pack and sh ip the materials to him in California. This 
.shipment was delayed when the Watergate Special Prosecutor 
dvised of his continuing need for the materials. At the same 
time, President Ford requested that the Attorney General 
give his opinion respecting ownership of the materials. The 
Attorney General advised that the historical practice of former · 
' For procC'C'd1n:z:~ prior to convC'11t1on of the three-judge court, see 
Nixon v. Richey, 51:{ F 2d 427 (1975), on reconsideration 513 F . 2d. 
-1:10 ( Hl7!,) , SrC' :d1m N1xon v. Sampson, :{89 F . Supp. 107 (1975) •. 
'f 5-1605,--OPINION 
IXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES 3 
;Presidents and the absence of any governing statute to the 
contrary supported ownership in the appellant, with a possible 
limited exception. 43 Op. Attorney General No. 1 (Sept. 
6, 1974). l App., at 220-230.2 The Attorney General's opinion 
emphasized, however, that 
"[h] istorically, there has been consistent acknowledge-
ment that Presidential materials are peculiarly affected 
by a public interest which may justify subjecting the 
I absolute ownership rights of the ex-President to certain limitations directly related to the character of the docu-mei1ts as records of government activity." 
On September 8, Hl74, after issuance of the Atton 
eral 's opinion, the Administrator of General Services, A ur 
F . Sampson, announced that he had signed a d~pository agre 
went 'tith a12p¥lla_.2t under the authority of 44 U: S. C. § 2107. 
10 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1104 (1974). We shall refer 
to the agreement as the Nixon-Sampson a reement. The 
agreement recited that appe ant retaine "all legal and equi-
table title to the Materials, including all literary property 
rights, " and that the materials accordingly were to be "de-
posited temorarily" near appellant's California home in an 
"existing facility belonging to the United States." The agree-
ment stated further that appellant's purpose was "to donate" 
the materials to the United States "with appropriate restric-
tions." It was provided that all of the materials "shall be 
placed within secure storage areas to which access can be 
gained only by use of two keys," one in appellant's possession 
and the other in the possession of the Archivist of the United 
tates or members of his staff. With exceptions not material 
here, appellant agreed "not to withdraw from deposit any 
~ No opmion was given respecting ownership of certain permane;;.t 
files retained by the Chief Executive Clerk of the White House Trom 
iulmini8t ration °to administration. The Attorney General was unable 
definitively to determine theJr 1,tatus on the basis of then available 
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originals of the materials'' for a period of three years, but 
rcservf'd the right to "make reproductions" and to authorize 
othf'r persons to have access on conditions prescribed by him. 
Aflgr., three _y_,£,ars, appellant might exercise the "right to with-
draw from dt>posit without formality any or all of the Mate-
rial. ... and to retain . . . L them] for any purpose ... " deter-
mined by h11n . 
The ~ixon-Sampson agreement treated the tape recordings 
~<'paratcly. They were donated to the United States "effec-
t,1vP Sept<>rnbcr 1. 1979" and meanwhile "shall remain ou 
il<'J>O'-'it . ·· lt "as provided howevPr that "subsequeut to Sep-
tc•1nber 1, J!l7~l the admi nistrator shall destroy such tapPs as 
I .\fr :\"ixon I ,;hall direct" and in any event the tapes "shall 
lw destroyNI at the time of lhis 1 death or 011 September 1, 
1DR4. whwhevc'r event shall first occur.' ' Otherwise the tapes 
WPr<' not to he> withdrawn and reproductions would be made 
0 1ily b~· "nn1tual agreement." Access until September 1. 1979. 
wa8 expressly reserved to appellant, except as he might au-
t,boriz<> acccHs by others on terms prescribed by him. 
Puhlie a111iou11cement of th<' agrcemellt was followed 10 
dayi- ltHPr , ;-;pptember 18, by the introduction of S. 4016 by 
t:3 ;-;<,nator1:- 11i the United States Senate, The bill. \\"hich 
hc•canH' PulJ. L. \)3-526 and was designed . inter alia, to abro-
gal<' th<· \1xon Sampson agreenlf)nt. passed the Senate on 
d('tol><'r 4.- 1D74".'""' It was awaiting action in the House of 
Hc'Jm'scntat1\<'1- when on October 17, 1974. appellant filed 
~utt 1n tlH· District Court seeking specific enforcement of the 
:\1xon-~amp~o11 agreement. That action was consolidated 
\nth otlwr ~mts seeking access to Presidential materials pur-
suuut lo th<' Frc>edom of Information .\.ct, 5 U. S. C. 552 
1 ;-;upp. Y). a1Hl also seeking injunctive rC'lief agai11st enforce-
111cnt of tlw al!;r('ement. ,Vixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 
\ I!)?.) J .' TIH' Hou~e pa8sed its version of the Senate bill 011 
· Till• < '011r1 ot Appeab tor the D1stnct of Columbia Circuit ~ht~·pd 
;1 m onlc-r dlt•<· I u:11 m~ the d_rr1~ion m Ni.ro11 , 8cun p l!Oll pPnding deci~ioo. 
75- JB05 - OPl:\' tUN 
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Dt'<'<•111h<'r :1, Hl74. J;'ollowing eonf<,r<'llCC committee actjon, 
both I I ousc,s of C'o11grPss passed the confc>n•ncP vf'rsion of S. 
40Hi 011 l)pec•111lwr !l. HJ74. and , as stal<'d, President Ford 
:-;1g11c·d it illt() la\\ \.)JI Dec0mber rn. 
LI 
The Act 
P11b. L. ~l'.2 ;->2(-i has t\\'o Titles. Title l. the challe11ged 
· Prc•sidPnt ial Jfreordi11gs aud Materials Prcservatio11 Act" con-
~bt~ or ~~ 101 through 106. Title I I, the "Puhlic Docurne11ts 
.\ <·t. " at1H·1nl~ ('hapter :-ri of Ti11<' 44. l 'n it<'d ~tates Code. to 
add ~~ :t-n.-) through :-1:f24 tlw•·etu. a1HI <'Rtablish the ~atio11al 
-;t 11rly ( '1n1lll1issirn1 011 Hc•<·ords and I )oeu11H•11t8 of Ferlc•ral 
< >tfic·1,tl~ 
•"<'<'I io11 l(Jl ( n I of Tit]p I dirPets tlu-11 thlc' Adn1inistrator of 
r ;c•11,•ra l :-,c•n·1c·< •,.;. 1101 \\ it hsta11di1ig nil)' othN law or agrcerne>11l 
,,, 1111 d<·l'~ta111li11u.. 1 c y., tli<· :'\ixu11-:-;ampso11 agn'<'llH·ut) ''1:,hall 
1'1'<'<'1 \'t'. ohtai11. or r<'tai11. eompl<'t<' possession a11d co11trol of 
all oriµ:111al lnJH' n•cordi11µ:,.; of conw,rsations \\·hich wPr<' r<'-
1•11rdPd or c·a 11--<•d to lw n '<·ord(•d by any officpr or c•111ployc'<' of 
Ill' F1·d<•ral < ;()\'1•r1111 1P11t 1ltld ,\'hieh .. 
· 1 I I I 11voh·(• formN Pn~sid<'11t Richard .\f. :\"ixo11 OJ' 
nll11·1 11l(li\·id11als \\ho . at tlw tinw of tlw c·o11v<'l'satiou 
11c•1p 1·mpl<>Yl'd b~ tli(' Frderal Uoverrnncnt : 
1 :..! 1 1, vr1• rt•co rrl<'cl 111 tlw Whit<' UouSl' or i11 tlw offite 
of ril(• P1t •s1dP11t in the· Exc'cutiv<> Office Buildings located 
11 1 \\ a"lii11µ_t(l11. l)is1r1c·.t of Columbia; Camp David, 
•>I 1li1· 1li n ·•·-,111clg1· t·o•1 r1 \\]H·ilH•r 11J1dn ~105 \:\) tlw in~tm1I c:i.,P w:1,.; to 
·1i,1 "' pt11>l'l1, 011 I hf' do<·kc•t of I !lw Disnict ·1 court OV<'I' otlwr <•:,,;p,.;,'' 
\',.,,,,, , /?,r/u • "'/'/'II . .'iJ:·l ~- :2d , :it 4:31, -i:~5. -l-W--l4S. Thr 1hn·<•-judg<• 
, ,111r1 wa, of tll!' 1u•11 th:11 "tlw c·1·11tral purpo,.:c• of C'ongrr~,.;. in rrlation 
1,1 ·d i 1w1Hli11!!. lt11g:i 11on . 1, 10 haYr au l'arl~· 1111d prior ,dc•tc•rmi11:i1iou 
ol llw \,·t '- 1·011~111111>01111 li1~·· :ind thrrf'fon· did not rrqu<•:-:1 di~,._o]ution 
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Maryland; Key Biscayne, Florida; or San Clemente, Cal~ 
ifornia; and 
" (3) were recorded during the period beginning January 
20, 1969 and ending August 9, 1974." 
Sect1011 101 (b) prnvides that notwithstanding any such 
agreei'-i1e 1lt " or u11derstaudillg. the Administrator also "shall 
receive, retarn, or make reasollable efforts to obtain complete 
possession and control of all papers, documents, memoran-
dums, transcripts. and other objects and materials which con-
-;t1tute the Presidential hi::;torical materials las defined by 44 
..., (' \ ~ 2101 1 uf Ri,·hard M. Xixon. coveriug the period 
begmmng January 20, 1969. and e11di11g August 9, l\:l74." 
-,f'{; tion 102 ( a) prohibits destructiou of the tapes or ma-
terials except as may be provided by law, a11d § 102 (~ ~11akes 
them available ( giving priority of access to the Othce of 
:\ atergate Special Prosecutor) in response to court subpoena 
,r other legal process, or for use in judicial proceedings. This 
\\as made subJect howrver, "to auy rights, defe11ses or privi-
leges which tlw Federal Government or any person may 
111voke.1 Sect10n 102 ( c) affords appellant. or any person 
de::;1gnated h,Yh un 111 writ111g, access to the recordings and ma-
tenals tor auy purpose cousistent with the Act "subsequent 
,rnd subJect to the regulations'' issued by the Administrator 
u11<ler ~ 103. ~<•ct10n 102 (d) provides for access according to 
~ 103 rcgulatio11s by any agency or department in the Execu-
tive Branch for lawful government use. Section 103 requires 
custody of the tape recordings and materiafs' to be maintained 
111 Washington except as may otherwise be necessary to carry 
out the Act. and directs that the Administrator promulgate 
regulations uccessary to assure their protection from loss or 
lestruct1on and to prt'vent access to them by unauthorized 
persons. 
:-i<•ct10n 104. 111 pertrncnt part, directs the Administrator to 
prornulgat(' regulations governing public access to the tape 
l'('('ordings ;:ind lllHter.ials. Scct1011 nfi'"ta) requires sub111is-
~
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sion of proposed regulations to each House of Congress, the 
regulations to take effect under § 104 (b)(l) at the end of 90 
legislative days unless either House or Senate adopts a resolu-
tion disapproving them. The regulations must take into 
ccount seven factors specified in ~ 104 (a), namely : 
" ( 1) the need to provide the public with the full truth, 
at the earliest reasonable date. of the abuses of govern-
mental power popularly identified under the generic term 
" Watergate .. , 
' , ~) the need to makf• such recordings and material. 
available for use 111 judicial proceedings; 
·• ( 3) the need to prevent 15eneral ac~~ss except in accord-
.wee with appropriate proct>dures established for use in 
Judicial proceedings, to infonnatio11 relating to the Na-
t1011 's security; • 
h l 4) the need to protect every individual's right to a 
lair tnal, 
"(oJ the need to prot(•ct auy party's opportunity to assert 
a11y legally or constitutionally based right or privilege-
which would prevent 01 otherwise limit access to such 
recordings and matenals; 
' ( 6) the need to provide public access to those materials ~ 
\\hich haw g<'tH'ral hii,torical sig11i:ffoa11ce, and which are 
11ot likely to lw related to the 11eed described in para-
graph ( 1), a11d 
·• ( 7) the 11ccd to g1 ve H ichard M. Nixou, or his heirs, 
for his sole custody and use, tape recordings and other 
materials which arr• not likely to be related to the need 
descnbed m paragraph ( 1) alld are not otherwise of 
general histoncal sigllificance." 
Sect10n 105 ( a) vest:- LIH• District Court for the District 
<1t' Columbia not only with exclusive Jurisdiction to hear 
co11st1tutio11a1 challPllf.!;('s t,o the Act, but also to hear chal-
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involvrng quest1011s of title, ow1w1·ship. custody. posscs~ion 01· 
rontrol of any tape' or materials. or i11volvi11g pay11w11t of any 
award of just compensation re(JuirPd by ~ 105 (c) when a 
clPciswn of that court holds that any individual has beP11 de-
prived by th<' .'\ct of private property without just compC'n-
:atio11. 'c•d ion 105 (b) is a SC'\·c-rabilitv 12,rovision providing 
l 
that any decisio11 invalidating a provision of tlw Act or a 
n•gttlat1011 shall not affrct tlH' validity or pnfor('PllH'nt oi 
irny othpr provision or rC'g-ulation. Section 106 authorizes 
appropriatiu11 uf sucl1 sums as may be 11cccssary to curry out 
l1P pro,·1s11111s of thC' Titl<' 
CU 
The ~rnpe of lite ll! Q'uiry 
1 lw District Court ('Orreetly noted that, the• Act requires 
IH· .\d111i11istrator uf GcnC'ral :-iPrvicPs to admi11istPr the tape 
1•(·01 clrngs and matPrials plac<•d in hii- custody 011ly under· 
n•µ;ttlati o11~ promulgated by hi111 "that would provide for thP 
1Jl'<krl)· proC('Ssi11g- of such mat1•rials for the purpose of re-
tm11 11 1g to lnpp!•lla11t I such of them as are pcrso11al a11d 
prind(• i11 11alllt'{' . and of dctc-rniini11g the terms and conditions 
11po11 1rl11rh public a<'C<'SS 111ay eventually be had to those 
rt• 1n;1111111g 111 clw Gov<•r11111e11t's posscs:siou.' ' Tlw Districl 
< nurt, a !so 11ot<·d that ''Ii I II dPsi~11i 11g till th regulatio11s the 
.\d111i111strntor 1nu~t consider the 11ced tu protect the con-
,t 1ttt t 1011a] riµ;h ts of I appella11 tJ and other individual::; against 
11 1fri11g<'llH·11t h:v th(' procrssing itself or. ultimately. l>y public 
,1< 0r·C'ss to th1• 1naLcrials r<'lai11Pd." 408 .F. ~upp., at --. This 
,·o nstrn<"tio11 1::- plainly rcquirc'd hy the wording of ~~ 103 and 
I {)4 ' 
'l'h1, 11111·11,n·l:11 10 11 ha~ t1,11ncl;1n t "liJlport in the legi~latin· h1,-tory 
w Ii,,, \ ,·1 ~t·n;11 or .l;n 11 .,. 11111 or t lw :-;pon,-or:- of S. 401!1 .,;ta t<'cl thaL 
,Ji,. ITlll •J'l:t nl ~ 10-l 1,11 
·1 11d<·:1 • 1 11 1, ·01 1·1· 11•1< pru1•p,,~ lor mdl\·1d11aJ,- who nia~· l1P llHlll<'d 
111 11l1 1•a 111 •r,- ·1- wl')J a:- :1 11_, jlt'J\" il< ·~<' that may be 111yo[n•d in tbe 
itJ- 11305-OPrnJO~ 
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l{,q1;ulatio11s imple111enting §§ 102 and 103, which did not re-
qmre submission to Congress. and which regulate access and 
scrC'C'nin by vernment archivists. have been promulgated, 
4 J ied. Reg. 266 ( 975); FR§ 105-63 (1976). Public 
Hccess regulations that must be submitted to Congress ~ 104 
( a) have not. however. become effective. The initial set pro-
posC'cl by the Administrator was disapproved pursuant to § 104 
( h) ( 1) by Senate Resolution. S. Res. 244. 94th Co11g., 1st 
f;('ss. ( 1975) . 121 Cong. Rec. S. 15803-S. 15808 (Sept. 11, 
I !J7!'i). The SC'natC' also disapproved seven provisio11s of a 
propos<:>d second set. although that S<'t had b<:>Pll withdrawn, 
.. Res. 428. 94th C'ong .. 2d Sess. (1976); 122 Co11g. Rec. 
S 5200-S. 5291 (April 8. 1976). The House disapproved six 
pt·ov1s1011s of a third sC't. II. R , Res. 1505, 94th Co11g .. 2d 
Sess. ( 1976). The Administrator is of the view that regula-
t10 11s cannot become effectivf' except as a package and con-
S<'que11tly is prepari11g a fourth Sf't for submission to Congress. 
Bncf for Federal appellel s. at r-'9. 11. 4. 
The District Court therefore conclu<led that as no regula-
tions ui1der ~ 104 had yet. tak<'ll effect, and as such regula-
pap(• r,; , and ol cour~c tlw 1wce:s:sary a(•c(•~~ or the form(•r Prci;ident 
f11m:sdf 
·Jn ,;hor t, the arizumeut that tlw bill a11thorize~ t111rp,;(rictPd Jmulic 
11·(·1•:-:,; doC',; 11of ,;t,rnd up 111 tlw fat<:' of the ('l'iteria and thC' rpquirrmenL 
,lor th<' regul,1tion:s whi('h W<' !1;1,·p m:-:Prtrd III th<' bill today,'' 120 Cong. 
Ht•<· S 18244 (dail~· ed Oet 3, 1974) 
Sc•11atot \'eborr , tlH' lllll',; draft,:;man. ,tgrred that th(• primar.,· 1n1rpo,;e 
lo provide• for th<' Anwncan pPople an hi:storical r0cord of tlw Watergate 
e,·(•11t ,.: '':should nor ov0rridP all rPgard for thC' right,-: of tlw indiYidual 
1 0 pnvaey and a fan· trial. " Id .. at S. 18236. SPnator Ervin, also a 
,pon:sor a11d Hoor manager of tllP l,ill, :s tatc•d . 
'Xohody':-: nght ,:; arP affc•c·ted h~· th1:s bill, bC'eatt:sl' 1t pro\'ldes, a:s fnr 
a,- pr1var~· i,- co11rPl'IIPd, that the r(•gttlat1011:s of th(' Admini:;trator shall 
_ta k(• 111tu account . the oppurt un1ty to a:;:-;0rt an~· Jpgnlly or ron-
,11t11ttonally ba:sed nght wh1C'h wonld prrvpnt or otherwi::<c limit accei;s 
to till' tap<' n·cordmg>< and othrr matPnals ," Id ,, at S. 18029 (d.nily 
·d. Orf. 4 Hl7 4) 
~s.~ 
/-. /() 2 •103 
(ar.-... k a.e.cA•• 
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tions ouce effective were explicitly made subject to judicial 
review under ~ 105 the court could consider only the injury 
to appellant's constitutionally protected interests allegedly 
worked by the taking of his Presidential materials into cus-
tody for screening by government archivists. 408 F. Supp., at 
335-340. Citing Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387. 402 (1941), 
Judge McGowan, ,vriting for the District Court, 408 F. Supp., 
at '338, stafea: 
"No one can foresee the varying applications of these 
SP para tr provisions which conceivably might be made. A 
hi" wh1rh JH co11~titutio11al aH applied in one manner may 
still contravene the Constitution as applied in another. 
~inc<~ all con tingenciPs of attempted enforcement can not 
be e11visio11ed in advance of those applications, courts have 
w the main found it wiser to delay passing upon the 
constitutionality of all the separate phases of a compli-
cated statute until faced with cases involving particular 
provisions as specifically applied to persons who claim to 
Le Ill.I ure<l. Passrng upon the possible significa1Jce of 
the manifold provisiolls of a broad statute in adva11cc of 
efforts to apply the separate provisions is analogous to 
ren<lenng an advisory opinion upon a statuu, or a de.~ 
claratory .l udgrnent upou hypothetical case." 
Ouly tl11s Term we applied tlus principle in an analogous 
situatwu w declining to adjudicate the constitutionality of 
regulatwns of the A<lnrnnstrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Act that were rn process of revision, stating, "For I the 
CourtJ to review regulations not yet promulgated, the final 
form of which has been only hinted at, would be wholly 
novel. ' EPA v. Browu, - G. S. --. -- (May 2, 1977). 
, 'ce also Rusenbery v. Fleute, 374 U. S. 449. 451 ( 1963); 
Harmon v. Brucker, 355 L'. S. ,579 (1!)58); 'l'hor'}Je v. Housh1g 
,1uthority, 393 r. ~- 268. 283-284 (1969); United States v. 
Rames, :102 l" . .-, , 17, 20- 22 (1!:l60). 
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appellants scven'al constitutioual claims to those addressed 
to tlw f~ al y aliclity of the provisions of the Act that require 
the Administrator to take the recordings and materials into 
the Government's custody subject to screening by Government 
arrhivists. 
The CO!,.§.,tituJj_onal q uestions to be decided are, of course. 
of considerable importance. They touch the relationship 
between two of the three coordinate branches of the Federal 
Governuwnt, the Executive and the Legislative, and the rela-
tionship of appellant to his Goverunwnt. They arise in a 
c·o11t<'xl uniqu<' iu thr lustory of thP J->n,sirlP11cy which this 
('c~1rt !ms !i u71 110 oc·easiou heretofore, to adch·pss. Judge 
.\ifrGowau. speaking. for the District Court. cornpr<'hensively 
tall\'ai:'srd all tlw claims. and in a thorough opinion, concluded 
that 11011<· had 111Prit. Our ind<"p<'nd<'nt examination of the 
issues brings us to tbr same co11clusio11, although our analysi~ 
may diffrr so11H'wh::1t 011 >'0lll<' qurstious 
I\' 
Clmrns C'oMemwg t:he ,I nlu11omy of the Executive Bm11ch 
l'lw .\('t \\'US tll<' product of ,1oi11t action by the Congrc-ss 
,111d Presidc' 11t Ford, who signed thr bill into law. It is 
tlwrdtir<' urged by 111terv<'11or-appellees that. rn this circum-
stance, the case does uot truly present a controversy concern-
rng the separation of powers. or a controversy concerning the 
Prcsirlrntial privilege of confidentiality. because. it is argued, 
such claims may be asserted only by incumbents who are 
prPsently responsible- to the American people for their actiou . 
.\s shall 1><' f'C'n, we need not resolve all of these contentions, 
for eveu assuming that appellant, as a former President. may 
IH' heard to assert that Joint artion by the Congress and the 
i11cumbent President will upset the constitutional balance of 
,go\wnmc'n tal po\\'ers. we hold that neither his separation of 
- -po~ 'rs elaun 1101· his rla~~ lireach of constitutional privile_ge 
!tu~ merit -..........._ 
• f.l.•~ )$..•'4•t-«..v...J ~ Uu-~ 
&r;:;;:;/-- ~~L ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ .. ~~.., ? ~..,~.J ~ 
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Appellant argues broadly that the Act encroaches upon 
Presidential prerogative to control iuternal operations of the 
Presideutial office a11d therefore offends the autonomy of the 
Executive Branch. The argument is divided into separate 
but interrelated parts. 
First. appellant contends that Congress is without power to 
delegate to a subordinate officer of the Executive Branch the 
decision whether to disclose Presidential materials and to 
prescribe the terms that govern any disclosure. To do so, 
appellant contends. constitutes. without more, a11 impennis-
sibl<' interference by the Legislntive Branch i11to matter 
inherently the business solely of the Executive Branch. 
i econclly, appellant· co11tcnds. somc\\'hut more narrowly, 
t hatbyauthorizing the Administrator to take custody of all 
Presidential materials in a "broad, undiffere11tiated' ' manner, 
and in authorizing future publication except where a privilege 
L afTfrmatively established. the Act offends the presum ptive 
confidentialit of P csid ntial comrnu11ications recoO'nized in 
Unite tates v. 1\"ixo11, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). He argues t at 
th~ t • Court erred in two respects i11 re,iecti11g this 
contention. First, he contends that District Court erred in 
distinguishing incumbent from former Presidents in evaluating 
appellant's claim of confidentiality. enlike the very specific 
privilege protecting against disclosure of state 8Pcrcts alld 
sensitive information that concern military or diplomatic 
matters, which appellant concedes may be asserted only by an 
illcumbent President, Brief for Appellant 81-90, appella11t 
asserts that the more generalized Presid ntial privTie e sur-
vi\Yt"s ~ ern1111a IOU o t 1r res1 e - isor relations 1ip 
n uc 1 as t 1e attorney-client pnv1le e survives the relatwns 1ip 
ti~ 1 • ecoud. appe ant argues t at the District 
Court erred in applying a balancing test to his claim of 
PrPsidential privilege and in concluding that. notwithstanding 
the fact that some of the materials might legitimately be 
r.9v~re(l, with.in ~ cl{lill1 of Pre:5iclrntial confidentiality, sub.,. 
75-1605-OPINION 
NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES 13 
stantial public interests outweighed and justified the limited 
inroads on Presidential confidentiality necessitated by the 
Act's provision for government custody and screening of the 
materials. Finally, appellant contends that the Act's authori-
zation of the process of screening the materials itself violates . 
the privilege and ~ chill the future exercise of constitu- 1 
tionall )rotected executive f uiictions. thereby inhibiting the 
ability of future resi euts to obtain the candid advice neces-
sary to the conduct of his constitutionally imposed duties. 
Separatio1~of Powers ~/..,..,_t ,a.,,/-~ ( 
We reject at the outset appella11t's argurne_n_t b ttl1e Act's 
regulation of the function of the Executive Branch in the 
control of the disposition of Presidential rnaterials constitutes 
without more a violation of the priuciple of separation of 
powers. Neither President Ford 110r President Carter support 
this claim. The Executive Branch became a party to the 
Act's regulation when President Ford sig11e<l the Act into law, 
and the administration of President Carter, acting through the 
Solicitor General. vigorously supports affirmance of the Dis-
trict Court's judgment sustaining its constitutionality. More-
over, the function remains in the Executive Branch. The 
Administra.tor of the General Services Administration , who 
must promulgate and administer the regulations that are the 
keystone of the sta.tutory scheme. is an official of the Executive 
Branch. appointed by the Presidellt. The career archivists 
appointed to do the initial screening for the purpose of select-
ing out and returning to appellaut his private and personal 
papers similarly are Executive Branch employees. 
The argument is in any event based on an interpretation of 
the separation of powers doctrine inconsistent with the origins 
of that doctrine, receJ1t decisions of the Court. and the con-
temporary realities of our political system. 'I'rue, it has been 
St¼id that "each of the three general departments of govern-
l 1 '\l\t>\' 1· Al>:\llKf~THATOR OF GE:--JERAL SERVICES 
ll1<'11t I 111ust n•mai111 <•11tm,ly frre from the control or coercive 
J11fhw1H·<·. dirl'<'t 01 111din•et. of either of the others .... " 
II Ulllplirf!y·8 8.rffulor \'. t ·mted Stales, 29.5 F S. 602, 629- 630 
1 Hn.1,. aud that "l t I lw sound application of a principle that 
nrnkes u1H• 111aster in his own house precludes him from 
1mpof-i11g his <'ontrol i1, tlw housr of another who is mastrr 
tlH'1·t•." Id .. at 0;10: :-;e(' ali'o UDonoghuf' v. U11ited Stales, 
.2'"'\J l·. ~- ,11G ( HJ3;3); Springer v. Government of lhe Philip-
1ii11e ls/011cls, 'J.Ti l ". ~- 189,201 ( 1028). 
l 
But tlw 111orc pragmatic. JiC'xihl<' approach of Madison and 
:VI 1 .J 11st1<·<· ~tur.v · \HI." <•x pn•ssl~· affirnwd liy tlw C'OUrt only 
thn·<· y•·:11· ago 111 ( ' 111/<'rl 8foiP-8 ,· . .\'i.ro11. 418 C'. f-;. 683 
i l\li•+l Tlic•n• tit<· :-au,c• hroad nrgulll<'llt concerning the 
•wpt-11,111011 of JHl\\c•r:- 11as 1J111d<' l.1· appellant in the context of 
uppo,-1l l(>t1 to :1 -.,1il>poc•nn <lures /;ecu111 of th<· \Yatergate :-:ipecial 
Pro:--(•c·11lor 1(1, c·c•rta111 Pn·Hid<'11tial tiqws and docunwnt.<; 
\lad1,,,11, 111 Tl11· F1·d<·rnl1st \u -17, n·, t(•11·111g Ilic· origiu of the• ,.;('Jmra-
lilll o[ poll'( r., doc-I rtll('. c·umnH•ni,,d !lull "Io Ill th<· ,.;fit?;h I l-'~t vip11· of t lw 
1; :t1sl1 1·(HH111111011 \\'1' mu.,1 Jl<'l'(\'IH'. th.ii tlH' lt•gi,latil'l•, ('X,c·111i\'f• and 
111d•1·1;11.1 <il'p: rtt1H •111, ar(' l,1 110 m1•:111, 101;111>· ,,c•para l(' and di,.;till('( 
" l'()tn 1·:1,·h 1th<•1' Till' F1•d1•rnl1,1 :J:.!.i (.J. ('ool,,· C'd. 1!:HH) . Ile· 1·on-
1111111•d 1:·111,, rk :1,g ,h:11 \lont1•,q111, •1 1. tlw "oraC'lc •·· al11a>·" coustdt(•d c111 
I h, ,111 IJ('('i, 1rl . ;II :l:.!4 
·,1111 not 1111·:111 111:11 1IH•s<' d1'1,.11t1u1•111~ ough1 lo h111(' 110 partial ay1•11c.1r 
111. ,11 110 1,11.lrol o,1•r tli1· ;u·t, 01 l'aC'h oth, ·r !)1,- mc·:111i11g, :1~ hts O\\'ll 
1111nl, 1 1q»•rl ,·1111 :1m,H11H IP tJ(> mon· th:111 thi,. 1lwt wlwn· tlw 
11 ho/, 111 ,11, r of 1111 · ,J,·partlll('llt 1, r·,r·n°1S1•d h>· 1IH• :-;anH· h;tl)(I, wh1c·h 
pus. ,, llH ,,.J,o/,• 11r,11Tr of aJ1oth1•r ,t,•pa rt111('lll , tlw i't1J1cl,1m1•nt:1l pri11-
•·1pl1·- 01 :1 Irr••· ('(lll,t1t11t1011 nn• ~llhY<·rtPd .. Id .. nt ;'!2S- :QG (cmpha:;itj 
'II 11rig111:1I I 
"llllil::rl> .l11s111·1· -"lc1r> 111011· 
'I \\ !h,· 11 11,• ,,1w;1k of :1 .,c•par:it11>J1 (J[ th1· thn•P gn·:tf d1•part1n<•nt,. 
·1 J1d 11 1:11 111:1111 th:11 tlw ,,·par:iiio ll 1., ind1,p1·11:-ah!P lo p11hlic· lilwrt)· , 11·c• 
:• n· 1,, 1111d1•r,t11 11d th,~ m:1x1m 111 ;1 limitr•d ,.;1•u,-,c·. [t 1;; 1101 nH•;11Jt lo 
itlinn li:i1 1,11·.1· 1111 1~1 IH • k1·p1 11!1011.1 :111d 1•J1t1r0h· ,-,,•p:irat(' :111d di,.;iim·f, 
tlHI lt:11 •' llo l'OIJltl](11l 1111k ur {'()lllll'('I IC , 11 or dc•p('IHIC'll('('. l I:,• Oil(' llJ)OII tlw 
,tl1<•1. 111 1IH .,ligh 11 •, 1 ckgn•1· I .J . ;-i1ory, ('omtnl'tari(•, on tlw Co11:-;titu•. 
11111 ~ .-,·2:; I \l l',1g,•lcl\\ "'I. l!-lfl.~I 
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of valll(' to a P<'t1d1ng cr1111inal i11vPstigation. AHhougli 
a1·knuw1t,<1µ,i 11g that <•iwh lmwrh of th <' Uo,·('l'lltnc11t ha1:; the 
dttt)' i111tially to intPrpr<'t tlw ( ·011stitutiou for itsC'lf. and that 
it:- i11t<'rprrl atio11 of it::; pow<'r8 is duC' great res1wct fron1 the 
othN branclw~. 418 £' . S., at 70:3. the Court squarely rejected 
1h(• argu11w11t that tli<' Constitution contemplates a compkte 
rlivisioll of authority between the three branches. Rather, 
) 
11·<· <•tnhra<:Nl Justic<' Jackson's view expressed in his concur-
r1•1H'<• 111 You11gstow11 ShePl & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 
-)iq. 6% ( l!J,521 
· I 11 des1g11i11g. t.he structure of our Government and 
d1v1d1ug and allocating the sovereign power among the 
thn'P <'(H'qttal branches. the Framers of the Constitution 
,.;011µ,ht to provide a comprehensive system, but the sep-
arrlll:' po11•e1-.~ iuere not utf Pnded to operate wit/1 absolute 
111rleJJe11de111·e." 4IX r. ,-;., at 707 (emphasis supplied). 
L,kt- tlH• Dist rn·t ( ·oun. wr thrrefore find that appellant's 
argu11H'11t n-'st~ upon a11 "archaic view of the separation of 
pu\1·1•rs a:- n•qt1iri11g three airtight departments of government," 
•.HJ~ F. :-iupp .. at M:2. Rather, in determining whether the Act 
l 
d1:-ruptR tl1<' proper balance between the coordinate branches 
t lie· iuquiry requir<>s analysis of the extent to which it prevents 
tlw Ex0eutiv0 Brauch fro111 accomplishing its constitutionally 
nss111,n<>d fu11ctio11s. l mted &ates v. Xfro11, 1:,--upra, 418 'C. S., 
at 711 71:!. Only when• the potential for disruption is pres-
\'lll. 111111:;t. we• thell df'tcrmine whether that impact is justified -+-" 
I\)' nn ove1-ridmg llf'ecl to promote objectives within the &.-1 
<·1>11:-titut101ial authority of Congress to promote. Ibid. ~ 
1 
I~~ 
It 1s. tli<'rdorc. highly relevant t,hat the Act provides for I ~.--, 
<·t1-;tody of th<' materials by officials of the Executive Brauch, ._.,,_,.. J 
I E l h 11 h !~-.. ~-:1111I t 1at ('mploy00s of the ~ xccutive Branc 1 s a ave access -~ 4 - ,~~ 
1<1 t lw n1aknals only ''for lawful Government use, subject to ~: -; t:,,,t,,,A-,-.1 
tlH' I Ad111i111~trator's I regulatiolls:' ~ 102 ( d); 41 CFR lfAJl-'I 
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rials may be made available for USE' iu judicial proceedings, 
this provision is expressly qualified by any right, defenses. or 
privileges that any person may invoke including. of course, a 
valid calim of executive privilege. United States v. Nixvn, 
.~'upra Similarly, althQugJ! s~me of the materials l]}ay eventu-
f 
all y be rnac!f.. avail~horvuTtri"c access. the Act expressly 
r0cognizes tt; nee'tr"6otf("to p/:t'tect any party's opportunity to V assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege," 
\i 104 ( a)( 5), and to return purely private materials to appel-
lant. ~ 104 (a)(7). Tlwse provisions plaillly guard against J 
. • J- hsclusun•s hatTl'd hy any dPfr118e:-- or privlieges available 
~ ~ to app<>llant or thP Executiv0 Branch ! And appellant hin1-
-~~ ·elf conct•dcs that the \et "do<>s 11ot make the preside11tial ,., ~ r materials available to tlw Congress-except insofar as Con-
~ . .,; gressnl<'n are '.nenib~rs .. of tl~e, 1~ublic and entitled to access 
(
~. ~ when the pubh<" has 1t. Bnef for AppPlla11t 119. · Thus the 
~ • Exe~ t1ve Branch rernai11s 111 full control of the Presidential 
materials, and the Act facially is designed to ensure that the 
.J-0 n1atenals can be re>leased only when release is not barred· by 
~ome applicable pnvilegc• that inheres in that branch . 
.. J Thus, whatever are tlw future possibilities for constitutional 
V\ 1•011flict 111 the promulgation of n'gulations respecting public 
·1c·cc•ss to particular docunwnt~. nothing contained in the Act 
rp11dcrs it unduly d1srupt1vt• of the Exl'cutivc Branch and, 
therefon•. u11coust1tut10nal 011 its face. Aud, of course. there 
1s abundant statutory prpcedent for the regulation aud mauda-
tory disclosurp of documents in the possession of the Executive 
"St'P abo, e y., I K Davi~, Admim:st rativc L1\1' Tr!'ati:sr § 1.09 (1958) ; 
, GuntlH'r, Con:stitu11onnl Law: Ca~e;; und \fa1enaJ;; -100 (9th eel. 19i5) ; 
L . . Jaff<•, ,Jud1cial Control of Admini~trativc Action 28-:m (1965); Cox, 
Ex<•e11t1v<' Privilcµ;(•, 122 ( i or l'a L. Hcv . 1:38:3, nt 13~i-l::l91; Ratner, 
Ext'cutiv(• Pri\'IIC'µ;r, S<>lf l1H'nmina1ion, and thr SPpnration of Powers 
lllu~ion, 22 l ' C L. A L. l{py \!2-92 (Hli4) 
ThP D1~1 nrt Court eorr1•c·tlr intrrprrt <>d the Act to reqmre meaningful 
1101ic(· 10 np1wll:111t or areh1val ci<'ri.•1011~ 1hat might bnng into play 
riµ;ht~ ~Pt'\lrP<l. ll\· § 104 (;1) (5) HIS F ~llpp,;34() IL 1:3. 
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Branch. See, e. g., the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. 1 ~~ 
: 552 (Supp. V); the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S. C. § 552 (a) ~~ __1£ 
(Supp. V); the Federal Records Act. 44 .e. S. C. § 2101 et seq.; J.o  -~
1 and a variety of other statutes, e.g., 13 U.S. C. §§ 8-9 (ceusus .,.~ ~ 
data); 26 U. S. C. § 6103 (tax returns). Such regulation of ~,-
material geuerate<l in the Executive Branch has uever been -:,J 
4
~ A.,.r 
considered invalid as an invasion of the autonomy of the ~..._.. 
Executive Branch. Cf. Environmental Protection Agency v. /l'V - , '-"~ -
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973); FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. U~ of, 
.J ... r,,., t:,c.A.. 
255 (197-).8 Similar congressional power to regulate Execu- J1"11 
t1ve Branch docu11H•11t~ <•xist~ i11 this instance, a power that is A-
augmented by the important interests that the Act se<'ks to -, _ 1 Q.,, ~L . 
attain. Seein/ra,at-, ;\/ ~ • ,~ 
' Wr :,;re 110 rru~on to euf(ag<.· 111 th(' debate• wlwtlwr appellant has 
!Pg11l titlr tn thr matrriab. 8<><' Brief for Appellant 90. Sueh an inquir~· 
,_ irrr!r,·ant for prrsent p11rpo,.;rs berau:;c• § 105 (c) as,,urr:,; nppellant 
of 1m;t romprnsation 1f his private propert~· i:s taken, and, rven if lrgal 
t1tlt• is hi,.;, thr materials an• not thereby immtme from regulation. 
Tt ha:; lwen nrc<'pted ,once nt lra:;t Mr. ,Ju:;t icr Story':; opinion i11 Folsom 
v Marsh, 9 Fed. Cm;. ;{4:!, 347 (1841) that rpgardle:.'8 of wherr legal 
titl<• lie~ . " from tlw naturr of tllf' public :srrvirP, or th~ rhararler of 
tloc11mt'11t,;, rmbrnring hi4orir:d. milit,1ry , or diplomatic information, 
1t may b<' tlw right, and rvt'll tlw duty, of tlw g;ovC'rnment, to give them 
public1t.\', C'ven :1gni11st thP will of th C' writns .., Appellant':; ~ugge~tion 
that the Folsom prim·iplr doC';; not go br~·oncl' matl'riab concerning 1m-
1wual src•11rity and r11rrent govrmmrnt bu:,;ine;;;; 1::. nrgared by Mr .. Ju:,;tice 
:4tory ',; l'lllphas1:,; that ii also extended to materiaf:; ·'embrneing histori-
nl •.. 111form:1tion.' ' Id., al a47 . (Emphasi:; ndded.) Significantly, 
no l11111tat1011 wa, ,;ugge:;ted in thr Attorney -Grneral ',.: opinion to President 
.Ford . J\Jtho11gh indiC'a.ting :i viC'w tlrnt legal title to the materinls be-
lollgl•cl to appellant. the opi11io11 :lcknowlrdged that '·Presidrntial mate-
na l-.." without q11:1lilil'ation .. are peculiar!~- atfrcted by a public interest" 
11hirh ma~ j11,.;tif., ,.,111Jjrrling .. 1he nb:solute owner,;hip right:;" to certain 
·]11n11at10n, din·c-tl~· n•latrd to th(• r haracter of tlw documents a:; rrcord,; 
ol gtW(' riltTH' lll :IC•l f\ 11~- '' 
1 )f •·011N· if I 1lil' ,,., fo1111rl lo he in !hi:' go,·rrnnwnt rnther than 
:ipp<•lla111, t IH'n ( 'ongrp,-,, .. ant hority to !Pgi~latr 11ndrr the J>ropcrty Clause, 
\ 1·1 I,·, * ;; h rl<'ar Thnt dau:<c• ha, eou,.;i~tr11tl~· been given an ·"ex-
_,:111-1 \f l'l':ttl.i ng . l{ fr JJ(}(' ' · s,,,,, \fc.r,ro, 121i r H. 529, 536 (197(),) .. 
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/Jre:,identfr1l JJnvileyl! 
.\.t tlw c1ub.<0 l. w<• <:011sid<'r tlw i:;eope of Presidential privilege ? 
111 tlii~ co11t<-"xt. \\' <' turn now to llw rc,lated considcrntio11 of 
tlH' c·o1ll<'ntio11 1nad<· by nonfPd<·ral appC'llPPS that only a11 in-
c·urnlH·nt Prcsidc'11t ca11 aF",Prt th<> privilege of the Presidency. 
\cccptanee of that proposition would, of course. encl this in-
quiry. The ront<'llt:011 draws on United States v. Rey·11olds. 
;l-1i1 l". ~- I, 7- P.. ( I\J;);j). when' it was said that the pnv1i'ege 
"lic-101 1µ: ., tu the Uo\·c,rnment nncl must IK' asserted hy it: it. 
1·:u1 IH'lthcr lw daJillt'd 11or wuivl'cl l>y n private party.·· l'lw 
I >1-.;tri<·t ( '011r1. IH'liPvPd that thi:-- stateme11t was strong; sup-
port for the co11tention. hut, found r<'solution of the issue un-
11<'t<'ssa1.r. 408 F. ~upp. :-34:~-:34,1. It sufti.ccd. said th<' Dis-
11i<'t <'ourt. that tlw privil<"~t•. if availahlP tu a fonlH:'r Prei"i-
dl'llt. \\ a:-- at lC'ast Oli<' that "earri<'S much IPss \\'C'igh t thirn u 
l' IHi111 a:--::-ertl'd by tlw i11eurnhent hi1nself." Id., at 34i'>. 
lt is tl'II(' that 011ly the i11cumb<'11t is charged with per-
furinane< ' of th<· ('X<'cutivc duty under the Constitution. And 
dH'n' an•. of course. i11c('11tives t.111:1(, inhil>it a11 incurnbclll from 
1fowlosinµ: conti(!Pnees of a J)l'('<IPCt'srnr when he h<'li<'V<'S that 
tiw t'flPct may ii<' to discouragl' candid preiae11tation of \·icws 
liy Ins advisor:--. :.Vlorcov<'r. to thl' extellt that the privilegc" 
'-('rvt•s "" ~l shi1•Jd tor <'XN'.utiv(' otfirials against burdC'11som0 
n•quPsts [or i11forn111tio11 . :::e<> ['nited 8tnles v. i\'ixo11, supra , 
41X l'. ~ .. al 71-1: d '. Eastland v. C11ited Stales Servicemen's 
Fund, 421 l ' :-,, 4!H. ,101- 5m ( 1~!75); Dombrowski v. h,'ristlrl'lld, 
~87 l ' . ~- 82, 84- 8,S ( 1967) (per curi:arn), a fornwr Pre~icknL 
1s 111 !C'ss 11c'<'d of it tlHrn an incu1nlwnt. In addition. there 
Hn' ohvio11s politi<·al cltc>cks agai11st an incumb<'nt's abuse of 
1 IH· pnvilPµ;(' . 
.\' "' c'rt he'.<•ss. WP th ink that th<' Solicitor General's Brief for 
l1'1·dc 'ral App1•ll1'<'" :3:3 _ "tat(':-- tlw sotlllckr view, and we adopt 
11 - " Thi~ ( '011r1 ht•lcl in [ ' wiled 8.tntes v. Yixon, I 4L 1~. , ' 
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fi83 (HJ74J I that t,lw privih'gP is 11ecei:;sary to provide the 
<"onfidcntiality rt>quired for the President's conduct of 
offic<•. i:~11lPs:-, lw can givp his advisers some assurance of 
1·011fidentiality. a PresidPnt could not ('Xpect t,o receive 
thP full and frank i<Ubmis.-io11s of facts and opinio11s upon 
~, hich effrcti vr discharg(' of his duties depends. The con-
fidc'ntiality 1H•c·c'ssary to this exchange carnwt be rneaimrecl 
by the frw months or y('ars between tlw submission of 
the information and the C'lld of the PresidPnt's teuure; 
tlH· privilc•g<· is not for tlw lwnefit of tlw President as an 
i11diviclual. llllt for the b(•nefit of the Republic. There-
fon• th1· privilege stirv1vc,s the indivi<lual PrC'sident's 
1 !' II lire -
f 
. \1 the· !-.anw t1111P. l10W('VN. the fad that 11(•ither Prc•sicknt 
Ford nor Pn,sidc'11t ( 'art.<'r supports apJ.Jellant\; clairn argues 
aga111st lus cont1•11ticrn t!rnt the• .\ct impermissihly intrnde~ 
111tu tlic· c•x1•e·utive· fu11c-tio11 ,111<1 the' 1weds of tlw Executive 
Bnrnch. This follows for it must, b(' presumed that the in-
1:tu11lw11t Pn•sid<'t1t is vitally co11cer1wd with and i11 Uw best 
po:-itio11 to assl'i"S th<' prP:-(•nt and future lH.'('ds of tlw Ex1•cutive 
Brn11<'h 
The' J )i-.trict ( 'ourt abo c·ouclude<l that appellant's clai1n 
could apply at most to tlw :200.000 items of the estimated 4:2 
m illio11 JHigi•s of ~ )('11111P11ts ==:u'J' 880 tape recordings with 
whil'h hv wa,- pnsonaJly involwd. 408 F. Supp. 345; Xixon 
de•pu1-i11011. at l."'i rn. , \t this stag;e. howev('I', we need not be 
coneernt'd 1, ith \\'hat precii:;c materials 81'(-' covered by the-
privileg;c·. It 11- sufiicient t(' re1ni11d that 1·nited States v. 
.\'i.r<)II, Kupra, lwld that th<' privilege is limited to communica-
11ous "ii! 1wrfon11anec' of I a President's I responsibilities.''' 
-llb l· . :-i. at 711, "of lus office,·· id., at 71:~. a11d comrnunica-
rion!-. ''i11 tlw proePss uf i:;hnpi11g policies and making decisions,·· 
1~ 
u/.,ut70~. ~ 
The' qll(~stw11 or th(• pnvilC'ge is thus narrowed to whether · 
t!hl' ap1wll,u1t . a former Presid('llt. may asflcrt t,hat thC' privilege~,~--' 
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bars the Congress from directi11j the incumbent Presiden~ ~J 
career archivists of the Executive Branch to screen, pursuant ~-
to regulations subject to judicial review, appellant's Presiden- ~ ~ 11 
tial materials, and from later delivering to appellant the 1" ---~ £:A 
private and personal materials among them. We agree with ~~ ? 
the District Court that he may not. d , 
The privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon is a -~ 
quali~iYil~e.v Appellant argued in that case that in 
camera yltie District Court inspection of Presidential 
ocuments and materials subpoenaed by the Special Prosecu-
tm wuuld itsrlf violate' tlH' privilege without regard to whether 
th<' documents were protected from public disclosure. The 
Court chsagreed. stating that "neither the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of 
high-level communications. without more, can sustain an abso-
lute, unqualified Presidential privilege .... " 10 418 U. S., at 
706. The Court recognized that the privilege of confidential-
ity of Presidential communications derives from the suprem-
acy of the Executive Branch withiu its assigned area of con-
)Stitutioual responsibilities, 11 but distinguished a President's 
11 L1kP tlw Di;;trid Court, W<' do not cli:stinguish between the qualified 
'l'X<·c·11t1H'" prl\ 1lc•g(• rr>c•ogrnzPd Ill Unitl'd .States v. Nixon and the 
·· l'1<•:-;1dc•nt1al '' pnvil<'g<· 1 o which a pprllant refer:s, except to note that 
nppt>llant doP::: not argu,, that the privilege he claim:, extends beyond 
he pnvilrgc• n•r·og111zrd 111 that case. Ser 408 F. Supp. 343 n. 24. 
10 l'nit1•d States v. Nixou r<'cognizrd that therr is a legitimate govern-
m<•nt a I 1111 Nr,-t m the conticlPnfotlit~· of communications between high 
governmP111 offiei;1l::;, e. g ., those who advise the President, and that 
' J h J uma11 rxprnr11r<' teaches tlw t thosr who expect public dissemination 
or tllC'II' rrmark:s ma~· wrll trmprr eandor with concem for apprarances 
·111d for I lwir own intere,it" to the detriment of the decisionmaking 
]ll'o('<':<::;." Id., at 705. 
11 lnclPecl, thr opirnon notrd, 418 U. S., at 705 n. 15, that government 
:·onfidrnt iality ha :- bern a con1·c•rn from the time of the Constitutional 
l '011,·p111ion Ill 17:--i , thr m<·rtmg,- of which wrn' ronducted in private, 
I \I F:1na11d. Thr Heeord~ of thr FC'dernl Com·rntiou of 1787, pp. xi-xxv, 
·11Id I lw n•<·onl:,: of which were sraled for more than 30 ycar:s after 
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·'broad, u11<lifferentiatc<l claim of public interest in the con-
fidentiality of such [communications]" from the more parti-
cularized and less qualified privilege relating to the need "to 
protcct. military. diplomatic, or sensitive national security 
secrets . .. .'' Ibid. Tlw Court held that in the case of the 
general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential conunuui-
cations, its importance must be balanced against the inroads 
of the privilege upon the effective functioning of the Judicial 
Branch. This balance was struck against the claim of privi-
lcg<' in that C'.ase becausc tlw Court determined that the 
rntrw,io11 i11to Uu• c·o11fidC'11tiality of Presidcntial communica-
tio11~ r<•::;tilti11g from w <"amera inspectio11 by the District 
Court. ''" ith all th,· protection that a District Court will be 
obliged tu provide," would be minimal and therefore that 
the claim was outweighed by "I. t] he impediment that an 
nbsolut<'. u11qualified privilege would place in the way of the 
primnry co11stitutio11al duty of the Judicial Branch .... " 
Id., at 706- 707. 
Tlw only specific claim of impairment of the Presideut's 
11bilit:v to perform his duties made by appellant is that the 
pot<'11t1al disclosure of communications given to the President, 
rn co11ficknc<' \\'oulcl adversely affcct the ability of future Presi-
dents to ohtai11 thc candid aclvic(' necessary for effective de-
cisio11rnaking. But any eventual public access to these ma-
terial~ must lw U11der regulations not yet prornu1gated. Our 
only pr<'H<•11t inquiry. thrrdore. need he whether tbe guidelines 
of ~ 104 fnc-ially an• in suffi<'i<'nt to protect appellant's clann 
of p7i,~l<·g<'. s·o phrased th(' question is readily resolved. 
Future rpgulations must, take into account the need "to 
protect. a11y party 's. opportunity to assert a constitutionally 
bmwd rig;ht ur privilege." ' ~ 104 (a)(5), and the need to 
rd,urn pun•!~· private materials to appellant. ~ 104 ( a)(7) . 
It is. of cours.<> possible' that a particular interpretation of 
1hr Con,·t,11t 1nt1 . :4P<' :{ Stat. 475, 1.5th Con~ .• 1st Srss., H<'~. (Un, ) . 
$<'<' gc'n<'r:ill;- C , WarrPn. Thr .vfakin~ of the Con~titution 134-rn9 (1937) , 
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the guidelines incorporated into the regulations could give 
rise to future claims challenging application of the Act. But 
the guidelines of ~ 104 ( a) are plainly sufficiently broad 
to require regulatio11s that prevent disclosure of materials to 
persons outside the Executive Branch where such disclosure 
would violate a valid claim of privilege asserted by appellant 
or by the Executive Branch. An absolute barrier to all out-
side disclosure is not practically or constitutionally necessary. 
AE: the careful research by the District Court clearly demon-
:'ltrntes, there has never been an expectation that the confi-
dc1H:(':-' of tlH· c•xN·11 t1\ P offi<·P arc absolute a11d unyielding. All 
fornwr Pn•s1el0n ts si ncc• Pres id en t Hoover have deposited their 
papen, rn Presidential libraries ( an example appellant has 
said he• in tended to follow) for governmental preservation 
am! rve11tual disclosure. 1~ The screening processes for sorting 
materials for lodgment in these libraries also involved compre~ 
hensive rrvi0w by archivists, often involving materials upon 
which access rnstnrtions ultimately have been imposed. 408 
F. Supp .. at 347. The expectation of the confidentiality of 
(•Xe<'.Utivc commu11ications thus has always been limited alld 
sub,il'et to l'l'o:-- io11 over time after a11 administration leaves 
officr . 
Agarn~t tl11~ background. wr agree with the District Court 
n Th<" op1111011 of thr· Dist riet Comt find:,: that , in the Hoover Librar~·, 
I lwrr :tr(• no n ·sl riet 10n~ on Presidential papers, although 80tne restriction:; 
,•xist w11h 1•<',;pret to prr~on:il and privatp material, and in the Roosevrlt 
L1hntr)· , I<•,;, t ha11 0.,5 ':f, of ·thr matPriab are restricted. There is no 
1·v1d011('(• 111 th<' l'('OC'l'd a,; to the p<·rcPntagP of materials currently under 
r,•,1rierio11 iu ilit> Tn11nan or Ei~c·nhower Librnrief'. but in the Kennrclr 
Libra r~·, i-.0 o/, of l lw mn1 (•rial ha:,: bee11 procP:,:sPd, and of the processPd 
111atPri:1k 0111~· O.filX 1~ u11drr donor (n:,; disting:uishrcl from securit~1-
n• lat<'d) n•strn·11011. In tlw .fohnsou Library , review of uonclassifiPd 
111atl'l'ial i:,; virtually eomplPt(•. and more than 99% of all nonsecurity 
,·l:1,,-ifird makri:d:s are 1111restrietrd. In ea<'h of the Presidential Libraries, 
p1 o\·ision hn:,; h<'<'ll niadP for tlw rc>mcwal of t hP re:;trietion::; with th~ 
['H~,:11-!;l' or I 1111(' ~OH F . :"'ill[>[)., at ;Hun. 31, 
. . 
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that "mere screening of the materials .. . [does not] sub-
stantially infringe[ I executive confidentiality, especially in 
I igh t of the practices that might be adopted ... to limit the 
intruE-:ivf'ness of revif'w. '' Ibid. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 
l';llJ!rCl, at 706. There is .110 Pvidence that even remotely sug-
g<•st~ that trai1wd. prof Pssional archivists will fail to perform 
tlic•ir ft111etio11 in a discrete and professional ma1111er. let alone, 
ac:; appellant implies. that they will disclose personal or confi-
dential matters. 
~\fon,o,·er. adeq uat,c~ justifications are shown for this limited 
mtrnsio11 i11to eX('CUtive eo11fide11tiality comparable to those 
l1E>ld to justify the w ca111erCt inspectioll of the District Court 
sustai1H'tl i11 ( '11ited State.~ ,· . .\'ixo 11, S'Upru. Collgress ' pur-
posrf'. in r11acti11g the Act an• exhaustively trcateu in the 
opinion of tlw District Court. Among other purposes. the 
kgislatin• history of tlH' Act <'lE'arly rcvc'als that Congn•ss 
nctE'cl to Psta!Jfo,li regular procedures to deal with the 1wrceived 
11c>cd to pn's<•rvc• the materials for legitimate h1storical and 
go ,·c,r1111wntnl purpos<>s."1 Co ngress could legitimately con-
11 Fn,ui it,; 1•xh:n1,,tn·r ~urvry of th1· ]<:'f!i><lattw hi~tory, the Di~lrict 
( \,u rl ,•oll(•l11d1·d 1h,1t th<' p11hli<· 1nl <' l'<',;h ,;c•rn•d b~· tlw Art ,·mlld I)(' 
nwrf.?;<'d 111id1·r "th,· rn brn· of pn'.-,rn·ation of an :ic·c·ur,11<' ,illcl rornplet l· 
h1-,to ri<"a l n·, ·ord." .J(),s, F. Rupp. :H8-:H9, "ITJi r><r. :rnd most bro:1dl~· . ... 
It, ]' l'f'~<·n Ill)! m:,tr·rial~ 111,on \\'hich hi,,torian:-; mu~t rlra\\' J11 ordrr al'-
•·11ra1d~· 10 l'l'l'Olllll :ind to 1udgP il l<' pulitil'al hi~lor~ of 0111· tinw. ,('1', 
,·. y .. 8 J:,·p . ~o. 9:1--lli-> l . !l::ld Cong., 2d Srti"., ai 1, ;{ \19i4); H . H. 
f{,,p. ,\., , D:, l.iOi, 9:~rl Coll/!. 2d SPti~., at 2, 3. 8 (1!:Ji-!) : ,Senate Jfrarings 
"" <:5,A R,u11/atw1,s. nt :2.'i(i: 120 Cong. Hrr . S. Hi8'il (cl:1il~· Pei. Srpt. 18, 
1!17 I) (n·m:irk, ol' :·kn. ~d:<on): id., at S. 182:15 (dnil~· ed. Oct.:{, 19i4); 
ul .. :it S. 11'2-i'- (n•mnrk,-, of S1•11. Ervin) ; id., at ~- 1.-.:259 (n•markti of 
-~I'll. Huddh,;1011): i,/.. at S. lS:200 (rrmark- of 8l'n . Hiuicoff); id., at 
:-,;, l~<?Gl (n,111:1rb of S<"ll. \Ju~kir): id .. nt S. IK:{25 (dail~· <'cl. Oct. 4, 
n17J) (r,·111 :irk~ uf Sr n .• ·rbon) ; id .. at H. l UOi (dail~· ('{I, DPc. 3, 
1\lif) (n•111arh nf H<'p . Brad(•m: 1,; ), Sl'e abo §§ 101 (b) (1), 10-i (a) (i) 
1,' tlH' .\rt ' Sc·rondl~·, ilw Act wa~ dc•;-; igtwd "lo rn,rnre tlwir 
,1Y:iilabilil~ for ~11r•1•l'~>< tVt' admi ni;-;trat ion;; Pngaf!('d in polic·~·making. See 
" . Hep '\u '. 1;{ I !SI, 0:k[ Con[! .. '2d ~:b,:;,, :it a, 4, 5 (19i4); H. H. Hep, 
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24 IXO • v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES 
elude that the materials should be entrusted to expert handling 
and not left to haphazard review by persons-former Chief 
Executives or their families-who are untrained in such mat-
ters, particularly when they always have a possible incentive 
to select materials that better their standing in history. 14 
Other substantial public interests that led Congress to seek to 
preserve appellant's materials were the desire to restore public 
confidence in our political processes by preserving the materials 
a::; a source for facilitating a full airing of the events leading 
lo appella11t's resignation. a1ict t o11grcs::;' need to understand 
huw those political proc<.>sse::- had in fact operated in order to 
guage the necessity for n•medial legislation.rn Thus by pre-
1· 0 9:3- 150i, !):3d Cong., ~d H1':::s., al:~ (1974); 1:20 Cong. Rec. H. 11211 
1d:11l~· rd. IJt•e :{, Hl7-l) (n·tH:irks of Hep Abzug) Src ril,;o ~<'ction 
I0:2(d) or tlw Ad" Id .. :it :H9-:)50 
11 Lt i:s mstruc-t1,·r to notr the fate of the paprr~ ncrumulatrd during 
,tie Adm1111strntw11 of Warrc•n Harding, who:-;e Prr~idenry was markrd b~· 
the• Trapot DollH' .1ffair. n highly publicized politiral scandal which, 
at lc•ns! m trrm~ of uotom·t~·, wa~ not unilkr Watergate. Aftrr Harding's 
de.1th while III ofl-irt', tlw p:iJH'rs W<'re packrd and store. :Mrs. Harding 
11rnlrrtook to rl"movr and l"Xaminr the '·Private Office" matrrial, and 
·• 1 hJrr ob,1c•et1vr ~<•rm" lo lu1Yr liee11 tlw de:,:tructio11 of anr material 
which might haw proY<'ll harmful to the memor~· of her husband." 
Shr burned :-01111· papPr" whil<' they were still at the Whitr House. 
Aftrr tlw n'maill(kr wpn• :<hipJH'd to Ohio. '.\Ir,:;. Harding ''allwnately 
.fp:;ignat I eel] md1ndual H!'tn:< or <•ntire folders for destruction . . . . The 
amount I HI<' lof file" dP:<t ro~·pcl b~· ,\lr:;. Harding cannot be accurately 
:1:<r(•rtain<'d: 1ho11gh gap,- u1 t II!' Jilr n11mber,:; of the private oflice papers 
•do mdicatl' that she ma~· havP burned a~ many or more than half 
rllC• 1rn11c•nal avnilablr to her." Lr11tz, Thr Warren G. Harding Papers, 
;it '2-:{. nnd n. 3. (Ohio I-fotorical Socirty, Columbu~, Ohio, 1970) , 
Tln· PrPHtdrntrnl pnp<' r~ of Pre:-idr1118 Pierce. Arthur, and Coolidge 
111:1_,. h:1v1• :-;uffered from cl<·Ht ruction initiatrd or authorizrcl by these 
l're:-;1de11h. ~lcDonough , Who Own,; PrPsidrntial Papers'?, 27 Manu-
..,c-npt,; '2, ti ( 1975) 
1
" PrP:,mlrnt,; 1ll th<· pa:-;t h:wc• had to apply to thr Prrsidential Librarir::i 
1f tlH•1r prrdPc1•,;,;or~ for pt>rrni~:-iou to rxaminr records of post govern-
1111•ntal :1<·11011., n•lntu1g 1·0 <-urrrut govrrnnwntal problems. See 408 F, 
-..1,pp •1 1 :{,'J l-:3.'i'2 \!though ,t appears th.it most ~uch requests J1ave 
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·erving these materials. tl te Act n 1ay be thought to ai<!, the { ~ ~ 
le,.islativt' process and Congress' broad congressional investi- ) ~ -- ' ~A~ 
gati~ wer, sc<'. e.g .. Hci.sllcwd "· nite tates ervicell/,en's ~ ~..,,,- - J 
Fw1d, supra. And. of course. the Congress repeatedly referred 
to the importa11ce of the materials to the judiciary in the 
event that tlwy shed light upon issues in civil or criminal liti-
gatio11, a social interest that cannot be doubted sec U11ited 
.States \', si:xon, supra.JU 
1n light of t,hese objectives, the screening of the materials 
is rompcll<•d bc,cause the· materials are it 1111x, coutarning 
1ffl onnut'rtJ11 t·sse11t1al to the future co11duct of the Executive 
Offi<·<·. a~ "·ell as confidential co11unu11ications; materials 
rPlal ing to military and diplomatic :-;ccrPls, as well as purely 
pc-r~o11a I <·011 vPrsa tions bet"veen the former Presicle11 t and his 
fn1•11(I~ 01 ltt('mlwrs of his family. Appellant made no attempt 
10 "'<'P,T<'g.11l<· j)('l'SOnal, political. or official documents. 40c F. 
S11pp .. at a.35. The materials were gathered hastily by his 
-;tafi e111ploy<'PS, and little is k11ow11 ns of this date of the 
lh•c·n gr:111t<•d Congres:, could leµ;1timn1el~ · eoHclud(-' that llw sit11:1tion 
\\':1, 1111'1 :ti ,11 · :1 11d npr for change. Ii i,- C'IPH r from the l'H<•P of t lw Art 
1 h:1t 111:1k111g t IH· n1atenal:; availab!P for tlw on-going comluet of Pl'(••i-
.f<'nl 1:il poll(·~· \\'a,.; :it lem,t one of th<' obj<'clivl'" of the . .\et. See~ 10:2 (d) . 
'•· _\, tn tlw,P -<'veral objective:; of th,, ll'g:i,-latme. ,-pp S. Jfrp .• · o. 
'.J:{ 111.; I. n:,d Cong. 2d Sess., at 3-4, ti ( H.174) ; H. R. Hrp. No. 9:{-1507, 
H:ld <'onµ;. :!d S<•,.;~ .• at 2, 8; 120 Cong. lfrC' . S. 16Sil (dail~· ed. Sc•pL 18, 
11)711 (n·mark,, of Sen. Nebon); id., at S. JS:!::!::! , 1K:n5 (daily ed. Oei.3 , 
l! li' -!) . 1</ .. :11 H 11207 (daily ed. Dec. :3, H)74) (remark,- of l{{•p , 
llrad,·111:1"). ul .. at H. 11211 (n-'marks of Bt>p . .\IcKinm',,·). S<•e 11bo 
)( JOI (:1 l ol' th<· Act. See also S. Rep. No. 9;3-1181, !:)::!cl Cong., 2d 
.\ ,,. .. al :J 1 (HJ74); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, 9:{d Cong., 2d Se,-;,;., at 
.! :,. " 0974). 120 Cong. Rec. S. HiS71 (rlail~· rd. Rept. 18, l!-J74) 
\ n·m:,rk,; pf S1•n. Nel:,;on) ; id., at S. 182:35 (dail~· <•d. Oct.:\ 1974). Sec 
d.,11 S. H, ·p :"l'o 93-1181 , 93d Cong., :2d Se,-~ .. ai 1, 4, G (1974); 
II H Hq> . ·o 93-1507, 93d Cong., 2d Rrss., at 2, 3. 8 (1974): 120 
r " ng l{p1• ::\ 16870-16871 (daily ed. Sept lX. 1974) (remark:; of S<·ll. 
Plso11l . 1,/ .. :tt S. 18233 (daily ed. Oct . :3, l!:)74); id .. a1 U. IJ:!07 
cl:iil~ I'd l>c•<· ,{ , 1974) \remark:-- of Rep. Bradm1a,;). S<'c abo §§ JO:./ (IJ), 
11 I , :1 l (:2) of I lie Ad. 
•' 
, 
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content of many of the boxes in which the material is stored. 
Even individual documents and tapes often intermingle com-
munications relating to governmental duties, and of great 
historical interest, with private and confidential communica-
t10n . Ibid. 
The Act authorizes retention by the government of only 
those materials that have historical significance. See §§ 101 
(b)( l) ; 104(a)(7). It authorizes DO immediate public 
a.ccess. At present, and for the immediate future, only I 
appellant. officials of the Executive Branch in the conduct of 
their official duties, and the archivists who will screen and 
classify the materials, will have access to them. Before any 
public acct'ss is provided, the materials will be scrutinized by 
govermneut archivists to separate privileged materials, which 
under § 104 (a) (5) will notJ >e disclosed, from nonprivileged 
matters, which if they are not private and returned to 
appellant will be disclosed but only under regulations promul-
gated by the Administrator, subject to federal review. · ThereJ 
ts no reason to infer that this screening process will lead to 
disclosur:s= rn violation of appellant's privilege; indeed § 104 
~a) ( 5) explicitly preserves it. 
-
lt 1s Urns clear that Congress chose narrow means to accom-
plish its unportant goals. lt is, of course. true that in sifting 
thro ugh the materials all(.I cataloguing them-some to · be 
returned to appellant, some to be permanently stored. and 
some cveutually to be made available to the public-the 
archivists will b<> reyuired J.o vie)\;. both purely pi'ivate mate-
rials anJ materials which may contain sensitive. confidential 
comm umcat10ns Ge"fa:°een tfie "Toifoer P reslaen t and his fu!uily 
, nd closP advisors. Tfut given the safeguards built into the 
Acl'"toj')revcnt uisclosure of such mate~ials, this very minimal 
intrus1011 rnto the co11fidentiality of the Executive Branch is 
out\\'e1ghed by the unportance of Congress' purposes in pre-
serving tlw matenals and maintaining access to , them for 
-n..,,,-c.., '-"'-" 
~4-4•~ 
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~J 
In short. we conclude that the screening process coutem-s ,jy-./J4"~ 
plated by the Act will not co1l8t1tu t_e a mn,re sevel'e mt111,5ion T ~ 
into exeeuti_ye confidentialitytha11 the in camera. inspection ~ 
by the =r5fstiTe't Court approved in United States v. 11·ixon, 
s'upra, 418 (-.~-,at 700. We must of course presume that the '""--; -4~~~ 
Achnini:--trator and tlw career archivists concerned will carry ~-;,,~ 
1 
-
oul tile dutie,.., assig11<>d them uy the Act. Thus. there is no '
basis for appella11t'f-' claim that the Act ·'reverses" the pre-
'-Ull1 ptio11 111_ favor of confidentiality of Presidential papers 
n·<·ognizl'<i i~ r ·111te fl°R tate:::r Y • • \.Lwn. Appellant's right to 
11.~s1·rt tlw pr!\· 1 h~g.1 · 1:-- specifi<"a.lly prt'served by the Act. The 
guHlc•l.in<' pro,·i:--io11~ 011 tlwir foe:<• are as bl'oad alS the privilege 
11:--l'lf lf thl' lll"uadl~· \\Tittp11 protPction~ of the Act should 
_,,,,__ 
~ 
1w,. ..... 4 ,-.c ~ 
nPvc•rtl1dp:,;:,; pro\'(' 11wd<•quate to safeguard appellant's rights A,(A..,rt e..le .,...._, 
u1 lo p1<•v<•nt 11:--urpatio11 ot Pxeeutivp powers. there will be • 
t111H• c·1wugh to cu11sider that prol,lc~n1 in a specific factual C., • .t..,._,.,.,.,_,/'( 
t·ontPxt. For (Ii(• pn•s(•nt. \\"l' hold. in agreeme11t with tlw ,e.. ~
l)i,-trl('l C'uurt. lliat tl11• .\C'I 0.11 its face does 11ot violate the 
1 
~ !: 
l 'n•:--ld('lll ial pr1rill')!(' of tuididt•ul iality. .,.,_~....,......._rs 
V (V ,-(.4.,~ 
~ 1-ur.1c 1' ~• • •1' ._.,, e --c} 
l\ppPllant ('Olll'ed(J:,; lhat whe11 he f'lltered public life he 
vol11111 arily ~UIT<'lHlerPd tlw printcy seemed by law for those 
\,\,hu Plc•et 11ot to plac<' IIH·111s<'lves i1J the public spotlight. 
,'<'<'. E y .. Y, 11· l'ork 'l'i111e8 Co. "· fiullivan, 376 U. S. 254 
f I !J(H ) Ht' mgu<'s. liuwcw•r, that he was not thereby 
.'.'1ripped ol ail !Pµ:al prutcetion for his privacy, and contends 
that the' \c·t ,·1olal,!;::: fuJ1da11w11ta.l rights of express1011 and 
p i ·l\1H'j' !!, u'itl'a1 1t 1-•ed to h11u hy the F ll'st, Fourth and Fifth 
lllt'IH I lll('ll I;. .-
I'll<' J >i:-triel { 'our! lrt·at1·cl appellnnt's argument as ad-
I 11-ot:11 :,- :iJ>J>f•ll:1111 :1rg111 -., a pri'",H'Y daim ba:sed upon the Flr.:it 
.\1111·~1l1111t•111 _ ',f'(' 1' ·1 1'1 \"I /11/ ( (J _ 
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dr1'S-il'd only to the process by which the screening of the 
tnnt('rials will b<> performed. "Since any claim by [appellant] 
Lliat his privacy " ·i ll b<> invaded by public access to private 
111atcrials must be considered premature when it must actually 
be dirc,cted to the regulations once thry become effective. we 
11pf•d not consider how the materials will be treated after they 
·ire reviewed." 408 F. Supp .. at 358. Although denomi-
11:1ti11g the privacy claim " [ t l he most troublesome challenge 
that plaintiff raises ... ,'' id., at 357. the District Court 
co1H·lrnled that the claim was "vithout merit. Tlw court 
n•11srnwd that the proportion of the 42 million pages of docu-
1 •w11t ~ and 80 tap<' recordings implicating appellant's privacy 
11it<'rcsts was quite small si 11ce tlie great bulk of the materials 
n•lat.c·d to appellant's conduct of his duties as PrPsident, and 
were tliC'reforc n1al<'rials to which great public interest 
:1ttached. Tht> touchstone of I he lrgality of the archival 
pruccs ing. 111 thP District Court's view. was its reasonableness. 
Balancrng the publi(' intC'rest in pres<:'rving the materials 
touching appellant's perforrnance of his official duties against 
the invasion of appellaut·s privacy that archival screening 
tH'C:e~aril:v p11tials. the District Court concluded that the 
\<•t wa:- not umPasonabk and hence was not facially 
1111runsti tu tiuna I 
"Here, we have a processillg scheme without which 
uational i11tcrests of overriding importance cannot be 
,:;en'Pd ,'' ld., at. al34 . 
. \.ct "is a reasouable 
/J-c 's-
fJ.le,,.....,..,,t_ 
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Court that the Act does not unconstitutionally invade appel-
lant's right of privacy. 
011(' element of privacy has been characterized as "the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ter8. '' VT'halen v. Roe, 45 U. S. L. W. 4166, 4168 
( Fen. 22, 1977). We may agree with appellant that, at least 
wlwn government intervention is at stake. public officials, 
111duding the President, are not wholly without constitution-
.ti ly protected privacy rights in matters of personal life that 
"have no legitimate relation to or bearing upon any act done 
hr I thcrnJ i11 a public ... capacity." Brandeis and Warren, 
I'lw Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193. 215-216 (1890). 
l'rPsicJents who have established Presidential Libraries have 
usually withhdd matters concerned with family or personal 
finances, or have deposited such materials with restrictions on 
rhei r screening. 408 F . ,' upp., at 360. l ti \\-?e may assume 
'' Till' 01,tri('t Court, 408 F Supp., nt 350 11. 54, 1:,1.1rveyed evidence 
u1 l h<· n·eord n•spPrting depo,.;Itor~· rrstrict ion,.; for n11 Prrsidrnt;; ;;ince 
I 'n ·,1d<·nt lloov<•r. l 1 1:; u 11r!Pa r whet'her Prr~idrnt HooVC'r aet ually 
,·i.:<·luckd an.\· of h1,; per~onal aud privntr matrrinls from thr RCOJlP of 
h1, gift. although hi:,; offer to d<'po:sit material;; in a Pre,;idr11tinl Librar~· 
r,·,<'l'l<·d th<' nght to do so President Roo:;evrlt nbo indicated his 
11lt<'n1mn to s<'l<'rt <'<'rtain matPrial:; from hi~ paprr:; to be retained by 
li1,.; t':imil)· . B<'<·au~r of hi~ clc•a1h, this function wn:; performed b~· desig-
nat<•d i11d1v1duals and b~· h1,.; se<'rrt:u~·. Again the record is unclear as 
'" how n1an~· m:itt•nab wrre rrmoved. A number of personnl documents 
d<·<·nwd to lw pPr,.;onal f:imil~· <·one,;pondenc(' werr turned over to the 
Hoo~l'\'('lt fnmih· librnry III rn4t-:, latrr returnrd to the officinl Library 
in 1954-1955. :rnd have· brC'n on Joan to the family since then. It, 'is 
unclrnr to wh:1t C'Xtc•nt thr:;e materials were rrviewed by the library 
pc•r,onnrl. 
PrP,.;1d('nt Trnman withlwld from depo:;it the per:sonal file maintained 
ill thr Whit<:" Hou ·c• bY hi,.; wr,.;orIHJ secretar~·- Thi:; file was deposited with 
Tilt> library upou his death in 1974, nlthough the terms of his will t'xcludecl 
{I .small numbl'I' of 11rms rlet<'rm111hed by the executors of his will to 
pPrta m to persmwl or bu,;ine:;:,; affairs of the Trnman family. President 
Eu,Pnhowc,r\ offrr to deposit hi:,; Prrsidential m:itrrials excluded material,; 
•ldPrmi1w1l bY him or h1H r<'pre;;entative to be personnl or private, 
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with the District Court, for the purposes of this case. that this 
pattern of de facto Presidential control and congressional 
acquiescence gives rise to appellant's legitimate expection of 
privacy in such materials. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351-353 (1967).rn This expectation is independent of the 
question of ownership of the materials. an issue we do not 
reach . See supra, at n. 8. But the merit of appellant's claim 
of invasion of his privacy must therefore be weighed ag_ainst 
the public interest subjecting the Presidential materials of 
appellant's administration to archival screening. Camara, v. 
vfunicipal Gou.rt , 387 TT. S. 523, 004- 539 (1967); '1.'erry v. 
Ulno, 392 U. S. 1. ·21 (1968)."" l'mler this test. the privacy 
111tNest asserkd by appella11t is ~-Paker than that found waut-
1ng in the rece11t decision of Whalen v. Roe, - U. S. --
( 1977) . Emphasizing the precautions utilized by New York 
~tau, to prevent the unwarranted disclosure of private medical 
111formatio11 retained i11 a state computer bank system, 
W ha/en reJect,Pd a constitutio11al objection to New York's 0 IJ. ,I_ 
program u11 privacy grou11cls. Not 011ly does the Act chal- ~--- dd ~ "'J<,D . 
knp;<•rl her<' mandate regulations similarly aimed at preventing G_,.-...,,., ~ 
undut' clis~l'llllllation of private rnaterials but. unlike Whalen, "'IC,......_."~~ 
the ( ~overnment will not even retai11 loug-term control over ~ 1 
~urh pnvat(-' mformatiou, rather, purely private papers and ~ .... ,.._..,....,_ 
l ' r( •:.:1d Pt1f KPIIIJ(•d~·•:.: ma({'l'l:II ,.; d<·po:.:1trd with r.sA did not inrluclP cprtain ;,, ;0ec·,,. I t 
111at Pn :tl ,-, nfati11µ; 10 hi,-, pnv:Ill' :1ff:11r:.:, Hild ,-;0111e recording:,; of rnrrtingti 
11,, oh ing l'n•,idenl Kemwd~-. although ph,n,irall~· :storPd in thr I<Pm1rd~· ~J • ~ 
Lil,rnr.,·. h,l\·P 1101 ,\"C'1 bPcn tunwd ovpr to tlw librar~· or revirwrd by - J,' -
~0\'('l'JllllPIII archiv1,-;1~. PrP!:ilU<'lll ,John:;ou':s uffrr to cl<>po::;it mnll•rinls)'&a~al-,,.,./ 
,· ,('l11dPrl ll <' tll.• IYhi<'h lw dNerrni11Pd to be of :spPcial or prirntp imerc:,;t ,_ ~ J' 
1u p(•r,-;on:d or fa111il~- affair:.: . - ~,C., 
"' h ·1·11 ,r pnor Pn,,-;1dP11t:.: h:id dl•c·linrd to a:.:,,Prt tlwir privar_,· i11tc•rc•::;ts ~ __ _:;f~ 
11 1 , 11('h 111 :i t('l'i :d,-., tlwi r f:1ilm1 • 10 do ,;o IYould 11ot t1(•1•e,.;,mril.1· bincl c;t-,,..,,,..,_ ~ -
1pp1·lln11t . for pn1·:1c·~· 1111 1•11 •,b al\· 1101 ,.;old_,· dqwlldl•nt for lhrir con- ~ 
-11111 11011 :1 1 p1·ot<'<'I ion 11po11 1•,1 nbli,;l1pd praet ice of go1·<·nmH·11tal t okra t ion. --1 ""'--" 
1" \Y ,, agn''.' 11·11h 1lw [)1,-; triC'! ('ourt that, tlw Fomth AmP11dnwnt'::; JA • • /J ~ ,'1-, 
11,11-r:1111 n •q11m·11H·nt ,~ i1ol llll'Olv<'d. 40b I• . Supp., at 361- :36:2. ~v •• -~ .,,....i< 
~ ~ . .11.~d 
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recordings will be returned to appellant under § 104 (a) (7) of 
t~e Act. 
The overwhelming bulk of the 42 million documents and 
the 880 tape recordings pertain, 11ot to appellant's private 
communications, but to the official conduct of his Presidency. / ~ 
Most of the 42 million papers were prepared a,nd seen by 
otht.•rs and were widely circulated within the government. 
Ap wlla11t concedes that he saw no more than 200 , and· 
we do 11ot UllC ers am. 1111 to suggest at his privacy claim 
f'Xtends to items lw never saw. See United States v. Miller, • -~ . J,-
42,-1 C R. 4:1.5 ( IU7(j) . Further. it i:s logical to assume that the } ~-J-
tapc recorcU!,igs made in the Presidential offices primarily  
r0lat<' to the conduct and business of the Presidency. And, of  
c·oursc. appellant cannot assert any privacy claim as to the , _ •• ~1.. , 
('ountless documents and tape recordings that ha,ve been ac,_. ,'-,J ~.,.._, 
disclosed to the public. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. ~
1, 14 (1973); Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U. S .. at 351. 
Tl,erefore appellant's privacy claim embracing. for example, ~ ~ 
" extrernel:v pftv~te communications between [him] and; u• Jc.·••• M.1 
among othcrR. h.is wife, his daughters, his physician, lawyer , __ _, ~  .J 
and clergyman, and his close friends as well as personal diary /"~- • 
dictab<'lt:-- a11d hi:s wife's personal files," 408 S. Supp., at 359, ..e.. 'f . ~~ 1.-. 
n•lat<'S 011 ly to a very small fraction of the massive volume of _ ~. __ q · - 7 
official materials with which they arc presently comingled.21 • .,. . .. -c.."-,_, 
Tlw faet that appellant may assert his privacy claim as to ~ /"'-~ 
u11 ly a small fraction of the materials of his Presidency is ~ J,.,.,.__,,. 
plainly r<'lcvant, in judging the reaso11ableness of the screening ...,.. p- .,.. 
" .--om, , ~n:if Pnal., :1n· ,•i11ll iJJ :1ppt'lln11I·':,; po::,i;es::!io11, a,; the Adminis-~ ~ 
1r,1tor ha~ 1wl .1·,,1 att0mpt<'d to aet on his authorit~· under§ 101 (b)(l) ~ 
10 lake <'11',tod~· ul' tlwm. Srr Brirf for FE>ck·ral Appellees, at 4 n. 1. ,-.,,. _.----
:\loreo\'t'r. tlH' Solicitor Gt•11rral concE>ded nt oml argument that there . =~~ '"" 
:ire <'<'rtn111 purd~· privnk m,1terials whiC'h "::;bould be retunwd to [appel- I 
l:tnt 1 once . id<•nlifivd . Tl'. of Oral Arg., nt 590. In our view the 
1 ,ov<'rnrne11t . without awaiting n Court order, ::!houlcl promptly disclaim .I~ ~ 
,1n_1· 111t<'fe~1 111 materiab ro11rt•drcl to be appellnnt'l'< purely private com-~ 
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process contemplated by the Act, but this of course does not 
without more, require rejection of his privacy argument. 408 
F . Supp., at 359. Although the Act requires that the regula-
tions promulgated by the Administrator under § 104 (a) take 
into account appellant's legally and constitutionally based 
rights and privileges, presumably including his privacy rights, 
~ 104 (a)(5). and also take into account the need to return to 
appellant his private materials, § 104 (a)(7), 22 the identity 
and separation of these purely private matters can be achieved, 
as all parties concede, only by screenirrg all of the rnateria.ls. 
\ppcllant co11t01Hlf: that thP Act is tantamount to a general 
warrant authorizing search and seizure of all of his Presiden-
tial "papers, and effects.' Such "blanket authority," appel-
lant contends, 1s precisely the kind of abuse that the Fourth 
.\mendmeut was intPnded to prevent, for "the real evil aimed 
at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself. that invasion 
,,f a man's privaey which consists of rummaging about his 
personal effects to secure rvirlence against him.'' Brid for 
.\ppellant 148, quoting United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911t 
m4 (CA2 H)3O). ·Thus.his Brief continues, w., at 100-131: 
'' [h1sj most private thoughts and communications, 
both written and spoken. will be exposed to and reviewed 
by a host of persons whom he does not know and did not 
seh•ct. a11d in whom he has no reason to place his con-
fidence. This group will decide what is personal, to be 
returned to [himj. and what is historical, to be opened 
for public review "" 
"" ThC' Sol iritor GP1wrnl i111pliPd at oral argument that the requirement 
ul tlw g1m!Pli11<·~ di1wtin;r tlw Admini8trator to con~ider the need to return· 
in :t ppdlant "for his 801<' ru~1ody nnd use ... materials which are not 
I \Y,1tPrg:1tP-r<'latPd I . :md :irt' not othf'rwise of genenil hi:storical' 
::ng11ific·:1 1H'<', ·• § 104 (a)(7/, i~ furtlwr qualified by the r<'quirC'rnrnt under 
§ ](J:2 (b) and § 104 (a) (5), that th<' regulation:; promulgated by the 
\drnmi,;1 rat or ta kC' mto areount the need to prolcrt appellant's rights, 
•l<'f Pn~<'~, or privil<'gl',:; Tr of Ontl Arg. :38. 
' \ ppPlla11i rt rg11P~ that ~('rrc•nin~ und_er th~ Act Qontrast:s with the, 
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Appellant principally relies on Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 
476, 485 ( 1965). but that reliance is misplaced. Stanford 
invalidated a search aimed at obtaining evidence that an in-
dividual had violated a "sweeping and many-faceted law 
which, among other things, outlaws the Communist Party 
and creates various individual criminal offenses, each punish-
able by imprisonment for up to 20 years." Id., at 477. The 
search warrant authorized a search of his private home for 
books, records, and other materials concerning illegal Com-
munist activities. After spending more than four hours in 
talldford's house. police officers seized half of his books which 
mclucled works by Sartre, Marx, Pope John XXIII. Justice 
Hugo Black, Theodore Draper, and Earl Browder, as well 
as private documents including a marriage certificate, in-
surance policies, household bills and receipts, aud personal 
corTespondence. Id., at 479- 480. Stanford held this to be 
11 unconstitutio11al general search. 
The District Court concluded that the Act's provisions for 
custody and screening could not be analogized to a general 
earch and that Stanford, therefore, did not require the Act's 
111validation. 408 F. Supp., at 366-367, 11. 63. We agree. 
Only few documents among the vast quautity of materials 
seized in Stanford were related to any legitimate government 
intc,m4. This cas(• presents precisely the opposite situation; 
'<crPPlllJJI-( pro(·rdun•~ followC'd br rarlier Pm;idents who, "in donating 
matPrial~ to l'rP~ictrntial libraries, have been able ... to participate 
111 tlw i;elc>rt1011 of per~on:s who would review the materials for classifica-
tion pmpose;;.'' Hri<'f for Apprllant 151 n. 68. We are unable to say 
that t hr l'l'<'ord ~ubstant iates this a::;sertion. The record is most com-
J)ietr with l'<'::i JWCt to Pre~idrnt Johnson, who apprars to have recommended 
thr i11d1vid1111l who w:1~ latrr :selected a;; Director of the Johnson Library, 
but t<eemi; not to haw played nny role in thr selection of the archivists 
act nail~· J)('l'forming the day-to-day p1·oce;;i:;ing. 408 F. Supp., at 365 n. 60. 
Moreo,w, W<' agree with the Dit<trict Court that it is difficult to see 
how professional :irchiYi~ts performing a i,;creening ta:;k under proper 
~tandard~ would lw mramngfully affected in the performance of their 
'._{1111r:- h, loval1y to 111di,idw1I,, or irn,titutions. Ibid. 
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the vast proportion of appellant's Presidential materials are 
official documents or records in which appellant concedes the 
public has a recognized interest. Moreover. the Act provides 
procedures and orders the promulgation of regulatious ex-
pressly for the purpose of minimizing the intrusion into ap.-
pellant's private and personal materials. 
Moreover, the search in Stanford was an intrusion into an 
.i ndividual's home to search and seize personal papers in fur-
therance of a criminal investigation and designed for exposure 
in a criminal trial. In contrast, any intrusion by archivists 
mto appellant's privatP papers and effects is undertaken with 
the sole purpose of separating private materials to be returned 
to appellant from nonprivatc materials to be retained and 
prcservc'd by the Government as a record of appellant's 
Presidency. 
Moreover. the screening will be undertaken by government 
archivists with. as the District Court noted, "an unblemished 
record for discr<'tion,'' 408 F. Supp .. at 365. That review 
1•1111 hardly differ matC'rially from that contemplated by ap-
iwllant 's wt<'11t1011 to <~stablish a Presidential Library, for 
Presidents who have established such libraries have found 
that screening by professional archivists was essential. Al-
though the District Court recognized that this contemplation 
of archival review would not defeat appellant's expectation 
of privacy, the court held that it does indicate that "iu the 
special situation of documents accumulated by a President 
during his tenure and reviewed by professional government 
personnel. pursuant to a practice employe<l by past Presidents, 
any intrusion into privacy interests is less substantial than it 
n11ght appear at first. '' 408 F. Supp., at 365 (citation 
omitted). 
The District Court analogized the screening process con-
te111platPCI by the Act to electronic surveillance conducted 
pursuant to Title J1 I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
StreC'ts Act of Hl68, 18 U ~. C. ~ § 2510-2520 ( 1970). 408 F, 
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Supp., at 363. We think the analogy is apt. There are ob .. 
vious similarities between the two procedures. Both involve 
the problem of separating intermingled communications, 
( 1) some of which are expected to be related to legitimate 
government objectives, ( 2) some of which are not, and 
( 3) for which there is no means to segregate the one from 
the other except by reviewing them all. Thus the screening 
process under the Act. like electronic surveillance, requires 
some intrusion into private communications unconnected with 
my legitimate governmental objectives. Yet this fact has 
not ueP11 thought to rellder surveillance under the Omnibus 
ct unco11st1tutional. ('f. e. (!., l'mted States v. Donovan, -
r :-, - ( H)77); Berger V. i\'ew York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
'ee also 408 F . Supp .. at 363-364. 
Appellant argues that this analogy is inappropriate because 
the electro11ic surveillance procedure was carefully designed to 
meet the constitutional requirements enumerated in Berger v. 
\iew York, supra, including (1) prior judicial authorization, 
(2) specification of particular offenses said to justify the in-
trusion, (3) s1wcificat10n "with particularity" of the conver-
:sat10ns sought to br seizPd. ( 4) minimization of the duration 
vf t.he wiretap. ( 5) termillation once the conversation sought 
1s seized, and ( 6) a showing of exigent circumstances justify-
mg US<' of the wiretap procedure. Brief for Appellant 157. 
Although the parallel is far from perfect. we agree with the 
I 
District Court that many considerations supporting the con-
_st1tut10nahty of the Omnibus Act 11,lso argue for the consti-
tutionality of the Act's materials screening process. For ex-
ample, the Omnibus Act permits electronic surveillance only 
to investigate designated crimes that are serious in llature, 18 
P S. C. ~ 2516 ( 1970). and only when normal investigative 
techlllques have failed or are likely to do so, id.,§ 2518 (3)(c) . 
.:51milarly. the archival review procedure is designed to serve 
important national rnterests asserted by Congress, and the 
_mavailability of less restrictive means necessarily follows from 
75-1805-Ol>lNlO. 
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the comingling of the documents?' Similarly, just as th~ 
Omnibus Act expressly requires that interception of nourele• 
vant communications be minimized, 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (5), 
the Act's screening process is designed to minimize any privacy 
intrusions, a goal that is further reinforced by regulations 
which must take those interests into account.~" The fact 
that apparently only a minute portion of the materials impli-
cates appellant's privacy interests/u also negates any conclu-
ion that the screening process is an umeasonable solution to 
the problem of separating conuni11gled communications. 
~• Apprll:tnt argues that, 11nltkc• Plc>ctronic su1Teillance, whrre success 
epends upon thr subjrct's 1gnoranct• of its rxi,-:tencc•, appellant could 
have been allowed to separate hi,; prr"onal from oJ!icial materials. But 
~ ongrriil:i rnaC'trd the Act in part to disphice I he Nixon-Sampi:;011 agree-
ment that exprei:;sl~· provided for automatic destruction of the tape 
rc•cordiug::i in tlH' rvrnt of appellaut':,; death and that allowed appellant 
l'omplete discrrtion in tlw destruction of materiali:; after the initial three-
war ;,torage period. 
Morl'ovrr, appc>llant',, view of what constitutes official as distingui;,hed 
from prr,;onnl and private maleriab might differ from th!' virw of 
Conp;rr;;s, the Exrc111 ivr Brn11ch, or a reviPwiug court. Xoi only may 
tlw u:-;r of disintrre,.;ted archivist:,; lead to application of uniform standard:,; 
111 ,;eparnting prin1tr from nonprivatr communicatiom;, but the Act 
providrs for ,1udiewl rc•v1r,,· of their detprmi11ations. Thiti would uot be 
the cai:;e as to appdlant':,; cletermi11atio11,-, 
"'' Thr D1::;tnct Comt found, 404 F. Supp., at 364 n. 58, am! we agrer, 
that rt 1~ 1rrdevnnt that Title III, unlike the Act, require:,; adherence 
10 a dC'taift,d warrant requirement, 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (] 970). That 
rrquirrmC'ut is innppltcable undPr the Act. 
26 The fact that thr ovrrwhelming majority of the materiali:; i:s relevant 
t o Congrrs:s' lawful objective:,; is in contrast to the experience under 
the Om11ih11s Cnme Al't A rrcent report on tittrveillance conducted 
under the Omnibus Act mdicatri:; that for the' cal<>ndar year 197(i more 
than onr-h:ilf of all wire intrn·c•pt" authorized by judicial order yielded 
11oninrnmim1ting commuuicatiom;. Admini:st rative Office of thr United 
'.'.', tate,- Courts, Rt>port on Applic.t tions for Ordrn; Authorizing or Ap-
1rov111g thl' lntercrption of Wire or Oral Comm11nicationi:;, January 1, 
1976 to Dc•reml:ier at, 1976, at XII (Table 4). 
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In sum, appellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
his personal communications. But the constitutionality of the 
Act must be viewed in the context of the limited intrusion of 
the screening process, of appellant's status as a public figure, 
his lack of any expectation of privacy in the overwhelming ma-
jority of the materials, of the important public interest in pre-
servation of the materials, and of the virtual impossibility of 
segregating the small quantity of private materials without 
comprehensive screening. When this is combined with the Act's 
·ensitivity to appellant's legitimate privacy interests, see § 104 
1 a) ( 7) the unblemished n'cord of thP archivists for discretion, 
and the likelihood that the regulations to be promulgated by 
the Administrator will further moot appellant's fears that his 
materials will be reviewed by "a host of persons," 27 Brief 
for Appellant 150. we are compelled to agree with the District 
Court that appellant's privacy claim is without merit. 
VI 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
During his Presidency appellant served also as head of 
his national political party, and spent a substantial portion of 
his working time 011 partisan political matters. Records aris-
illg from his political activities. like his private and personal 
·records, are not segr_egated from the great mass of materials. 
He argues that the Act';""archival scree11ing process th{'refore 
11ecessarily entails invasion of his coDstitutionally protected 
27 Throughout this litigation appellant has claimed that his privacy 
•will nPrrs><arily be unco11;:;titutio1rnlly invaded bPcausr the scrrrning requires 
a staff of "over one hundred nrchivists, accompanied by lawyer::;, tech-
nicians, and ,;ecrrtarir:s I who] will have a right to review word by word 
five aud one-half )'ears of a man's lifr ... . " Tr. of Orn! Arg. 16. The 
·size of the :;tnff is, of com;;r, 1wc•r;;sarily a function of the e11ormous 
qw1nl1iy of materinl;; involvl'd . But clearly not all rngaged in the scrren-
111g will exnminr each document . The Administrator initially propo:;ed 
that onl .,· onr archivitit cxumine mo::;t documents. See 408 F. Supp., 
'."l I. :3(3,') lL fi!-), 
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rights of associational privacy and political speech. As sum• 
marized by the District Court, "It is alleged that the Act 
invades the private formulation of political thought critical 
to free speech and association, imposing sanctions upon past 
expressive activity, and more significantly, limiting that of 
the future because individuals who learn the substance of 
certain private communications by lhimJ-especially those 
critical of themsC'lves-will refuse to associate with him. 
Tlw Act is f urtherrnore said to chill lhis l expression because 
lw will be 'saddled· with prior positions communicated in pri~ 
vate . leaving him u11ablt> to take inconsistent positions in the 
future.' 408 F . Supp., at 367- 368. 
The District Court, viewing th('se arguments as in essence a 
daim that disclosure' of the materials violated appellant's 
a~sociatig.11al privacy , and tlwreforc as not significan tly rni-
ferc,11t in sfruct,1re from appellant's privacy claim, again 
t reated the argurne11ts as limited to the co11stitutio1Jality of 
thr Act's screening process. Id., at 368. As was true with 
rr,:prcl to the more general privacy challenge only a fraction 
.of the materials ca11 be said to raise a First Amendment claim. 
~ rwrtheless. the District Court acknowledged that appellant 
' 'would appear to have a legitimate expectation that he would 
have an opportunity to remove some of the sensitive political 
tlocum.ents before any government screening took place."· 
l b'ld. The District Court held. however, that since there was 
no reason to believe that the mandated regulations when 
promulgated would not adequately provide protection against 
public access to materials implicating appellant's privacy i11' 
political association. and that "any burden arising solely from 
review by professional and discreet archivists is 12.2,t si~ ifi~-
ca11t. " Therefore concluded that the Act does not signifi-
~ tly interfere with or chill appellant's First Amendmeut 
rights. Id ., at 36H. We agree with the District Court's· 
l'onclusion . 
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closely protected by the First Amendment, Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U. R. 1 (HJ76). and therefore that "compelled disclosure 
rn itself can seriously infringe on privacy and belief guaran-
teed by the First Amendment." Id., at 64. But a compelling 
public need that cannot be met in a less restrictive way will 
override those interests. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 , 
58-59 (1973). United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367. 376-377 
(1968). Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479. 488 (1966). "par-
ticularly when the 'free functioning of our national institu-
tions' is involvt>d. " Huckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S .. s11,pra, at 66. 
~lllC(' nu less restnct1ve \\ uy than archival screening has been 
s11ggl'~tc-d a~ a rneans for identification of materials to be 
t'<'tt1rt11•<1 to appellant, the burden of that screening is presently 
the nwasun• of his First Amendment claim. Id., at 84. Any 
sneh burden, however, 1s speculative in light of the Act's 
t('rms protPcting appellant from improper public disclosures 
and guaranteeing him full judicial review before any public 
access is pcnnitt<'d. ~~ 104 (a)(5). (a)(7), 105 (a)."·~ As 
th<' District Court concludc>cl, this First Amendment claim 
is clearly outweighed by the compelling governmental interests 
promoted by the Act 
For the same reasons, we find no merit in a.ppellant's arg,u-
me11t that the Aet s scheme for custody aud archival screening 
".-\ppella111 argm'" that Lov1!ll , . G1iffin, 303 li. . 444, 452-453 
'1931'), Shuttlesworth v. Binnmgham, ;{94 U. S. 14,, 150-151 (1969); 
Co.r v. Loui.~imia, a'i9 l S. 5:rn (1965); Staub '"· Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 
;{ rn-;tn ( Hl58); and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 538-541 (1945), 
-;upport hiH routrntion tlwt "L,1] i;tatntf' which vei;t::; ,mch broad authority 
1 with rP;.;p<·ct to Fir,;1 Amruclrnrnt right:;7 is uncoustitutiona\ on its face, 
and tlw part~ ,;111>.wet<'d to tt may tn•at H n,; 11 nnllit~· even if its artual 
,mple111e1,tatw1, u·uulrl !lot harm him." Hrirf for Appellaitt 169. The 
arguuwJtt ha,; no nwrn . Thrnw case:; involved rcg11la tions that permitted 
publtc otfi<'wli,; 111 tlw11 arlntntr~· di:;crrtion to impose prior n•::;1raints on 
t'XJ >1"p,;;.;1011:tl or a,:.,oe1:1t10nal aetivitir:;. In cont ra:;1, the Act i,; eo11cerned 
on!~ wtth tn:11!'rtal~ that n•<·ord pn::;1 activitie::; and with a screening 
~1ro<'""" g111drd. In· long,:tandmg nrehival screening .;tandarc!J;. 
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f tlw matc-nals ' ·11<•tes:-;anly i11liibits [the I l'r<•Pdom of political 
aC'tiY1ty [of futun' Prt'sid011ts I a11rl tlwreby reduct's the 'quan-
tity a11d div<•n;it,v· of tlw pulit.ieal spec'ch a11d associatio11 tlml 
lllf' "\'atwn will bP n'<'<•iving from its leadt'rs.'' Bril:'f. p. 16 . 
TL is significalll. 1uoreowr. tha.t this c·o11C<'l'll ha:-; nut d<>t<0 ned 
l'n•sHle11t Ford from s1g11ing tli<' .\ci 111to law. or Pn•sident 
Carter from urgi11g tln:-; Court's affirrnancc• of the ,i udg1nt•ut oI 
the Distnct Cour( . 
TI 
B-ill of A ttoi/l(ler Cfow;f. 
F11ially . ~<· addrel:'-s i:lP !Wlla11t s arguniellt 1,hat the Act 
co11stituU's a ])Ill ot alta1mlt'r proscribed by .\1-L. 1. ~ ~) of 
the Co11st1tut,10 11 .i" His argu111e11t Ji:i that Congress acted on 
the prenuse that he had <•11g.aged in ' 'n1isco11<luct: was an 
'unrehabh• custod1a11' of lus ow11 documents. and gcm•rally 
was deserving of a "lcg1slat1 n• J udg111e11 t of blameworthiness, ' 
Brl<'f fur Appella11t 13:2 -1:33. Thus. he argues, the Act ,~ 
pervaded with LliP key feature6 of a !Jill of attalllder. a la" 
that k•gislat1vely determrnes guilt and 111flicts pumshment 
upo11 a11 identifiable indl\·idual without provisio11 of the pro-
tPct1011s of a Judicial trial. See U11ded States v. Brown, 381 
l • . .-i. 437, 44,J. 447 ( HJ65) ; ( '11ded States v. Lovett, 328 V. S. 
;10:1. :315-316 ( HJ46), E.t parte Garla11d, 4 Wall. 333. 377 
11~66), C-u111,mi11ys v. Misso·un. 4 Wall. '277. ;t23 (1866) . 
Appellants arl-(ument reliC's almost entirely upon U,nted 
:,tot<'s v Bro1n11. 8upra, tlw Court's most recent dec1s1011 ad-
,,, .·\rnd<· l, ~ H. ,1pplieahlP 10 C'o11µ;H:-::-. proY1d1•:-: " \o Bill of Attainder 
11r P'.'i post farto la\\' :-:hall lw p:1,,1•d." :ind ..\rt I. § JO . appli!'ahlt> iu ihe 
St:111•,. pro,· 1d< ·~ th:11 o S1:it<· . ,hall pa,, a11.1 Bill of .-\1t :11d1wr. ex 
pu,1 f:ielO l: 111 Tlw l111k111g of bill, of att:1rnd1•1· all(! P'.'i post 
t:il'to !nll'., 1, 1·xpl:111 H•d h~ t lH' f:ic:t lh:11 a IPg1~la11n• dem111C·1:1(1on 
11,1 <"ulld1·mt1at1ot1 ot :Ill 1tl(II\ 1clt1:1I. oft1·11 a et Pd to 1111po,1· n•1 ro:1<:t1vc• 
1 111 111,hml'n• s1•1 Z ('lc:1f1·1•, Th1v, H11111:111 Highh n, tlH· C'o11~1111111on 
•J·i-9:, , n 1;;1 \ 1 _ 
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dressing the scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause. It is in~ 
structive, therefore. to sketch the broad outline of that case. 
Brown invalidated § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclb~ure Act of 1959, 29 U. S. C. § 504, that made it a 
crime for , n, Communist Party member to serve as an officer 
of a labdr 11 union. After detailing the infamous history of 
bills of a~tainder, the Court found that the Bill of Attainder 
Clause wM an important ingredient of the organizing prin-
ciple of ourt system of government: the doctrine of "separation 
' ~ 
of powers.' Id., at 442-443. Just as Art . III confines the 
judiciary to tl1e task of adJudicatrng coucrete ''cases or con-
troversiEJs/ so too the Bill of Attainder Clause was found t0 
&1·reflect , it'. the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch 
is not so.l, elf sui ted as politically independent judges and 
juries to t e task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and 
1evying approprh1te punishment upon, specific persons." Id,, 
at 445 . . Brown thus held that § 504 worked a bill of attainder· 
by fp¢~~itll!~ upon ea~iiy iden_tifiabl~ me°:bers of a class, mem~-
bers, of thJ1Commumst Party, and unposmg on them the sane~ 
tion df maJ1datory forfeiture! of a job or office, long deemed to 
be punish~ent within the contemplation of the Bill of At~ 
tainder Cl~use. See, e. y., United States v. "Lovett, supra, at 
316; 'Cur(JX((lings v. Missouri, s·upra, at 320. ' 
Br<twn; 'Luvett, aud earlier cases unquestiouably gave 
broad and 'generous meaning to the constitutional protection 
agarnst bills of attainder . But aµpellant 's proposed reading 
is : f !il-r broa~er still. In essence, he argues that Brown estab-
hsh~s: th~t' the C011stitution, is offended whenever a law im--
poses undesired consequences on an individual or on a class· 
that is not defined at a proper level of generality. · The Act 
in , questioi\ therefore is fau\ted for singling out appellant, as-
orm'osed ~d1 all other Pres1de11 ts or members of the govern~ent, 
for disfavored treatment, ' · 
Appellant 's characterization of the meaning of a !Jill or 
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individual or defined group is attainted whenever it is com-
pelled to bear burdens of which the individual or group 
disapproves, appellant removes the anchor that ties the bill 
of attainder guarantee to realistic conceptions of classifica"'.' 
tion and punishment. For his view would cripple the very 
process of legislating : Any individual or group that is made 
the subject of adverse legislation can complain that the law-
makers could and should have defined the relevant affected 
class at a greater level of generality; "0 furthermore, every 
person or group made sub,iect to legislation which arouses its 
J1sagreenw11t may ~uh wc·t ivPlv f't>el and cafi complain. that ,t 
1s berng sub.1ected to unwarranted pumshrnent., United State/$ 
v Lovett, supra. at 3:24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ."1 How-
,,__.ver expansive is the prohibition against bills of attainder, it 
-urely was Hot llltended to serve as a variant of the Equal 
Protection Clause,"i rnvalidating every act by Congress or 
• 0 ln tlw, <'a,;1•. tor example, app<'llant fault:,; th<' Act for taking custody 
ut 111:s pa1wr:,; but not those of other Pr!'Hidents. Brirf for Appellant 180. 
But ~ven a congr<'~s1onal d<'tinition of the class consisting of all Preisi-
~lrnt:< would have beru vulnerable to the claim of 1Jemg overly specific, 
~mee the definition m1~ht morP generally mclude all members of the 
Exrcut1ve Brnn<'h, or all member:- of tlw gov<'rument, or all m possession 
of PreH1dentrnl p:qwr:-;, or all Ill possession of government papers. 
upon him mith the reqmslte dPgrC'e of ;,;pecific1ty for a bill of attainder, 
-;pe mjra, at -·: - , but it demonstrate::, that ,,;1mple reference to the 
Tim, doe~ not . dispose of appellaut 's C'ontention that the Aot focuses 
breadth ol tlif' Act's focn:,; caunot be determmative of the reach ot: 
the Bill ot Attamder <'lausr as a ]1m1t;ttio11 upon legislative act,ion 
that chsadvantages a prrson or group. See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 
~uµm, at 474-475 (Wlil'l'E, ,J ., disr;entmg)'; n - , infra. 
'
11 "Tl!(> fact that harm j:, mflictrd by governmental authority doe:s not 
make· 1t pum;;hment . F1~uratively Hpeaking all discomforting action may 
lw dl'<•med pumshment hecau,;e it deprives of what otherwi:,;e would hi:) 
PilJoyrd But then· may be rea;;ons othn than punitive for i!iUcli 
depriv:\t1011 
•
2 We obserw tlrnt appellant origmally argued m his jurisdictional ;,tale~ 
ment that " for ,mnila1 rra:sons '' the Act violate;,; both the Bill of Attainder 
.ind Eqnnl ProtPct1011 Cl1111:-<e,-, ,fo S 27-28 He ha;, smce abimdoned 
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the States that legislatively buJ.l'dens '°llle persons or groups 
but not all other pla~sible individu~l~.38 Ip short, while the 
Bill of Attainder Clause serves as l),n ~mportant "bulwor~ 
I 
against tyranny," United States v. Brown, supra, at 443, it 
does not clo so by limiting Congress t,o the choice of legisli~.ting 
for the u~1iverse, or legislating only benefits, or not legislat-
ing at all. 
Th us, in the present case, the Act's spectpcity---,-the fact tqat l 
it refers t.p appellapt by name-does no~ ~utom~ticaJ.ly offeha 
the Bill df Attainder Clause. Indeed, viewed in context, the 
focus oi :tibe enactment can be f!iirly a11d rationally under-
stood. If 1s tr~e that Title I deals exclusively witp appel-
reliance upp' the Equal Protection Clause, apparently reco~nizing that 
mere uncle~i~clusiveness is not fatal to the valic\ity of a law under the 
Equal Pro~ettion Clause of the Fourteenth All\epdment, New Orleans 
v. Dukes , f27 U. S. 297 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 , 
65. 7. (1966l , even if . t~e law disadvantages an individual Of identifiable 
members ~~ .!l group1 see, e. g., Wuliamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 
48$ (1955~1 ~oi:itician~); Daniel v. Family Ins . (Jo., 336 U. S. 2~0 (1949) 
01s11r~ncej -~tents) . :"J)'or similar reasons" the mere specificity of a law 
does 1jot d~ll into plily: .. the Bill of Attainder Clause. Cf. Comment, The 
Suprdne ourt 's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Neeq for Clari1Jcation, 
54,: Cwlif. n· Rev. 212, 234-236 (1966); but see Commept, The Bounds 
of Le.disla~~~e Specificat ion : A Suggested Approach to the l3i11 of Attainder 
C~ause, 72\t'rp-le L. J . 33p (1962 ). 
1
"
1 l,1row~ riecognizec\ t. his by makipg clear that copflict,pf-interest laws, 
which mer. 1~bly pr9hibit conduct on tile part qf desigp11ted individuals 
or classes J ,\ iinc!ividt)al~, do not co~t~avene the bill of attpin4e~ ~uaraµtee . 
Brown sr . di,fically noted the vahd1ty of § ~2 ~f the ij~nk111g Act pf 
193a, 12 [µ. S. C. §178, which djsqirnlifi~ identifiable !~embers of a 
group, of~ p:'rs and employees of underwritiµg organization~-froi_n serving 
as officf rs ~f• Federal Rl1serve banks, 381 U. S., at 453. Ot~er vahd federal 
contlict~oft1/1terest 81,atutes whic_h als? si~gle out ident \fiabl:' members 
of groups : tq bear Qlirdens or d1squahfioat1ons are collectild, id., at 467-
468, n 1 2 (\WHITE, J ., µissenting) . See also Regional Rail' Reorganization 
Act Cases(i 419 U. S. 102 (1974) (uphodliqg tr~nsfer of: rail propertie$ 
uf ta i~qai:I. companeis to gov£1rnment-organiz~ corpoJation) -
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lant"s papers. But Title II casts a wider net by establishing 
a special commission to study and recommend appropriate 
legislation regarding the preservation of the records of future 
Presidents and all other federal officials. In this light, Con-
gress' action to preserve only appellant's records is easily ex-
plamed by the fact that at the time of the Act's passage, only 
his materials demanded immediate attention. The Presiden-
tial papers of all former Presidents from Hoover to Johnson 
were already housed in functioning Presidential libraries. 
( 011gress had reason for concern solely with the preservation 
JI aJJpella11t s 111atenals. to, he alone had entered into a de-
1os1tury agreeme11t. the . Jixon-Sampson agreement, which by 
terms called for the destructio11 of certain of the materials. 
lndeed, as thP Government argues, "appellant's depository 
agreement creatE:>d an imminent danger that the tape 
iecon.hngs would bP destroyed if appellant, who had con-
t racted phlebitis, were to cliP." Brief for Federal Appellee 41. 
rn short. appellant constituted a legitimate class of one, and 
ibis alone can .1 ustify Congress' decision to proceed with 
dispatch with respect to his materials while accepting the 
status of his predecessors' papers and ordering the further 
1:onsideration of generalized standards to govern his successors. 
~\1oreuver. eve11 tf WP wete persuaded that the specificity 1 
deme11t 1s satisfied here, the Bill of Attainder Clause would 
not automatically be irnplicatc-cl. Forbidden legislative pun-
1slunent 1s not rnvolved merely because the Act imposes con-
sequences of which appellaut disapproves. Rather, we must 
inquire further whether Congress, by lodging appellant's ma-
t,enals m the cu~tody of the General Services Admiµistration 
pP ndiiig their screening by government archivists and the 
promulgation of further regulations, " inflict[ed] punishment" 
\\ 1thi11 the constitutional prosecription against bills of at-
1,urnder. Umted States v Lovett, supra, at 315; see also 
fl nited State8 v Brown, supra, at 4,56-460i Cummings v. 
J,t l,';!W'IJ,f1, ,'/U.pro1 lit a~m. 
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l 
fhe rnfamous history of bills of attJ!J1~ r is a useful start-
ing pornt rn tht> mqui ry wheth er the Actfairly can be charac-
terized as a form of punishment leveled against appellant. 
For the substantial experiellce of both England and the United 
:-itates with such abuses of parliamentary and legislative 
power offer a ready checklist of deprivations a.nd disabilities 
::io disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpuni-
1 w "llds 1111 •hey 11n,1uestio11ably have been held to fall 
w1th111 the proscnpt1011 of Art. I, ~ 9. A statutory enactment 
that imposes any ot those sanctions on 11amed or identifiable 
individuals would bt> nnme<liately constitutionally suspect. 
ln England ii bill of attamder originally connoted a par-
11amen tary act SPII te11c111g a named mdividual or identifiable 
members of a group to <leath_,., Article I, § 9, however, also 
proscribt>~ ena<'tlllPllt ongmally characterized as bills of 
' 11 8et•. 1'01 t•xamplf•, tht" rns5 attamder of ,James Duke of Monmouth 
Im High Tr!'a:son. "Whn<'as ,Ja me~ duke of Monmouth ha:s in an lwstile 
•11aunP1 mv,,dC'd tin~ kmgdom, and 1s now in open rebellion, levying 
wnr aga111:-t tlw kmg, contrary to thr duty of his allegiance; Be it 
Pllat·tt·d by thC' Kmg'rs most (•xcc-llPnt m:ijesty, by and with the advice 
·ind eon~Pnt of tlw lords :;pmtual and temporal, and commons in this 
,>arlrnnwut a:;s!'mblrd, and by the au thority of the :same, That the said 
.lam<'s clukr of :\lomno11th ~tand ai1d be convicted and attainted of high 
, l'Pn,-,on and that lw ,mff('r pam:,; of dPath, and incur all forfeitures as 
1 1ailo1 1·011VH'trd aml .1ttalllt('(I of high treason." 1 Jam. 2, c. 3 (em-
pha:;1::- om1ttPd ). 
The nttnmder ol dpath wa::- 11:,ually accompanied by a forfeiture of 
• lw condemm•d pl•rsun ,- prop(•rty to the king and the corruption of his 
t>Jood, wh<•1rby Im, he1r:s wrH• <lenied the right to inherit his estate. 
Blacbto1w traec·d thP praet1ce ol "<'orruption of blood" to the Norman 
·onqu<>t<I HP ro11s1dc•rrd tll(' praC'tJ<'P an ·'opprei:;r,; ive mark of feudal 
1r11urr auJ hoJ>Pd that 11 mny m prore:;s of time br abolished by act 
ot parhanwnt" 4 Black,;touc• Cummentarie:s ass (15th ed .. 1809) . The 
trnmrr,-. of thP \nwrH·an C'n11st11111 1011 re:spnnded to thi:s recommendation, 
_, :'. _r ~ '. 
i5-1605-OPINION 
--tf IXO •• v. AD?\llNISTHATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES 
pains aud penalties. that is, legislative acts inflicting punish-
ment other thau execution. United States v. Lovett, supra, 
at 323-324 (Frankfurter. J., concurring); Cummings v. Mis-
souri, supra, at 323; Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the 
Constitution \-17 ( 1956) . Generally addressed to persons con-
:mlered disloyal to the Crown or State, "pains and penalties" 
historically consistent of a wide array of punishments: com-
monly rncluded were imprisonment,"" banishment,'l 11 and the 
punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign.'J7 Our 
country's own experience with bills of attainder resulted in 
t!H• I Ii 11 ii,, th, 1 -.u1ctio11 to the list of impermissible 
eg1slatiw punish111('11ts. any legislative enactment that bars 
specified i11d1v1dualR or groups from participation in certain 
types of employment or vocations a mode of punishment 
commonly deployed agarnst those legislatively branded as dis-
1oyal ",ee, e y., Cummings v. Missouri, supra (barring 
dergymt'll from 11111ustry rn the abseuce of subscribing to a 
oyalty oath), l '111fed 8tates v Lovett, supra (barring named 
111div1duals from guwrnment employment); United States v. 
Nrown, supra ( barring Communist Party members from of-
hces 111 labor u1110n~ 
"' :-;p1•, <' 11. 10 and 11 Will :{. c. I:{: "An ae1 for continuing the 
11upn"o11nH•J11 of ( 'ount<-r and othrr~. for the latr horrid eonspimcy 
1, .1"i-a:-"111at<• tlw 1wr"on of lrn; sacrrd lvlajest~·." 
") H<·<· , I' y .. ('ooµN v Telfair, -+ Dall. 14 (1800) ("all aud every 
per"on, 11:imt>Cl and mrludP<l in tlu• :;aid act [declariug pC'rsons guilty 
ol tn•:1so11 j are l>an1"hrd from thC' smd :state [GC'orgiaJ"); 2 Wooddeson, 
\ S~·,t<lll:it,eal \'H'w ol tlw Law:;; of England G38-639 (1792) (banish-
llH'III ol Lord C'lan•udon and the Bi:;hop A1terbmy) . See Kennedy v. 
l/111(/(l,ll-\fort111e ,{i:.. (' s 144, Hih, II. 2:{ (196:3). 
'" Followmg th1• Ifrvoh1t10w1r~· Wnr, States often :seized the property 
of allc•iwd Tor~· "~·mp11tluzrn,. Srr, e. (!., James' Claim, 1 Dall. 47 (1780) 
",John Parro£·1, wa" atta mtrd of Hioh Treason, and his estate ::;eizC'd and 
11hPrl1spd for ,:d,,'), ReN7J11blwa v. Oordvn. 1 Dall. 2:33 (1788) ("at-
1:1111tl'd ol tn'a,011 for :ulh<'nng to thr king of Great Britain, in con-
~t•q1H•11r·1· ol \\l ll('h 111,. P"t at1• wa, c·on.fiseatr<l.. 1o the use of th~ 
OllllllO\l\\'(',l [ 1 h 
I I 
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1 eedless to say, appellant cannot claim to have suffered 
any of these forbidden deprivations at the hands of the 
Cougress. Whil<-' it is true that Congress ordered the General 
Services Adrniuistra tion to retain control over records that 
appellant clairns as his property .3' ~ 105 of the Act makes 
provision for an award by the District Court of "just com-
pPnsatioll. " Thi~ unckrcuts evPn a colorable contention that 
Lhe Government has punitively confiscated appellant's prop-
erty. for thP "ow11er [thereby] is put in the same position 
monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had 
,ot b('('II takl'lt 'I tales , Reynolds, ~97 r. S. 14, 16 
1 l\J70), accord r nited States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 373 
1943) Thus. no frature of the challenged Act falls within 
the historical niea11mg of legislative punishment . 
.!. 
But our 111qmry 11:; 11ot ended by the determination that 
he Act 11nposes 110 pumshment traditionally judged to be 
prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause. Our treatment 
of the scope of th<' Clause has never precluded the possibility 
that lit"\\ burdens all(.l deprivations might be legislatively 
fash1011ed that art> rncons1steut with the bill of attainder 
guarauteP. fhP Court, t~erefore, often has looked beyond 
mere historical experie11ce a11d has applied a functional test 
,f tlw ex1stl'llC<-' of punishment, analyzing whether the law 
under challenge. viewed rn trrms of the type and severity of 
burdens uupm,ed. reasonably can be said to further legislative 
purposes oth<-'r than punitive .a" Cummings v. Missouri, 
,,. I u faC't, 11 n•marn,- uu~t>ttled whetht'r th<' material ;; in question are 
Ill' prop<'l'1) of ,1ppdlant or of the Govl'rnment. See n. -, supra. 
rn l 11 d<'tPrm1m11g whether p111utive or nonpunitive objectives underlie 
1 law, [1111ted State.~ \ Rrvtl'ri e:-;tablii;hed that punishment is not re-
•t net Pd JHm•I\ to rPt nbut1011 tor past events, but may mclude inflicting 
dc•pnvatloll>- 011 "om1· blamc•worth~· or tniued mdividual in order to 
'm•w111 ht~ futurp m1:-;<'011duct :31-il U S., at 458-459. This view is 
·ou:-;1,-t1•11t with the• trad1t1onal purpose:; of criminal punishment, which 
~ 
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supra, at 319'--320; Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 193-
194 (1898) ; Dent v. West V'irgin-ia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889); 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 96-97 (1958) (Warren, C. J.); 
Kennedy v. Mendo.za-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 
(1963) . Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not 
appear, it is reasonable to conclude that punishment of indi-
viduals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of 
the decisiomnakers. 
Application of the functional approach to this case leads 
to re,iectio1 of appellant's ar ument that the Act rests u on 
a cull •res,,1011;;1,I .1ett, 1wuuon o 1s ameworthiness and 
Ii < t>sire to pums 1 him. or, as o e previous y, see supra, 
at ---, 1eg1timatf'~ Just1fications for passage of the Act are 
r0adily apparent First, in the face of the Nixon-Sampson 
agreement winch expressly contemplated the destruction of 
some of appellant 's materials, Congress stressed the need to 
preserw "li]nformatiou included in the ma.terials of former 
President Nixon [that] is needed to complete the prosecutions 
of Watergate-related crimes." H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess .. at 2 (1974). Second, again referring to the 
• ixon-::;;ampso11 agreement, Congress expressed its desire to 
safeguard the "public mterest in gaining appropriate access 
to materials of the .Nixon Presidency which are of general 
h1stoncal s1g11ifica11ce. The information in these materials 
also mclude a prrveutivr a.,pect. See, e. g., H. Packer, The Limits of 
the C'nmrnal Sauct10u 4iHH ( 1968). In Brown the element of punish-
ment wa~ found m t lw fact that " the purpose of the statute before 
11:-, i8 to pmge thP gov<>rnmg boards of labor unions of those whom 
CongrP8;; rt>ga rd,; a:- guilty of 8Ubv<>rsivc acts and a:;sociations and there-
fon· unfit Io fill I 11111011] po~1tiom; ... . " 381 U. S., at 460. Thus, 
,Bro11•11 ll,f1 undi,-lurbrd the requirement that one who complains of being 
attm11t<'d m11:-;t c•,-tabh:,;lt that tllf' legi:;lature's action constituted punish-
mt·111 and uor nwrrly thr lrgitimate rrgulation of conduct. r ndeed, just 
thr<'P 'frrm;; lat<·r, l'mted States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 n. 30 
(l9(:IK). al:,;o anthor<'d by Chirf .Ju~tice Warren, reconfirmrd thr need 
to <•xamrnc· tlw purpo:-;e:-; :,;t•rvPd by a purported bill of attainder in 
l<>tP1m111i1111. wlwthPl· 1t 1n !"art reprrs0nts a punitive law. 
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will be of great value to the political health and vitality of 
the United States." Ibid.4° Indeed, these same objectives 
are stated in the text of the Act itself, § 104 (a) , 44 U. S. C. 
~ 2107 ( Supp. 1976) , where Congress instructs the General 
Services Administration to promulgate regulations that fur-
t her these ends and at the same time protect the constitutional 
and legal rights of any individual adversely affected by the 
Administrator's retention of appellant's m11,terials. 
E valuated in terms of these asserted purposes, the law 
plainly mus held to be a11 act of non unitive le islati 
pohcyrnaking. eg1slat1011 c cs1gne to guarantee the avail-
a'61l[ty~idence for use at criminal trials is a fair exercise of 
Congress rel)onsibility to the "due process of law in the fair 
admimstrati n of justice," United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683, 713 (19 4), and to the functioning of our adversary legal 
~ystern whic depends upon the availability of relevant evi-
dence in car ying out its commitments both to fair play and 
to the disc very of truth within the bounds set by law. 
Branzbury v Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 688 ( 1972) ; Blackmer v. 
United Stat s, 284 U. S. 421 , 438 (1932) ; Blair v. United 
States, 250 . S. 273, 281 (1919). Similarly, Congress' in-
terest rn an~I expansive authority to act in preserv11tion of 
monuments and records of historical value to our national 
heritage are fully established. United S tates v. Gettysburg 
Electnc R. Co., 160 U. S. 668 ( 1896); Roe v. Kansas, 278 
l' ;-; gn ( H)29) . 11 A legislature thus acts responsibly in 
111 Tlw tlPnaH; point Pd to t hr8e 8ame object ive,; in nullifying the Nixon-
.:ltunp~on agn•eeent : "[lJ To begin with , prosecut ors, defendant:; and 
tlw conrb pror1bly would be deprived of cm cial evidence bearing on 
rlw tlc•frndant~ mnorence or guilt of thr Waterga te crime8 for which 
thry ,;tancl arr1srt!. 121 Moreover , the American people would be denied 
full acce:;:; to all fact:; about the Watergate affair , and the efforts of 
Congrn~8, the Jxecutive brnnch, and others t o take measures to prevent 
a rernrrf'ncc• of the Watergatf' a ffai r may be inhibited ." S. Rep. No, 
93-1181. 9:3d Cong., 2d Se:ss., at 4 (1974) . 
. 
11 ThP8C' cnsoo upheld f'xercise:; of the powf'r of eminent domain in 
. 1H P:-t>rv111~ h1:,;tor1ral monumrnts and thr like facilit ies for public use, 
' I 
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seeking to accomplish either of these objectives. Neither 
supports an implication of a legislature policy designed to 
inflict punishment on au individual. 
3 
A third recognized test of punishment is strictly a motiva- l 
tional one: inquiring whether the legislative record evinces a 
congressional intent to punish. See, e. g., United States v .. 
Lovett, supra, at 308-314; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
supra, at 169-170. The District Court unequivocally found 
that "l t I here is 110 evidenCJ:. presented to us, nor is there any 
to be f ;und in t~ gisla~ ~ rd.toii1dic&e that ~ on-
gress' design was to impose a penalty uiJon Mr. Nixon ... • 
a~ pu msh'n1e1rtr•;:"' ail;geJ';tongao'ings ~ . The legislative 
history leads to only one conclusion. namely, that the Act 
b<'fo~·e us is r~gulatory and_ not !:unitive in character.'' 408 ~ 
F. Supp., at 373 (emphasis omitted). We find 119 cogent .. ~ 
n•ason for disagreeing with this conclusion. ~ ·. ,. .-
-rrr;t, both Senate and House Committee reports, in for-
mally explaining their reasons for urging passage of the Act, 
expressed no interest in punishing or penalizing appellant. 
Rather. the reports justified the Act by reference to objectives 
that fairly and properly lie within Congress' legislative com-
petence : preserving the availability of judicial evidence and 
of historically relevaut materials. Supra, at-. More spe-
cifically. it seems clear that the actions of both Houses of 
Congress were predominantly precipitated by a resolve to undo 
the recently negotiated Nixon-Sampson depository agree-
nwnt. tlw terms of which departed from the practice of former-
Presidents 111 that they expressly contemplated the destruc-
Tlit• powrr of Pminc•nt domain . l1owPv(•r, i:s not rf':stricted to iangible 
prop<•r1y or rea11y but l'Xtl'nd,; both to intangiblf's and to personal effects· 
1, iuvolvPd ht>rP Se<• C'mcinnati v. Louisville & Nash R. Co., 223 U. S~ 
'JOO. 400 (1912) Pm;ter v, U'l1.ited,' States, 473 F . 2d 1329 (CA5 1973). 
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tion of certain Presidential materials.42 Along these lines; 
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, supra, at 2, stated: "Despite the 
overriding public interest in preserving these materials ... 
[the] Administrator of General Services entered into an agree-
ment ... which, if implemented, could seriously limit access 
to these records ... and result in the destruction of a sub-
stantial portion of them." See also S. Rep. No. 93-1181, 
supra, at 4. The relevant committee reports thus cast no as- · 
persions on appellant's personal conduct and contain no con-
demnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punish-
ment. Rather, they focus al most exclusively on the meaning 
and effect of an agreement recently announced by the General 
Services Administration which most Members of Congress 
perceived to be inconsistent with the public interest. 
Nor do the floor debates 011 the measure suggest that Con-
gress was intent on encroaching on the judicial function of 
punishing an individual for blameworthy offenses. When one 
of the opponents of the legislatio11, mischaracterizing the safe-
guards embodied in the bill ,'" stated that it is "one which par-
takes of the characteristics of a bill of attainder . .. . " 120 
Cong. Rec. 33872 (1974) (Sen. Hruska). A key sponsor of the 
measure responded by expressly denying any intention of de-
termining appellant's blameworthiness or imposing punitive 
sanctions : 
"The bill does not contain a word to the effect that 
Mr. Nixon is guilty of auy violation of the law. It does 
42 Particularly trouble;:;ome was the provision of the agreement re-
quiring the automatic destruction of tape recordings upon appellant's 
'1.eath. See note, s·urn·a. 
4 ~ In condemning the enactment as a bill of attainder, Senator Hruska 
. argued that the bill seizes appellant 's papers and distributes them to 
'1itigan1s without affording appellant the opport11ntiy judicially "to assert 
a defense or privilrge to the prod11etion of the papers." 120 Cong. Rec. 
aasn (1974) . In fact , thr Art l'Xprc::;:;Jy recognizes appellant's right 
to present all such defc·n~e~ and privilege:; through an expedited judicial 
proceedings. See inf1·a, at · -··· 
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not inflict apy punishment on h,m. So it has no more 
relation to a bill of attainder .... than my style of / 
pulchritude is to be compared to that of the Queen of 
Sheba." Id., at 33959-33960 (Sen. Ervin). 
Tn this respect, the Act stands in marked contrast to tha:t 
rnvalidated in United States v. Lovett, supra, at 312, where 
a House Report expressly characterized individuals as "sub-
versive ... and unfit ... to continue in Government employ-
ment." H. R. Rep. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1943). 
WP, of course. do not suggest that such a formal legislative 
a1111ou11ceml'11 t of moral blamC'worthiness of punishment is 
necessary to au unlawful bill of attainder. United States v. 
Lovett, supra, at 316. But the decided absence from the legis-
lativC' history of any congressional sentiments expressive of 
this purpose is probative of non-punitive intentions anq 
largely undercuts a major concern that prompted the bill of 
attainder prohibition: the fear that the legislature, in seeking 
to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it 
expedient openly to assume the mantle of judge-or, worse 
still, lynch mob. Cf. Z. Chafee, supra, at 161.44 No such 
legislative overreaching is involved here. 
We also agree with the District Court that ''specific as-
pects of the Act ... just do not square with the claim 
that the Act was a punitive measure." 408 F. Supp., at 
373. Whereas appellant complains that the Act has for 
some two years deprived him of control over the materials 
in question. Brief for Appellant 140. the Congress placed the 
materials under the auspices of the General Services Admin-
44 The Court Ill United States v. Brown, supra. at 444, referred to 
1.\lexandC'r Hamilton ':; conrC'rn that legislature:; might cater to the "momen-
tar~· pa~::;ion~" of a " free people in times of hC'at and violence .. . . " 
1n this case, it 1~ obviou:s thnt the ::;11pporten; of this Act :;teadfastly 
:ivoideu 111flami11g or appealing to any "pa:ssions" in the community. 
l ndc•C'd , rather than :,;pek expediently to impose punishment and to 
circ11111vC'nt the C'ourt:,; , Congre::;s expressly providC'd for access to the 
1udic1a ry for rei'ol11tion of any C'on:;titutional and legal rights appellant 
n ught a~:;<'rr ~- Ri>p 93-1 lRl , supra, at 2-3, 4-5, 5-6. 
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istrat1ou . ~ 101. 44 U. S. C. ~ 2107 (Supp. 1976), the same 
agency desig11 ::i t<>d in the Nixo11-Sampson agreement as deposi-
tory of th(' docu111cnts for a minimum three-year period, Ap-
p011dix 40. Whereas appellant complains that the Act 
<kpri V<'i'- Ii i111 of "rc•ady access" to the materials, Brief for Ap-
1wllan t 140. tlw .\et provides that "Richard M. Nixon, or any 
p<>rson whom lw may designate in writing, shall at all times 
haV<' accPss to th<' tape records and other materials ... ," § 102 
( <'). Tlw District Court correctly construed this as safeguard-
rng appellant's right to inspect, copy, and use the materials in 
1ssu<'. 408 F. Supp., at 375. paralleling the right to "make 
r<>productio us" contained in the Sampson agreement, Appen-
dix 40. And even if we assume that there is merit in a.ppel-
lan t's complaint that his property has been confiscated, Brief 
for Appellant 140, the Act expressly provides for the payment 
,f compensation in accord with co11stitutional requirements, 
~ 10.1 ( c) , see S'ltpra, at-. 
Other features of the Act further belie any punitive inter-
pr<'tatio11. In promulgating regula.tions under the Act, the 
Gt'nrral RC'rvie<'s Administration is expressly directed by 
( 'ongress to protect appellant's or "any party's opportunity 
to ass<'rt any lrgally or unconstitutionally based right or priv-
1 kgr ," ~ 104 (a)(5). If appellant is dissatisfied by 
th<' rcgulat10ns, ~ 105 (a) not only assures district court jur-
1.-dict10n and J uclicial review over all his legal claims, but 
commands that any such challenged asserted by appellant 
' 'shall have priority on the docket of such court over other 
eases. " The primary sponsor of the bill emphasized that this 
exp<'ditcd treatment is expressly designed "to protect Mr. 
Nixon's property. or other legal rights .... " 18 Cong. Rec, 
18239 (1974) (Sen. Ervin). Finally, the Congress has or-
dered the General Services Administration to establish reg-
11 \ations that recognize "the need to give to Richard M. Nixon, 
,r his heirs, for his sole custody and use, tape recordings and 
other matenals which a.re not likely to be related to" the 
_,rt1r11latcd obJectives of the Act, § 104 (a.) (7),. While appel-
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lant obviously is not set at ease by these precautions and 
safeguards, they confirm the soundness of the opinion given 
the Senate by the law division of the Congressional Research 
Service: " [BJ ecause the proposed bill does not impose crim-
inal penalties or other punishment, it would not appear to 
violate the Bill of Attainder Clause." 18 Cong. Rec. 18238 
( 1974).'i:; 
Oi1e final consideration should be mentioned in light of the 
unique posture of this controversy. In determining whether 
a legislature sought to inflict punishment on an individual, it 
is often useful to inquire into the existence of less burdensome 
alternatives by which the Congress could have achieved its 
legitimate more nonpu11itive objectives. Today, in framing 
his challenge to the Act, appellant contends that such an al-
ternative was readily available: 
"If Cougress had provided that the Attorney General or 
the Administrator of General Services could institute a 
civil suit in an appropriate federal court to enjoin disposi-
tion . . of presidential historical materials ... by any 
person who could be shown to be an 'unreliable custodian' 
or who had 'engaged in misconduct' or who 'would violate 
a criminal prohibition,' the statute would have left to 
judicial determination, after a fair proceeding, the factual 
allegations of Mr. Nixon's blameworthiness." Brief for 
Appellant 137. 
We have 110 doubt that Congress might have selected this 
course. It very WE:'11 may be, however, that Congress chose 
uot to do so 011 the view that a full-fledged judicial inquiry 
lllto appellant's conduct and reliability would be no less puni-
tive and intrusive than the solution actually adopted. For 
~,. ln brirf, tlw h-gi:,;lat1w hi,;tory of the Act offer:; a paradigm of a 
'<'ongre,:, awar<> of <"011stitut10nal constraint:,; on iti; power and carefully 
-<P<·long to act w11hi11 those limitation:,;. See generally Bre:st, The Con-. 
:-;r1r1111ou,.; Lrg1slator'::; (,11ide to Con:stitutional. Interpretation, ·27 Stan. 
t Hr>v, ,585 097,5), 
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Congress no doubt was well aware that just three months 
earlier, appellant had resisted efforts to involve him and his 
records in the activities of the Judicial Branch, United States 
v. Nixon, supra, a position apparently maintained to this 
day:' 0 A rational and fairminded Congress, therefore, might 
well have decided that the carefully tailored law that it 
~nacted would be less objectionable to appellant than the 
alternative that he today appears to endorse. To be sure, if 
the record were unambiguously to demonstrate that the Act 
represents the infliction of legislative punishment, the fact 
that the judicial alternative poses its own difficulties would be 
of no constitutional significance. But the record suggests the 
contrary. and the unique choice that Congress faced but-
tresses our conclusion that the Act cannot fairly be read to 
inflict legislative punishment as forbidden by the Constitution. 
We. of course, are not blind to appellant's plea that we 
recognize the social and political realities of 1974. It was a 
period of political turbulence unprecedented in our history. 
But this Court .is not free to in.validate acts of Congress based 
upon inferences that we may be asked to draw from our 
personalized reading of the contemporary scene or recent 
history. In judging the constitutionality of the Act, we may 
only look to its terms, to the intent expressed by Members of 
Congress who voted its passage, aud to the existence or non-
--xistence of legitimate explanations for its apparent effects. 
Persuaded that none of these factors is suggestive that the 
Act is a punitive bill of attainder, or otherwise facially uncon-
-;titutional, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
u; For example, rn hi~ depo8ition taken in this case, appellant refused 
ro nn8WPr que8tioll>' pertaining to the accuracy and reliability of his prior 
pubh<' statem<>ntH as Pre;;ident concerning the contents of the tape 
n•cordings nnd othrr matrriab in issur. He invoked a claim of privilege 
tnd ll>'>'Prtrd tha1 tlw questions were irrelevant to the jud.irial inquiry. 
·~"t' f', (I Appc>ndix 586-590. 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ ) 
Title I of Pub. L. 93-526 (1974), 44 U. S. C. § 2107, the 
"Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act," q,. , .. _ _ ..,--
directs the Administrator of General Services, an official of the / .,t_f t'~\ 
Executive Branch, to take custody of the Presidential papers • 
a~d tape recordings of appellan~, former President ~ichard M. ~ -} v' , 
Nixon, and promulgate regulations that (1) provide for the ~ - ____.J 
orderly processing and screening by Executive Branch archi- 't,-, ~~ , 
vists of such materials for the purpose of returning to appel- !, - - - - - ~ 
lant those that are personal and priva.te in nature, ~nd ~ 
(2) determine the terms and conditions upon which public __. __ _ 
access may eventually be had to those materials that are 
retained. The question for decision is whether Title I is un-
constitutional on its face as a violation of ( 1) separation of 
powers; (2) Presidential privilege doctrines; (3) appellant's 
privacy interests; ( 4) appellant's First Amendment associa-
tional rights; or ( 5) the Bill of Attainder Clause. 
On December 19, 1974, four months after appellant resigned 
as President of the United States, his successor, President 
Gerald R. Ford, signed Pub. L. 93-526 into law. 88 Stat. 
1695-1698 ( 1974). The next day, December 20, 1974, ap-
pellant filed this action in the District Court for the District 
of Columbia, which under § 105 (a) of the Act has exclusive 
jurisdiction to entertain complaints challenging the Act's legal 
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or constitutional validity, or that of any regulation promul-
gated by the Administrator. Appellant's complaint chal-
lenged the Act's constitutionality on a number of grounds and 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against its enforce-
ment. A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant 
to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282, 2284.1 Because regulations required 
by § 104 of. the Act governing public access to the materials 
were not yet effective, the District Court held that questions 
going to the possibility of future public release under regula-
tions yet to be published were not ripe for review. It found 
that there was "no need and no justification for this 
court now to reach constitutional claims directed at the 
regul&,tions ... the promulgation of [ which] might eliminate, 
limit or cast [ the constitutional claims] in a different light." 
408 F. Supp. 321, 336 (1976). Accordingly, the District 
Court limited review "to consideration of the propriety of 
injunctive relief against the alleged facial unconstitutionality 
of the statute," id., at 335, and, held that the challenges to 
the facial constitutionality of the Act were without merit. 
It therefore dismissed the complaint. Id. , at 374-375. We 
noted probable jurisdiction, - U.S. - (1976). We affirm. 
I 
The Background 
The materials at issue consist of some 42 million pages of 
documents and some 880 tape recordings of conversations. 
Upon his resignation, iippellant directed government archivists 
to pack and ship the materials to him in California. This 
shipment was delayed when the Watergate Special Prosecutor 
advised President Ford of his continuing need for the mate-
rials. At the same time, President Ford requested that the 
Attorney General give his opinion respecting ownership of the 
1 For proceedings prior to convention of the thi:ee-judge court, see 
Nixon v. Richey, 513 F . 2d 427 (1975) , on reconsideration 513 F . 2d 
430 (DC 1975) . See also Nixon v. Samp:son, 389 F . Supp. 107 (1975). 
.,, 
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materials. The Attorney General advised that the historical 
practice of former Presidents and the absence of any gov-
erning statute to the contrary supported ownership in the 
appellant, with a possible limited exception.2 43 Op. At-
torney General No. 1 (Sept. 6, 1974), I App., at 220-230. 
The Attorney General's opinion emphasized, however, that 
"[h]istorically, there has been consistent acknowledge-
ment that Presidential materials are peculiarly affected 
by a public interest which may justify subjecting the 
p,bsolute ownership rights of the ex-President to certain 
limitations directly related to the character of the docu-
:fnents' as records of government activity." 
On September 8, 1974, after issuance of the Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion, the Administrator of General Services, Arthur 
F. Sampson, announced that he had signed a depository agree-
ment with appellant under the authority of 44 U. S. C. § 2107. 
10 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1104 (1974). We shall refer 
to the agreement as the Nixon-Sampson agreement. See 
Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp 107, 160-162 (1975) (Appen-
dix A). The agreement recited that appellant retained "all 
legal and equitable title to the Materials, including all literary 
property rights," and that the materials accordingly were to be 
"deposited temporarily" near appellant's California home in an 
"existing facility belonging to the United States." The agree-
ment stated further that appellant's purpose was "to donate" 
the materials to the United States "with appropriate restric-
tions." It was provided that all of the materials "shall be 
placed within secure storage -areas to which access can be 
·gained only by use of two keys," one in appellant's possession 
and the other in the possession of the Archivist of the United 
2 No opinion was given respecting ownership of certain permanent 
files retained by the Chief Executive Clerk of the White House from 
administration to administration. The Attorney General was unable 
definitively to determine their status on the basis of then available 
information. App. 228. 
' .
75-1605-OPINION 
4 NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES 
·States or members of his staff. With exceptions not material 
here, appellant agreed "not to withdraw from deposit any 
originals of the materials" for a period of three years, but 
reserved the right to "make reproductions" and to authorize 
other persons to have access on conditions prescribed by him. 
After three years, appellant might exercise the "right to with-
draw from deposit without formality any or all of the Mate-
rials ... and to retain ... [them] for any purpose ... " deter-
mined by him. 
The Nixon-Sampson agreement treated the tape recordings 
separately. They were donated to the United States "effec-
tive September 1, 1979" and meanwhile "shall remain on 
deposit." It was provided however that "subsequent to Sep-
tember 1, 1979 the administrator shall destroy such tapes as 
[Mr. Nixon] shall direct" and in any event the tapes "shall 
be destroyed at the time of [his] death or on September 1, 
1984, whichever event shall first occur." Otherwise the tapes 
were not to be withdrawn and reproductions would be made 
only by "mutual agreement." Access until September 1, 1979, 
was expressly reserved to appellant, except as he might au-
thorize access by others on terms prescribed by him. 
Public announcement of the agreement was followed 10 
days later, September 18, by the introduction of S. 4016 by 
13 Senators in the United States Senate. The bill, which 
became Pub. L. 93-526 and was designed, inter alia, to abro-
gate the Nixon-Sampson agreement, passed the Senate on 
October 4, 1974. It was awaiting action in the House of 
Representatives when on October 17, 1974, appellant filed 
suit in the District Court seeking specific enforcement of the 
Nixon-Sampson agreement. That action was consolidated 
with other suits seeking access to Presidential materials pur-
suant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. 552 
(Supp. V), and also seeking injunctive relief against enforce-
ment of the agreement. Nixon v. Sampson, supra.3 The 
s The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stayed 
.. 
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House passed its version of the Senate bill on Decem-
ber 3, 1974. Following conference committee action, both 
Houses of Congress passed the conference version of S. 
4016 on December 9, 1974, and President Ford signed it 
into law on December 19. 
II 
The Act 
Pub. L. 93-52G has two Titles. Title I, the challenged 
"Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act" con-
sists of §§ 101 through 106. Title II, the "Public Documents 
Act," amends Chapter 33 of Title 44, United States Code, to 
add §§ 3315 through 3324 thereto, and establish the National 
Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal 
Officials. 
Section 101 (a) of Title I directs that the Administrator of 
General Services, notwithstanding any other law or agreement 
or understanding, (e.g., the Nixon-Sampson agreement) "shall 
receive, obtain, or retain, complete possession and control of 
all original tape recordings of conversations which were re-
corded or ca used to be recorded by any officer or employee of 
the Federal Government and which-
" ( ! ) Involve former President Richard M. Nixon or 
other individuals who, at the time of the conversa.tion 
were employed by the Federal Government; 
"(2) were recorded in the White House or in the office 
of the President in the Executive Office Buildings located 
in Washington, District of Columbia; Camp David, 
any order effectuating the decision in Nixon v. Sampson pending decision 
of the three-judge court whethPr under §105 (a) the instant case was to 
"have priority on the docket of [the District] court over other cases," 
Nixon v. Richey, supra, 513 F . 2d, at 431, 435, 446-448. The three-judge 
court was of the view that "the central purpose of Congress, in relation 
to all pending litigation, is to have an early and prior determination I 
of the Act's constitutionality" and therefore did not request dissolution of 
the stay until entry of judgment. 408 F. Supp., at 333-334, n. 10. 
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Maryland; Key Biscayne, Florida; or San Clemente, Cal-
ifornia; and 
11 (3) were recorded during the period beginning January 
20, 1969 and ending August 9, 1974." 
Section 101 (b) provides that notwithstanding any such 
agreement or understanding, the Administrator also "shall 
receive, retain, or make reasonable efforts to obtain, complete. 
possession and control of all papers, documents, memoran-
dums, transcripts, and other objects and materials which con-
stitute the Presidential historical materials [as defined by 44 
U. S. C. § 2101] of Richard M. Nixon, covering the period 
beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 9, 1974.'' 
Section 102 (a) prohibits destruction of the tapes or ma-
terials except as may be provided by law, and § 102 (b) makes 
them available (giving priority of access to the Office of 
Watergate Special Prosecutor) in response to court subpoena 
or other legal process, or for use in judicial proceedings. This 
was made subject however, "to any rights, defenses, or privi-
leges which the Federal Government or any person may 
invoke .... " Section 102 (c) affords appellant, or any person 
designated by him in writing, access to the recordings and ma-
terials for any purpose consistent with the Act "subsequent 
and subject to the regulations" issued by the Administrator 
under § 103. Section 102 (d) provides for access according to 
§ 103 regulations by any agency or department in the Execu-
tive Branch for lawful government use. Section 103 requires 
custody of the tape recordings and materials to be maintained 
in Washington except as may otherwise be necessary to carry 
out the Act, and directs that the Administrator promulgate 
regulations necessary to assure their protection from loss or 
destruction and to prevent access to them by unauthorized 
persons. 
Section 104, in pertinent part, directs the Administrator to 
promulgate regulations governing public access to the tape 
recordings and materials. Section 104 (a) requires submis-
'1~1605-OPINION 
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·sion of proposed regulations to each House of Congress, the 
regulations to take effect under § 104 (b )( 1) at the end of 90 
legislative days unless either House or Senate adopts a resolu-
tion disapproving them. The regulations must take into 
~ccount seven factors specified in § 104 (a), namely: 
" ( 1) the need to provide the public with the full truth, 
at the earliest reasonable date, of the abuses of govern-
mental power popularly identified under the generic term 
'Watergate.' 
"(2) the need to make such recordings and materials 
available for use in judicial proceedings; 
"(3) the need to prevent general access, except in accord-
ance with appropriate procedures established for use in 
judicial proceedings, to information relating to the Na-
tion's security; 
"(4) the need to protect every individual's right to a 
fair trial; 
"(5) the need to protect any party's opportunity to assert 
any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege 
which would prevent or otherwise limit access to such 
recordings and materials; 
"(6) the need to provide public access to those materials 
which have general historical significance, and which are 
not likely to be related to the need described in para-
graph (1); and 
"(7) the need to give to Richa.rd M. Nixon, or his heirs, 
for his sole custody and use, tape recordings and other 
materials which are not likely to be related to the need 
described in paragraph ( 1) and are not otherwise of 
general historical significance." 
Section 105 (a) vests the District Court for the District 
of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction not only to hear 
constitutional challenges to the Act, but also to hear chal-
lenges to the validity of any regulation, and to decide actions 
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involving questions of title, ownership, custody, possession or 
control of any tape or materials, or involving payment of any 
award of just compensation required by § 105 (c) when a 
decision of that court holds that any individual has been de-
prived by the Act of private property without just compen-
sation. Section 105 (b) is a severability provision providing 
that any decision invalidating a provision of the Act or a 
regulation shall not a.fleet the validity or enforcement oi 
any other provision or regulation. Section 106 authorizes 
appropriation of such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
the provisions of the Title. 
III 
The Scope of the Inquiry 
The District Court correctly focused on the Act's require-
ment that the Administrator of General Services administer 
the tape recordings and materials placed in his custody only 
under regulations promulgated by him providing for the orderly 
processing of such materials for the purpose of returning 
to appellant such of them as are personal and private 
in nature, and of determining the terms and conditions 
upon which public access may eventually be had to those 
remaining in the Government's possession. The District 
Court also noted that in designing the regulations, the 
Administrator must consider the need to protect the con-
stitutional rights of appellant and other individuals against 
infringement by the processing itself or, ultimately, by public 
access to the materials retained. 408 F. Supp., at 334-340. 
This construction is plainly required by the wording of § § 103 
and 104.4 
4 This interpretat ion has abundant support in the legislative history 
of the Act . Senator Javits, onr of the sponsors of S. 4016 stated that 
the criteria of § 104 (a ) 
"endeavor to protect due process for individuals who may be named 
in the papers as well as any privilege which may be involved in the 
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Regulations implementing § § 102 and 103, which did not re. 
quire submission to Congress, and which regulate access and 
screening by government archivists, have been promulgated, 
40 Fed. Reg. 2669 (1975); 41 CFR § 105-63 (1976). Public 
access regulations that must be submitted to Congress under 
§ 104 (a) have not, however, become effective. The initial set 
proposed by the Administrator was disapproved pursuant to 
§ 104 (b)(l) by Senate Resolution. S. Res. 244, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1975); 121 Cong. Rec. S15803-S15800 (daily ed. 
Sept. 11, 1975). The Senate also disapproved seven provi-
sions of a proposed second set, although that set had been 
withdrawn. S. Res. 428, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); 122 
Cong. Rec. S5290-S5291 (daily ed., April 8, 1976). The 
House disapproved six provisions of a third set. H. R. Res. 
1505, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The Administrator is of 
the view that regulations cannot become effective except as a 
package and consequently is preparing a fourth set for sub-
mission to Congress. Brief for Federal Appellees, 8-9, n. 4. 
The District Court therefore concluded that as no regula-
papers, and of course the necessary access of the former President 
himself. 
"In short, the argument that the bill authorizes absolute unrestricted 
, public access does not stand up in the face of the criteria and the require-
ment for the regulations which we have inserted in the bill today." 120 
Cong. Rec. S. 182.44 (daily ed .. Oct. 3, 1974) . 
Senator . Nelson, the bill's draftsman, agreed that the primary purpose 
to provide for the American people an historical record of the Watergate 
events "should not override all regard for the rights of the individual 
to privacy and a fair trial." Id., at S. 18236. Senator Ervin, also a 
sponsor and floor manager of the bill, stated: 
"Nobody's rights are affected by this bill, because it provides, as far 
as privacy is concerned, that the regulations of the Administrator shall 
take into account . . . the opportunity to assert any legally or con-
'stitutionally based right which would prevent or otherwise limit access 
to the tape recordings and other materials." Id., at S. 18329 (daily 
ed. Oct. 4, 1974). See also id., at S. 18320 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id., I 
at H. 11209 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Brademas). 
' I 
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tions under § 104 had yet taken effect, and as such regula-
tions once effective were explicitly made subject to judicial 
review under § 105, the court could consider only the injury 
to appellant's constitutionally protected interests allegedly 
worked by the taking of his Presidential materials into cus-
tody for screening by government archivists. 408 F. Supp., at 
339-340. Citiug WatBe\<I, v. B'ttck, 313 U. 8. 387, 402 (1941), 
Judge McGowan, writing for the District Court, 408 F. Sapp~ 
&t 3367 stated: 
"No one c.an foresee the varying applications of these 
separate provisions which conceivably might be made. A 
law which is constitutional as applied in one manner may 
still contravene the Constitution as applied in another. 
Since all contingencies of attempted enforcement cannot 
be envisioned in advance of those applications, courts have 
in the main found it wiser to delay passing upon the 
constitutionally of all the separate phases of compre-
hensive statute until faced with cases involving particular 
provisions as specifically applied to persons who. claim to 
be injured. Passing upon the possible significance of 
the manifold provisions of a broad statute in advance of 
efforts to apply the separate provisions is analogous to 
rendering an advisory opinion upon a statute or a de-
claratory judgment upon hypothetical case." _,l 
l-f0%' f • pvff · > d 
?i" ) ~ IA}~~ 
Only this Term we applied this principle in an analogous 
situation in declining to adjudicate the constitutionality of 
regulations of the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion: Act that were in process of revision, stating, "For [ the 
Court] to review regulations not yet promulgated, the final 
form of which has been only hinted at, would be wholly 
novel." EPA v. Brown, - U. S. - , - (May 2, 1977). 
See also Thorpe v. Ho,using Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 283-284 
(1969) ; Rosenberg v. Fleute, 374 U. S. 449, 451 (1963); 
United States v. Rames, 362 U.S. 17, 20- 22 (1960),..__ Harmon 
v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579 (1958) . We too, therefore, limit 
(],~ ~' '!> () S, 3!i"7.i _, 
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pur consideration of the merits of appellant's several constitu:: 
tional claims to those addressing the facial validity of thEJ 
provisions of the Act requiring the Administrator to take 
the recordings and materials ipto the Government's custoqy 
subject to screening by Ggvermnent archivists. 
The constitutional questions to be decided are, of cour~«;i, 
of considerable importance. They touch the relationship 
between two of the three coordinate branches of the Feder1,tl 
Government, the Executive and the Legislative, and the rela-
tionship of appellant to his Government. They arise in a 
context unique in the history of the Presidency and present 
issues that this Court has had no occasion heretofore to ad-
dress. Judge McGowan, speaking for the District Court, 
comprehensively canvassed all the claims, and in a thorough 
opinion, concluded that none had merit. Our independent 
examination of the issues brings us to the same conclusion, 
authough our analysis differs somewhat on some questions. 
IV 
Claims Concerning the, Autonomy of the Executive Branch 
The Act was the product of joint adion by the Congress 
and President Ford, who signed the bill into law. It is 
therefore urged by intervenor-appellees that, in this circum-
stance, the case does not truly present a controversy concern-
ing the separation of powers, or a controversy concerning the 
Presidential privilege of confidentiality, because, it is argued, 
such claims may be asserted only by incumbents who are 
presently responsible to the American people for their action. 
As shall be seen, we need not resolve these contentions, 
for even assuming that appellant, as a former President, may 
be heard to assert that joint action by the Congress and the 
incumbent President will upset the constitutional balance of 
governmenta.l powers, we hold that neither his separation of 
powers claim nor his claim of breach of constitutional privilege 
has merit. 
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Appellant argues broadly that the Act encroaches upon 
Presidential prerogative to control internal operations of the 
Presidential office and therefore offends the autonomy of the 
Executive Branch. The argument is divided into separate 
put interrelated parts. 
First, appellant contends that Congress is without power to 
delegate to a subordinate officer of the Executive Branch the 
decision whether to discl<;>se Presidential materials and to 
prescribe the terms that govern any disclosure. To do so, 
appellant contends, constitutes, without more, an impermis-
sible interference by the Legislative Branch into matters 
inherently the business solely of the Executive Branch. 
Second, appellant contends, somewhat more narrowly, 
that by authorizing the Administrator to take custody of all 
Presidential materials in a "broad, undifferentiated'' manner, 
and in authorizing future publication except where a privilege 
is affirmatively established, the Act offends the presumptive 
confidentia1ity of Presidential communications recognized in 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). He argues that 
the District Court erred in two respects in rejecting this 
contention. Initially, he contends that the District Court 
erred in distinguishing incumbent from former Presidents in 
evaluating appellant's claim of confidentiality. Appellant 
asserts that, unlike the very &pecific privilege protecting 
aga.inst disclosure of state secrets and sensitive information 
concerning military or diplomatic matters, which appellant 
concedes may be asserted only by an incumbent President, 
a more generalized Presidential privilege survives the termi-
nation of the President•advisor relationship much as the 
attorney•client privilege survives the relationship that cre-
ates it. Appellant further~ argues that the District Court -5 
erred in applying a balancing test to his claim of Presi• 
dential privilege and in concluding that, notwithstanding 
the fact that some of the materials might legitimately be 
included within a claim of Presidential confidentiality, sub-
r 5-1 q06:-0PH:fI Oij 
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13tantial public interes_ts outweighed and justified the limited 
inroads on Presidential confidentiality necessitated by the 
Act's provision for government custody and screening of th~ 
piaterials. Finally, appellant contends that the Act's authori-
zation of the process of screening the materi,a.ls itself violate~ 
the privilege and will chill the future exercise of constitu-
tionally protected executive functions, thereby impairing th~ 
ability of future Presidents to obtain the candid advice neces-
BttfY to the conduct of their constitutionally i,:nposed dutieJ, 
A 
Separation of Powers 
We reject at the outset appellant's argument that the Act's 
regulation of the disposition of Presidential materials within 
the Executive Branch constitutes, without more, a violation 
of the principle of separation of powers. Neither President 
Ford not President Carter supports this claim. The Execu-
tive Branch became a party to the Act's regulation when 
President Ford signed the Act into law, and the adminis-
tration of President Carter, acting through the Solicitor 
General, vigorously supports affirmance of the District Court's 
judgment sustaining its constitutionality. Moreover, the con-
trol over the materials remains in the Executive Branch. The 
Administrator of the General Services Administration, who 
must promulgate a.nd administer the regulations that are the 
keystone of the statutory scheme, is himself an official of the 
Executive Branch, appointed by the President. The career 
archvists appointed to do the initial screening for the purpose 
of selecting out and returning to appellant his private and 
personal papers similarly are Executive Branch employees. 
Appellant's argument is in any event based on an interpre-
tation of the separation of powers doctrine inconsistent with 
the origins of that doctrine, recent decisions of the Court, and 
the contemporary realities of our political system. True, it 
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government [must remain] entirely free from the control or 
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the 
others .... " Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602, 629-630 (1935), and that "[t]he sound application 
of a principle that makes one master in his own house pre-
cludes him from imposing his control in the house of another 
who is master there." Id., at 630. See also O'Donoghue v. 
United States, 289 U. S. 516 ( 1933); Springer v. Government 
of the Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 201 (1928). 
But the more pragmatic, flexible approach of Madison in 
the Federalist papers and later of Mr. Justice Story 5 was 
expres3ly affirmed by this Court only three years ago in 
Un1:ted States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). There the 
same broad argument concerning the separation of powers 
was made by appellant in the context of opposition to a 
subpoena duces tecum of the Watergate Special Prosecutor 
5 Madis:m in The Federalist No. 47, reviewing the origin of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, commented that " [ o] n the slightest view of the 
British constitution we must perceive, that the legislative, executive and 
judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct 
from each other." The Federalist 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). He con-
tinued, remarkng that Montesquieu, the "oracle" always consulted on 
the subject, id., at 324, 
"did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial, agency 
in, or no control over the acts of rach other. His meaning, as his own 
words import . . . can amount to no more than this, that where the 
whole power of our drpartment is exercised by the same hands which 
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental prin-
ciples of a free constjtution, are subverted." Id., at 325-326 (emphasis 
in original). 
Similarly, Justice Story wrote: 
"[W]hen we speak of a separation of the three great departments 
of the government, and maintain that thr Eeparation is indispensable to 
public liberty, we are to undn~tand this maxim in a limited sense. It is 
not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate 
and distinct, and have no common link of connrction or dependence, the 
nne upon the other, in the slightest degree." I J. Story, Comm~aries on 
· li<' Com;titution § 525 (M Bigelow ed . 1905). 
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for certain Presidential tapes and documents of value to a 
pending criminal investigation. Although acknowledging 
that each branch of the Government has the duty initially 
to interpret the Constitution for itself, and that its interpre-
tation of its powers is due great respect from the other 
branches, 418 U. S., at 703, the Court squarely rejected 
the argument that the Constitution contemplates a complete 
division of authority between the three branches. Rather, 
the unanimous Court essentially embraced Justice Jackson's 
view, expressed in his concurrence to Youngstown Sheet & t 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 ( 1952): 
"In designing the structure of our Government and 
dividing and allocating the sovereign power among the 
three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution 
sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the sep-
arate powers were not intended to operate with absolute 
independence." 418 U. S., at 707 (emphasis supplied). 
Like the District Court, we therefore find that appellant's l 
argument rests upon an "archaic view of the separation of 
powers as requiring three airtight departments of government," 
408 F. Supp., at 342.6 Rather, in determining whether the 
Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordina.te 
branches, the pro focuses on the extent to which 
it prevents the rom accomplis in its 
unctions. United tates v. ixon, 
supra, ., nly where the potential for 
disruption is present must we then determine whether that 
impact is justified by an overriding need to promote ob-
jectives within the constitutional authority of Congress. 
Ibid. 
0 See also, e. g., 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1.09 (1958); 
G. Gunther, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 400 (9th ed. 1975); 
L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 28-30 (1965); Cox, 
Executive Privilege, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383, 1387-1391 (1974); Ratner, 
Executive Privilege, Self Incrimination, and the Separation of Powers 
Illmsion, 22 U. C. L.A. L. Rev. 92-93 (1974). 
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It is highly relevant that the Act provides for cus. 
tody of the materials by officials of the Executive Branch. 
and that employees of the Executive Branch shall have Mcess 
to the materials only "for lawful Government use, subject to 
the [4-dministrator's] regulations." § 102 ( d); 41 CFR 
§§ 105-63.205, 105-63.206, and 105-63.302. While the mate-
rials may be made available for use in judicial proceedings, 
this provision is expressly qualified by any rights, defense, or 
privileges that any person may invoke including, of course, a 
valid claim of executive privilege. United States v. Nixon, 
supra. Similarly, although some of the materials may eventu .. 
ally be made available for public access, the Act expressly 
recognizes the need both "to protect any party's opportunity to 
assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege," 
§ 104 ( a) ( 5), and to return purely private materials to appe)-
lan t , § 104 (a) ( 7) . These provisions plainly guard against 
disclosures barred by any defenses or privileges available 
to appellant or the Executive Branch.7 And appellant him-
self concedes that the Act "does not make the presidential 
materials available to the Congress-except insofar as Con-
gressmen are members of the public and entitled to access 
when the public has it." Brief for Appellant 119. The 
Executive Branch remains in full control of the Presidential 
materials, and the Act facially is designed to ensure that the 
materials can be released only when release is not barred by 
some applicable privilege that inheres in that branch. 
Thus, whatever are the future possibilities for constitutional 
conflict in the promulgation of regulations respecting public 
access to particular documents, nothing contained in the Act 
7 The District Court correctly interpreted the Act to require meaningful 
notice to appellant of archival decisions that might bring into play rights 
secured by § 104 (a ) (5) . 408 F. Supp ., at 340 n. 23. Such notice is re-
quired by the Admini;;trator's RegulatiOJ}.i_ 41 CFR § 105-63.205, which pro-
vide: "The Administrator of General Services or his designated agent will 
provide former Pre::;ident Nixon or his designated attorney or agent prior 
notice of, and allow him to be p resent during, each authorized access." 
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renders it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch and,. 
therefore, unconstitutional on its face. And, of course, there 
is abundant statutory precedent for the regulation and manda-
tory disclosure of documents in the possession of the Executive 
Branch. See, e. g., the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. 
§ 552 (Supp. V); the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S. C. § 552 (a) 
(Supp. V) ; the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. \ 
94-409, 90 Stat. 1241, adding 5 U. S. C. § 552b; the Federal 
Records Act, 44 U. S. C. § 2101 et seq.; and a variety of 
other statutes, e. g., 13 U. S. C. §§ 8-9 (census data); 
26 U. S: C. §6103 (tax returns). Such regulation of 
material generated in the Executive Branch has never been 
considered invalid as an invasion of its autonomy. Cf. En-
vironmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 83 
(1973); FAA v. Robertson, 422 U. S. 255 (197~).8 Similar 
8 We S<'e no reason to engage in the debate whether appellant has 
~egal title to the materials. See Brief for Appellant 90. Such an inquiry 
is irrelevant for present purposes because § 105 (c) assures appellant 
of just compensation if his private property is taken, and, even if legal 
title is his, the materials are not thereby immune from regulation. 
It has been accepted at least since Mr. Justice Story's opinion in Folsom 
v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 347 ( 1841) that regardless of where legal 
title lies, "from the nature of the public service, or the character of 
documents, embracing historical, military, or diplomatic information, 
it may be· the right, and even the duty, of the government, to give them 
publicity, even against the will of the writers." Appellant's suggestion 
that the Folsom principle does not go beyond materials concerning na-
tional security and current government business is negated by Mr. Justice 
Story's emphasis that it also extended to materials "embracing histori-
cal . .. information ." Id., at 347. (Emphasis added.) Significantly, 
no such limitation was suggested in the Attorney General's opinion to 
President Ford. Although indicating a view that the materials be-
longed to apprllant, the opinion acknowledged that "Presidential mate-
rials" without qualification "are peculiarly affected by a public interest" 
which may justify subjecting ·' the absolute ownership rights" to certain 
"limitations directly related to the character of the documents as records 
of government activity." App. 220--230. 
Of coiirse if tide is found to be in the Government rather thaw. 
I ? ? 
? 
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congressional power to regulate Executive Branch documents 
exists in this instance, a power that is augmented by the 




Having concluded that the separation of powers principle 
is not violated by the Administrator's taking custody and 
screening appellant's papers, we next consider the claim that A. ~ 
Presidential privilege shields these records from archival 
scrutiny. We start with what was established in United 
States v. Nixon, supra-that the privilege is a qualified one.0 
Appellant had argued in that case that in camera mspection 
by the District Court of Presidential documents and ma.terials 
subpoenaed by the Special Prosecutor would itself violate 
the privilege without regard to whether the documents were 
protected from public disclosure. The Court disagreed, stat-
ing that "neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the 
generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communi-
cations, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified 
PreEidential privilege . . . ." 10 418 U. S., at 706. The 
appellant, then Congress' authority to legislate under the Property Clause, 
Art. IV, § 3, is clear. That clause has consistently been given an "ex-
pansive reading." Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 536 (1976). 
9 Like the District Court, we do not distinguish between the qualified 
"executive" privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon and the 
"Presidential" privilege to which appellant refers, except to note that 
appellant does not argue that the privilege he claims extends beyond 
the privilege recoguized in that case. Sec 408 F. Supp., at 343 n. 24. 
10 Unit , d States v. Nixon recognized that there is a legitimate govern-
mental intere.,t in the confidentiality of communications between high 
government officials, e. g., those who advise the President, and that 
" [h]uman experience teaches that thosr who expect public dissemination 
of their remarks may wrll temper candor with concern for appearances 
and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking 
process." Id., at 705. 
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Court recognized that the privilege of confidentiality of 
Presidential communications derives from the supremacy of the 
Executive Branch within its assigned area of constitutional 
responsibilities," .,cbut distinguished a President's "broad, 
undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confiden-
tiality of such [communications]" from the more parti-
cularized and less qualified privilege relating to the need "to 
protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security 
secrets .... " Ibid. The Court held that in the case of the 
general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communi-
cations, its importance must be balanced against the inroads 
of the privilege upon the effective functioning of the Judicial 
Branch. This balance was struck against the claim of privi-
lege in that case because the Court determined that the 
intrusion into the confidentiality of Presidential communica-
tions resulting from in camera inspection by the District 
Court, "with all the protection that a District Court will be 
obliged to provide," would be minimal and therefore that 
the claim was outweighed by "[t]he impediment that an 
absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the 
primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch .... " 
Id., at 706-707. 
Unlike United States v. Nixon, in which appellant as-
serted a claim of absolute Presidential privilege against in-
quiry by the coordinate Judicial Branch, this case initially 
involves appellant's assertion of a privilege against the very 
Executive Branch in whose name the privilege is invoked. 
The nonfederal appellees rely on this apparent anomaly to con-
tend that only an incumbent President can assert the privilege 
11 Indeed, the opinion noted, 418 U. S., at 705 n. 15, that government 
confidentiality hns been a cornwn from the time of the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787, the mretings of which were conducted in private, 
1 M. Farrand, The Rrcords of tlw Frdeml Convention of 1787, pp. xi-xxv, 
and the records of which were sraled for more than 30 years after 
the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., Res. 8 (1818). 
Sec generally C. Warren, The Making of the Corn;titution 134-139 (1937). 
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of the Presidency. Acceptance of that proposition would, 
of course, end this inquiry. The contention draws on United 
States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 7- 8 (1953) , where it wa., 
said that the privilege "belongs to the Government and 
mwst be asserted by it: it can neither be claimed nor waived 
by a private party." The District Court, believed that this 
statement was strong support for the contention, but found 
resolution of the issue unnecessary. 408 F. Supp., at 343-
345. It sufficed, said the District Court, that the privilege, 
if available to a former President, was at least one that 
"c~ries much less weight than a claim asserted by the.l_ 
....< tbo i!QWador viov.r, tthd we adopt ib 
It is true that only the incumbent is charged with per-
formance of the executive duty under the Constitution. And 
an incumbent may be inhibited in disclosing confidences of 
a predecessor when he believes that the effect may be to 
discourage candid presentation of views by his contem-
porary advisors. Moreover, to the extent that the privilege 
serves as a shield for executive officials against burdensorpe 
requests for information which might interfere with the proper 
performance of their duties, see United States v. Nixon, supra, 
418 U. S. , at 714; cf. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund, ~21 U.S. 491 , 501-503 (1975); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 
387 U. S. 82, 84-85 (1967) (per curiam), a former President 
is in less need of it than an incumbent. In addition, there 
are obvious political checks against an incumbent's abuse of 
the privilege. 
Nevertheless, we think that the Solicitor General states 
the sounder view, and we adopt it A 
"This Court held in United States v. Nixon, [ 418 U. S. 
683 (1974)] that the privilege is necessary to provide the 
confidentiality required for the President's conduct of 
office. Unless he can give his advisers some assurance of 
confidentiality, a President could not expect to receive 
the full and frank submissions of facts and opinions upon 
.,t..,V'~ (t,,;.,.4.)) 
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which effective discharge of his duties depends. The con-
fidentiality necessary to this exchange cannot be measured 
by the few months or years between the submission of 
the information and the end of the President's tenure; 
the privilege is not for the benefit of the President as an 
individual, but for the benefit of the Republic. There- 4 ~ fore the privilege survives the individual President's ) I 
tenure." Brief for Federal Appellees 33. 
At the same time, however, the fact that neither President 
Ford nor President Carter supports appellant's claim argues 
against his contention that the Act impermissibly intrudes 
into the executive function and the needs of the Executive 
Branch. This necessarily follows, for it must be presumed 
that the incumbent President is vitally concerned with and 
in the best position to assess the present and future needs 
of the Executive Branch, and to support invocation of the 
privilege accordingly. 
The appellant may legitimately assert the Presidential 
privilege, of course, only as to those materials whose contents 
fall within the scope of the privilege recognized in United 
States v. Nixon, supra. In that case the Court held that the 
privilege is limited to communications "in performance of 
[a President's] responsibilities," 418 U. S., at 711, "of his 
office," id., at 713, and made "in the process of shaping 
policies and making decisions," id., at 708. Of the estimated 
42 million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings whose 
custody is at stake, the District Court concluded that the 
appellant's claim of .12residential privilege could apply at most 
to the 200,000 itemswith which the appellant was personally 
familiar. 
The appellant bases his claim of Presidential privilege in 
this case on the assertion that the potential disclosure of 
communications given to the appellant in confidence would 
adversely affect the ability of future Presidents to obtain 
the candid advice necessary for effective decisionmaking. 
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We are called upon upon to adjudicate that cla.im, however, 
only with respect to the process by which the materials 
will be screened and catalogued by professional archivists. 
For any eventual public access will be governed by the 
guidelines of § 104, which direct the Administrator to take 
into account "the need to protect any party's opportunity 
to assert any constitutionally based right or privilege," § 104 
(a)( 5), and the need to return purely private materials to 
the appellant, § 104 (a) (7). 
In view of these specific directions, there is no reason 
to believe that the restriction on public access ultimately 
established by regulation will not be adequate to preserve 
executive confidentiality. An absolute barrier to all outside 
disclosure is not practically or constitutionally necessary. As 
the careful research by the Djstrict Court clearly demon-
strates, there has never been an expectation that the con-
fidences of the Executive Office are absolute and _unyielding. 
All former Presidents since President Hoover have deposited 
their papers in Presidential libraries (an example appellant 
has said he intended to follow) for governmental preserva-
tion and eventual disclosure.12 The screening processes for 
~orting materials for lodgment in these libraries also involved 
comprehensive review by archivists, often involving mate-
rials upon which access restrictions ultimately have been 
12 The opinion of the District Court found that, in the Hoover Library, 
there are no restrictions on Presidential papers, although some restrictions 
exist with respect to personal and private material, and in the Roosevelt 
Library, less than 0.5% of the materials are restricted. There is no 
evidence in the reocrd as to the percentage of materials currently under 
restriction in the Truman or Eisenhower Libraries, but in the Kennedy 
Library, 85% of the material has been processed, and of the processed 
materials, only 0.6% is under donor (as distinguished from security-
related) restriction. In the Johnson Library, review of nonclassified 
material is virtually complete, and more than 99% of all nonsecurity 
classified materials arc unrestricted. In each of the Presidential ¼ibraries, 
provision has been made for the removal of the re$trictions with th~ 
_passage of time, 408 F, Stipp,, at 346 n, 31, 
.P , ... ' 
75-1605-OPINION 
NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES 23 
imposed. 408 F. Supp., at 347. The expecjt\ ion of the ,11,( t: 
confidentiality of executive communications thus has always 
been limited and subject to erosion over time after an 
administration leaves office. 
We are thus left with the bare claim that the mere 
screening of the materials by the arcfiivists·w1h impermissibly 
interfere with candid communication of views by Presiden-
tial advisors.13 We agree with the District Court that, . thus 
framed, the question is readily resolved. The screening con-
stitutes a very limited intrusion by personnel in the Executive 
Branch sensitive to executive concerns. These very personnel 
have performed the identical task in each of the Presidential 
){ibraries, without any suggestion that such activity has in .R ~ • 
any way interfered with executive confidentiality. Indeed 
in light of this consistent historical practice, past and present 
13 Aside from the public access eventually to be provided under § 104, 
the Act mandates two other access routes to the materials. First, under 
§ 102(b), access is available in accordance with lawful process served upon 
the Administrator. As we have noted, see n. 7, supra, the appellant is to 
be advised prior to any access to the materials, and he is thereafter free 
to review the specific materials at issue, see§ 102 (c); 41 CFR § 105-63.301/\. 
in order to determine whether to assert any rights, privileges, or defenses. 
Section 102 (b) expressly conditions ultimate access by way of lawful proc-
e8s upon the right of appellant to invoke any rights, defenses, or 
privileges. 
Second, § 102(d) of the Act states that "[a]ny agency or department 
in the executive branch of the Federal Government shall at all times have 
access to the tape recordings and other materials . .. for lawful Govern-
ment use ... " The District Court eschewed a broad reading of that sec-
tion as permitting wholesale access by any executive official for any con-
.~eivable executive purpose. Instead, it construed § 102 (d) in light of 
Congress' presumed intent that, the Act operate within constitutional 
bounds-an int~nt manifested throughout the statute, see 408 F. Supp., at 
·337 n. 15. The District Court thus interpreted§ 102(d), and in particular 
the phrase "lawful use," as requiring that once appellant is notified of 
requested access by an executive official, see n. 7, supra, he be allowed to 
assert any consttiutional right or privilege that in his view would bar 
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exectiuve officials must be well aware of the possibility that, 
at some time in the future, their communications may be 
reviewed on a confidential basis by professional archivists. 
Appellant has suggested no reason why review under the 
instant Act, rather than the Presidential Libraries Act, is 
significantly more likely to impair confidentiality, nor has 
he called into question the District Court's finding that the 
archivists "record for discretion in handling confidential mate-
rial is unblemished." 408 F. Supp., at 347. 
Moreover, adequate justifications are shown for this limited 
intrusion into executive confidentiality comparable to those 
held to justify the in camera inspection of the District Court 
sustained in United States v. Nixon, supra. Congress' pur-
poses in enacting the Act are exhaustively treated in the 
opinion of the District Court. The legislative history of the 
Ast clearly reveals that, among other purposes, Congress 
acted to establish regular procedures to deal with the per-
ceived need to preserve the materials for legitimate historical 
and governmental purposes.14 An incumbent President 
should not be dependent on happenstance or the whim of 
a .,P'rior President when he seeks access to records of past 
decisions that define or channel current governmental obliga-
tions.15 Nor should the American people's ability to recon-
1 • From its exhaustive servey of the legislative history, the District 
Court concluded that the public interests served by the Act could be 
merged under "the rubric of preservation of an accurate and complete 
historical record." 408 F. Supp. 348-349. 
15 S. Rep. No. 93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 3, 4, 5 (1974) ; H. R. Rep. 
No. 93-1507, 93d Cong., 2d Scss., at 3 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. H. 11211 
(daily ed. Dec. 3, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Abzug). See also section 
102(d) of the Act." Id. , at 349-350. 
Presidents in the past have had to apply to the Presidential.,t'ibraries 
of their predeccessors for permission to examine records of past govern-
mental actions relating to currrnt governmental problems. See 408 F. 
Supp., at 351-352. Although it appears that most such requests have 
been granted, Congress could legitimately conclude that the situation 
was unstable and ripe for change. It is clear from the face of the Act 
-
~ C • 
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§truct and come to terms with their history be truncated 
f:>y an analysis of Presidential privilege that focuses only 
on the needs of the present.16 Congress can legitimately act 
to rectify the hit-or-miss approach that has characterized 
past attempts to protect these substantial interests by en-
trusting the materials to expert handling by trusted and 
disinterested professionals. 
Other substantial public interests that led Congress to seek 
to preserve a~ terWs were the desire to restore 
public confidence in our political processes by preserving the 
materials as a source for facilitating a full airing of the events 
leading to appellant's resignation , and Congress' need to 
understand how those political processes had in fact operated 
in order to gauge the necessity for remedial legislation. 
Thus by preserving these mateirals, the Act may be thought 
to aid the legislative process and thus to be within the 
scope of Congress' broad investigative power, see, e. g. , East-
land v. United States Servicemen's Fund, supra. And, of 
course, the Congress repeatedly referred to the importance 
of the materials to the judiciary in the event that they shed 
light upon issues in civil or criminal litigation, a social 
interest that cannot be €1oublecb, See United States v. Nixon, 
supra.11 
that making the materials available for the on-going conduct of Presi-
dential policy was at least one of the objectives of the Act. See§ 102 (d). 
10 S. Rep. No. 93-1181 , 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1, 3 (1974); H. R. 
Rep. No. 93- 1507, 93d Cong. 2d Sess ., at 2, 3, 8 (1974) ; Senate Hearings 
on GSA R egulations, at 256 ; 120 Cong. Rec. S. 16871 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 
1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson); id. , at S. 18235 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1974); 
id., at S. 18248 (remarks of Sen . Ervin) ; id., at S. 18259 (remarks oi 
Sen. Huddleston) ; id., at S. 18260 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff); id., at 
S. 18261 (remarks of Sen. Muskie) ; id., at S. 18325 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 
1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson) ; id., at H. 11207 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 
1974) (remarks of Rep. Brademas) . See also §§ 101 (b) ( 1), 104 (a) (7) 
of the Act . 
17 As to these several obj ec tives of the legislature, see S. Rep. No. 
93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 3- 4, 6 (1974) ; H. R. Rep. No, 93-1507) 
, 
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In light of these objectives, the scheme adopted by Congress 
for preservation of the appellant's Presidential materials 
cannot be said to be overbroad. It is true that among the 
voluminous materials to be screened by archivists are some 
materials tha.t bear no relationship to any of these objectives 
(and whose prompt return to appellant is therefore man-
dated by § 104 (a) (7) ). But these materials are commingled 
with other materials whose preservation the Act requires, 
for the appellant, like his predecessors, made no systematic 
attempt to segregate official, personal, and private materials. 
408 F. Supp., at 355. Even individual documents and tapes 
often intermingle communications relating to governmental 
duties, and of great interest to historians or future policy-
makers ,.._with priva.te and confidential communications. Ibid. ~ 
Thus, as in the Presidential )dbraries, the intermingled ~ -~ • 
state of the materials requires the comprehensive review and 
classification contemplated by the Act if Congress' impor-
tant objectives are to be furthered. In the course of that 
process, the archivists will be required to view the sm~,11 
fraction of the materials th.at implicate Presidential con-
fidentiality, as well as personal and private materials to be 
returned to appellant. But given the safeguards built into 
93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, 8 ; 120 Cong. Rec. S. 16871 ( daily ed. Sept. 18, 
1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson) ; id. , at S. 18233, 18235 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 
1974) ; id., at H. 11207 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1974) (remarks of Rep. 
Brademas) ; id., at H. 11211 (remarks of Rep. McKinney). See also 
§ 104 (a) of the Act. See also S. Rep. No. 93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess., at 3, 4 (1974) ; H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 
2, 3, 8 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. S. 16871 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1974) 
(remarks of Sen. Nelson); id., at S. 18235 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1974). See 
also S. Rep. No. 93-1181 , 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1, 4, 6 (1974); 
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, 3, 8 (1974); 120 
Cong. Rec. S. 16870-16871 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1974) (remarks of Sen. 
Nelson) ; id., at S. 18233 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1974); id ., at H . 11207 
(daily ed. Dec. 3, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Brademas) . See also§§ 102 (b), 
104 (a) (2) of the Act. 
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the Act to prevent disclosure of such materials and th~ · 
minimal nature of the intrusion into the confidentiality of 
the Presidency, we believe that the claims of Presidential 
privilege clearly must yield to the important congressional 
purposes of preserving the materials and maintaining access 
to them for lawful government and historical purposes. 
In short, we conclude that the screening process contem-
plated by the Act will not constitute a more severe intrusioµ 
into Presidential confidentiality than the in camera inspection 
by the District Court approved in United States v. Nixon, 
supra, 418 U.S., at 706. We must of course presume that the 
Administrator and the career archivists concerned will carry 
out the duties assigned to them by the Act. Thus, there is no 
basis for appellant's claim that the Act "reverses" the pre-
sumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential papers 
recognized in United States v. Nixon. Appellant's right to 
assert the privilege is specifically preserved by the Act. The 
guideline provisions on their face are as bro{l,d as the privilege 
itself. If the broadly written protections of the Act should 
nevertheless prove inadequate to safeguard appellant's rights 
or to prevent usurpation of executive powers, there will be 
time enough to consider that problem in a specific factual 
context. For the present. we hold, in agreement with the 




Appellant concedes that when he entered public life he 
voluntarily surrendered the privacy secured by law for those 
who elect not to place themselves in the public spotlight. 
See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 
(1964). He argues, however, that he was not thereby 
stripped of all legal protection for his privacy, and contends 
that the Act violates fundamental rights of expression and 
' . • 
' J 
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privacy guaranteed to him by the First, Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.18 
The District Court treated appellant's argument as ad-
dressed only to the process by which the screening of the 
materials will be performed. "Since any claim by [appellant] 
that his privacy will be invaded by public access to private 
materials must be considered premature when it must actually 
be directed to the regulations once they become effective, we 
need not consider how the materials will be treated after they 
are reviewed." 408 F. Supp., at 358. Although denomi- , 
nating the privacy claim "[t]he most troublesome challenge 
that plaintiff raises ... ," - id., at 357, the District Court 
concluded tha.t the claim was without merit. The court 
reasoned that the proportion of the 42 million pages of docu-
ments and 880 tape recordings implicating appellant's privacy 
interests was quite small since the great bulk of the materials 
related to appellant's conduct of his duties as President, and 
were therefore materials to which great public interest 
attached. The touchstone of the legality of the archival 
processing, in the District Court's view, was its reasonableness. 
Balancing the public interest in preserving the materials 
touching appellant's performance of his official duties against 
the , invasion of appellant's privacy that archival screen-
ing necessarily entails, the District Court concluded that 
the Act was not unreasonable and hence not facially 
unconstitutional : 
"Here, we have a processing scheme without which 
national interests of overriding importance cannot be 
served . . . ," Id., at 364. 
Thus, the Act "is a reasonable response to the difficult 
problem caused by the mingling of personal and private 
1 8Insofar as appellant. argues a privacy claim based upon the First 
Amendment, spe Part VI , infra. In joining this part of t.he opinion,,Jus- ~ • 
.tkc ~ adheres to his views on privacy as expressed in his concurrrng 
opinion in Whalen v. Roe, - U.S.-,-. 
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documents and conversations in the midst of a vastly greater 
number of nonprivate documents and materials related to 
government objectives. The processing contemplated by the 
Act-at least as narrowed by carefully tailored regulations--
represents the least intrusive manner in which to protect an 
adequate level of promotion of government interests of over-
riding importance." Id., at 367. We agree with the District 
Court that the Act does not unconstitutionally invade appel-
lant's right of privacy. 
One element of privacy has been characterized as "the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters .... " Whalen v. Roe, - U. S. -, - (1977). We 
may agree with appellant that, at least when government 
intervention is at stake, public officials, including the Presi-
dent, are not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy 
rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done 
by them in their public capacity. Presidents who have 
established Presidential,,£ibraries have usually withheld mat-
ters concerned with family or personal finances, or have, 
deposited such materials with restrictions on their screening. 
408 F. Supp., at 360.10 We may assume with the District 
19 The District Court, 408 F. Supp., at 360 n. 54, surveyed evidence 
in the record respecting depository restrictions for all Presidents since 
President Hoover. It is unclear whether President Hoover actually 
excluded any of his per,;onal and private materials from the scope of 
,e., ... 
his gift, although his offer to deposit materials in a Presidential,.,I;ibrary £ ....... 
reserved the right to do so. President Roosevelt also indicated his 
intention to select certain materials from his papers to be retained by 
his family. Because of his death, this function was performed by desig-
nated individuals and by his secretary. Again the record is unclear as 
to how many materials were removed. A number of personal documents 
deemed to be personal family correspondence were turned over to the 
Roosevelt family library in 1948, later returned to the official Library 
in 1954-1955, and have been on loan to the family since then. It is 
unclear to what extent these materials were reviewed by the library 
personnel. 
President Truman withheld from deposit the personal file maintained 
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Court, for the purposes of this case, that this pattern of 
de facto Presidential control and congressional acquiescence 
gives rise to appellant's legitimate expectation of privacy 
in such materials. Katz v. United Statfs, 389 U. S. 347, 
351-353 (1967).20 This expecttaion is independent of the 
question of ownership of the materials, ~ issue we do not 
reach. See supra, at n. 8. But the merit of appellant's claim 
of invasion of his privacy cannot be considered in the ab- \ 
stract; rather, the claim must be considered in light of the 
specific provisions of the Act, and any intrusion must be 
weighed against the public interest in subjecting the Presi-
dential materials of appellant's administration to archival 
screening. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-
539 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968). 21 Under 
this test, the privacy interest asserted by appellant is weaker 
than that found wanting in the recent decision of Whalen 
v. Roe, supra. Emphasizing the precautions utilized by New 
York State to prevent the unwarranted disclosure of private 
medical informa.tion retained in a state computer bank sys-
in the White House by his personal secretary. This file was deposited wi-th 
the library upon his death in 1974, although the terms of his will excluded 
a small number of items determined by the executors of his will to 
pertain to personal or business affairs of the Truman family. President 
Eisenhower's offer to deposit his Presidential materials excluded materials 
determined by him or his representative to be personal or private. 
President Kennedy's materials deposited with GSA did not include certain 
materials relating to his private affairs, and some recordings of meetings 
involving President Kennedy, although physically stored in the Kennedy 
Library, have not yet been turned over to the library or reviewed by 
government archivists. President .Johnson's offer to deposit materials 
excluded items which he determined to be of special or private interest 
to personal or family affairs. 
20 Even if prior Presidents had declined to assert their privacy interests 
in such materials, their failure to do so would not necessarily bind 
appellant, for privacy interest:; are not solely dependent for their con-
:;titutional protection upon established practice of governmental toleration. 
21 We agree with the Distrcit Court that the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement is not involved. 408 F . Supp., at 361-362. 
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tern, Whalen rejected a constiutional objection to New York's 
program on privacy grounds. Not only does the Act chal-
lenged here mandate regulations similarly aimed at preventing 
undue dissemination of private materials but, unlike Whalen, 
the Government will not even retain long-term control over 
such private information; rather, purely private papers and 
recordings will be returned to appellant under § 104 (a)(7) of 
the Act. 
The overwhelming bulk of the 42 million documents and 
the 880 tape recordings pertain, not to appellant's private 
communications, but to the official conduct of his Presiden~y. 
Most of the 42 million papers were prepared and seen by 
others and were widely circulated within the government. 
Appellant concedes that he saw no more than 200,000, and 
we do not understand him to suggest that his privacy claim 
extends to items he never saw. See United States v. Miller, 
425 U. S. 435 ( 1976). Further, it is logical to assume that the 
tape recordings made in the Presidential offices primarily 
relate to the conduct and business of the Presidency. And, of 
course, appellant cannot assert any privacy claim as to the 
documents and tape recordings that have already been 
disclosed to the public. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 
1, 14 ( 1973) ; Katz v. United States, supra, at 351. There-
fore appellant's privacy claim embracing, for example, 
"extremely private communications between [him] and, 
among others, his wife, his daughters, his physician, lawyer 
and clergyman, and his close friends as well as persoriai diary 
dicta.belts and his wife 's personal files," 408 F. Supp., at 359, 
relates only to a very small fraction of the massive volume of 
official materials with which they are presently commingled.22 
22 Some materials are still in appellant 's possession, as the Adminis• 
trator has not yet attempted to act on his authority under § 101 (b) ( 1) 
to take custody of them . 8<'<' Brief for Federal Appellees 4 n . 1. 
Moreover, the Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that there 
a re certain purely private materials which "should be returned to [appel• 
lant] once . . . idm tified.'' T r. of Oral Arg., at 590. In our view the 
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The fact that appellant may assert his privacy claim as tQ 
only a small fraction of the materials of his Presidency is 
plainly relevant in judging the reasonableness of the screening 
process contemplated by the Act, but this of course does not 
without more, require rejection of his privacy argument. 408 
F. Supp., at 359. Although the Act requires that the regula-
tions promulgated by 'the Administrator under § 104 (a) take 
into account appellant's legally and constitutionally based 
rights and privileges, presumably including his privacy rights, 
§ 104 (a)(5), and also take into account the need to return to 
appellant his private materials, § 104 (a)(7),23 the identity 
and separation of these purely private matters can be achieved, 
as all parties concede, only by screening all of the materials. 
Appellant contends that the Act therefore is tantamount to a 
general warrant authorizing search and seizure of all of his 
Presidential "papers, and effects." Such "blanket authority," 
appellant contsnds, is precisely the kind of abuse that the 
Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent, for "the real evil 
aimed by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that in-
vasion of a man's privacy which consists of rummaging about 
his personal effects to secure evidence against him." Brief for 
Appellant 148, quoting United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911, 
914 (CA2 1930). Thus, his Brief continues, id., at 150-151: 
" ... [Appellant's] most private thoughts and communi~ 
cations, both written and spoken, will be exposed to and 
Government, without awaiting a court order, should promptly disclaim 
any interest in materials conceded to be appellant's purely private com-
munications and deliver them to him. 
23 The Solicitor General implied at oral argument that the requirement 
of the guidelines directing the Administrator to consider the need to return 
to appellant "for his sole custody and use ... materials which are not 
[Watergate-related] . .. and arc not otherwise of general historical 
significance," § 104 (a) (7), is further qualified by the requirement under 
§ 102 (b) and § 104 (a)(5), that the regulations promulgated by the 
Administrator tnke into account the need to protect appellant's rights1 
defenses, or privileges, Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. 
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reviewed by a host of persons whom he does not know 
and did not select, and in whom he has no reason to 
place his confidence. This group will decide what is 
personal, to be returned to [him], and what is historical, 
to be opened for public review." "4 
Appellant principally relies on Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 
476 (1965), but that reliance is misplaced. Stanford in-
validated a search aimed at obtaining evidence that an in-
dividual had violated a "sweeping and many-faceted law 
which, among other things, outlaws the Communist Party 
and creates various individual criminal offenses, each punish-
able by imprisonment for up to 20 years." Id., at 477. The 
searcp warrant authorized a search of his private home for 
books, records, and other materials concerning illegal Com-
munist activities. After spending more than four hours in 
Stanford's house, police officers seized half of his books which 
included works by Sartre, Marx, Pope John XXIII, Justice 
Hugo Black, Theodore Draper, and Earl Browder, as well 
as private documents including a marriage certificate, in-
surance policies, household bills and receipts, and personal 
correspondence. Id., at 479-480. Stan/ ord held this to be 
an unconstitutional general search. 
24 Appellant argues that screening under the Act contrasts with the 
screening procedures followed by earlier Presidents who, "in donating 
materials to Presidential libraries, have been able . . . to participate 
in the selection of persons who would review the llLc'iterials for classifica-
tion purposes." Brief for Appellant 151 n. 68. We are unable to say 
that the record substantiates this assertion. The record is most com-
plete with respect to President Johnson, who appears to have recommended· 
the individual who was later selected as Director of the Johnson Library, 
but seems not to have played any role in the selection of the archivists 
actually performing the day-to-day processing. 408 F. Supp., at 365 n. 60. 
Moreover, we agree with the District Court that it is difficult to see 
how professional archivists performing a screening task under proper 
standards would be meaningfully affected in the performance of their 
~uties by loyalty to inqividuals or institutions. Ibid. 
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The District Court concluded that the Act's provisions for 
custody and screening could not be analogized to a general 
search and that Stanford, therefore, did not require the Act's 
invalidation. 408 F. Supp., at 366-367, n. 63. We agree. 
Only a few dcuments among the vast quantity of materials 
seized in Stanford were even remotely related to any legitimate 
government interest. This case presents precisely the oppo-
site situation: the vast proportion of appellant's Presidential 
materials are officia~ docu~en~ records in which appellant 
concedes the public has a recognized interest. Moreover, the 
Act provides procedures and orders the promulgation of regu-
lations expressly for the purpose of minimizing the intrusion 
into appellant's private and personal materials. Finally, 
the search in Stanford was an intrusion into an individual's 
home to search and seize personal papers in furtherance of 
a criminal investigation and designed for exposure in a 
criminal trial. In contrast, any intrusion by archivists into 
appellant's private papers and effects is undertaken with 
the sole purpose of separating private materials to belretained 
and preserved by the Government as a record of appellant's 
Presidency. 
Moreover, the screening will be undertaken by government 
archivists with, as the District Court noted , "an unblemished 
record for discretion," 408 F. Supp., at 365. That review 
can hardly differ materially from that contemplated by ap-
pellant's intention to establish a Presidential Library, for 
Presidents who ha,ve established such libraries have found 
that screening by professional archivists was essential. Al-
though the District Court recognized that this contemplation 
of archival review would not defeat appellant's expectation 
of privacy, the court held that it does indicate that "in the 
special situation of documents accumulated by a President 
during his tenure and reviewed by professional government 
personnel, pursuant to a practice employed by past Presidents, 
a11y intrusion into privacy interests is less substantial than it 
1night appear at first. " Ibid. (citation omitted). 
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The District Court analogized the screening process con-
templated by the Act to electronic surveillance conducted 
pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S. C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). 408 F. 
Supp., at 363. We think the analogy is apt. There are ob .. 
vious similarities between the two proceclures. Both involve 
the problem of separating intermingled communications, 
( 1) some of which are expected to be related to legitimate 
government objectives, (2) some of which are not, and 
(3) for which there is no means to segregate the one from 
the other except by reviewing them all. Th us the screening 
process under the Act, like electronic surveillance, requires 
some intrusion into private communications unconnected with 
any legitimate governmental objectives. Yet this fact has 
not been thought to render surveillance under the Omnibus 
Act unconstitutional. Cf. e. r,., United States v. Donovan, -
U.S. - (1977); Berr,er v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) . 
See also 408 F. Supp., at 363-364. 
Appellant argues that this analogy is inappropriate because 
the electronic surveillance procedure was carefully designed to 
meet the constitutional requirements enumerated in Berr,er v. 
New York, supra, including (1) prior judicial authorization, 
(2) specification of particular offenses said to justify the in-
trusion, (3) specification "with particularity" of the conver-
sations sought to be seized, ( 4) minimization of the duration 
of the wiretap , (5) termination once the conversation sought 
is seized, and (6) a showing of exigE;)nt circumstances justify-
ing use of the wiretap procedure. Brief for Appellant 157. / ~ 
Although the parallel is~ r from_perfect, we agree with the 
District Court that many c;ns'ictera~ supporting the con-
stitutionality of the Omnibus Act also argue for the consti-
tutionality of this Act's materials screening process. For ex• 
ample, the Omnibus Act permits electronic surveillance only 
to investigate designated crimes that are serious in nature, 18 
U. S. C. § 2516 ( 1970), and only when normal investigative 
techniques have failed or are likely to do so, id. , § 2518 (3)(c) . 
' , 
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Similarly, the archival review procedure involved here is de-
signed to serve important national interests asserted by Con-
gress, and the unavailability of less restrictive means neces-
sarily follows from the commingling of the documents.26 
Similarly, just as the Omnibus Act expressly requires that 
interception of nonrelevant communications be minimized, 18. 
U. S. C. § 2518 (5), the Act's screening process is designed 
to minimize any privacy intrusions, a goal that is further 
reinforced by regulations which must take those interests into 
account.26 The fact that appa~~ntly only a minute portion 
of the materials implicates appellant's privacy interests,21. 
25 Appellant argues that, unlike electronic surveillance, where success 
depends upon the subject's ignorance of its existence, appellant could 
have been allowed to separate his personal from official materials. But 
Congress enacted the Act in part to displace the Nixon-Sampson agree-
ment that expressly provided for automatic destruction of the tape 
recordings in the event of appellant's death and that allowed appellant 
somplete discretion in the destruction of materials after the initial three-
year storage period. 
Moreover, appellant's view of what constitutes official as distinguished 
from personal and private materiils might' differ from the view of 
Congress, the Executive Branch, or, a reviewing court. Not only may 
the use of disinterested archivists le·ad to application of uniform standards 
in separating private from nonprivate communications, but the Act 
provides for judicial review of their determinations. This would not be 
the case as to appellant's determinations. 
26 The District Court found, 404 F. Supp., at 364 n. 58, and we agree, 
that it is irrelevant that Title III, unlike the Act, requires adherence 
to a detailed warrant requirement, 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1970). That 
requirement is inapplicable to this Act, since we deal not with standards 
governing a generalized right to search by law enforcement officials or 
other government personnel, but with a particularized legislative judg- ~ b.,. ., - u~~o 
rnent,J similar to 9ondemnation under the power of eminent domain, that ... 
cet~in materials are of value to the publi'.A awl inpp1'nn011,ted by jtuheial G) 
~ 
27 The fact that the overwhelming majority of the materials is relevant 
to Congress' lawful objectives is in contrast to the experience under 
the Omnibus Crime Act. A recent report on surveillance conducted 
under the Omnibus Act indicates that for the calendar year 1976 more 
than one-half of all wire intercepts authorized by hidicial orqer yielqed 
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~Jso negates any conclusion th1tt the scre~ning process is an. 
unreasonable solution to the prgblem of ~parating com=-
plingled communication~. 
In sum, appellant has a legitimate expecta~ign of privacy in ~ 
his personal communications. B,ut the constitµtionality of the 
,Act must be viewed in the cgntex;t of the limited intrusion of 
the screening process, of appellant's status llS a public figure, of 
his lack of any expectation of privacy in the overwhelming m~ 
jority of the materials, of the important public interest in pre-
eervation of the materials, and of the virtual impossibility of 
eegregating the small quantity of private materials without 
comprehensive screening. When this is combined with the Act's 
sensitivity to appellant's legitimate privacy interests, see § IO~ 
(a) (7), the unblemished record of the archivists for discretion; 
and the likelihood that the regulations to be promulgated by 
the Administrator will further moot appellant's fears that his ~'o 
materials will be reviewed by "a host of persons,"@ Brief V 
for Appellant 150, we are compelled to agree with the District 
Court that appellant's privacy claim is without merit. 
VI 
First Amendment 
During his Presidency appellant served also as head of 
only nonincriminating communications. Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or 
Approving the Interception of Wire or Oral Communciations, January 1, 
1976 to December 31, 1976, at XII (Table 4). 
28 Throughout this litigation appellant has claimed that his privacy 
·will necessarily be unconstitutionally invaded because the screening requires 
a staff of "over one hundred archivists, accompanied by lawyers, tech-
nicians, and secretaries [who] will have a right to review word by word 
five and one-half years of a man's life .... " Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. The 
size of the staff is, of course, necessarily a function of the enormous 
quantity of materials involved. But clearly not all engaged in the screen-
ing will examine each document. The Administrator initially proposed 
that only one archivist examine most documents. See 408 F. Supp., 
at 365 n. 59. 
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his national political party and spend a substantial portion of 
his working time on partisan political matters. Records aris-
ing from his political activities, like his private and personal 
records, are not segregated from the great mass of materials. 
He argues that the Act's archival screening process therefore 
necessarily entails invasion of his constitutionally protected 
rights of associational privacy and political speech. As sum-
marized by the District Court, "It is alleged that the Act 
invades the private formulation of political thought critical 
to free speech and association, imposing sanctions upon past 
expressive activity, and more significantly, limiting that of 
the future because individuals who learn the substance of 
certain private communications by [him]-especially those 
critical of themselves-will refuse to associate with him. 
The Act is furthermore said to chill [his] expression because 
he will be 'saddled' with prior positions communicated in pri-
vate, leaving him unable to take inconsistent positions in the 
future." 408 F. Supp., at 367-368. 
The District Court, viewing these arguments as in essence a 
claim that disclosure of the materials violated appellant's 
associational privacy, and therefore as not significantly dif-
ferent in structure from appellant's privacy claim, again 
treated the arguments as limited to the const1tut10nahty of 
the Act's screening process. Id., at 368. As was true with 
respect to the more general privacy challenge, only a fraction 
of the materials can be said to raise a First Amendment claim. 
Nevertheless, the District Court acknowledged that appellant ( 
"would appear to have a legitimate expectation that he would 
have an opportunity to remove some of the sensitive political 
documents before any government screening took place." 
Ibid. The District Court concluded, however, that there was 
no reason to believe that the mandated regulations when 
promulgated would not adequately protect against public 
access to materials implicating appellant's privacy in 
political association, and that "any burden arising solely from 
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review by professional and discreet archivists is not signifi~ 
cant." The court therefore held that the Act does not signifi-
cantly interfere with or chill appellant's First Amendment 
rights. Id., at 369. We agree with the District Court's 
conclusion. 
It is of course true that involvement in partisan politics is 
closely protected by the First Amendment, Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U. S. 1 ( 1976), and that "compelled disclosure in it-
self can seriously infringe on privacy and belief guaran-
teed by the First Amendment." Id., at 64. But a compelling 
public need that cannot be met in a less restrictive way will 
override those interests. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-
59 (1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377 
(1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1966), "par-
ticularly when the 'free functioning of our national institu-
tions' is involved." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 66. Since 
no less r · t' e w han archival screening has been sug-
gested as a means for identi cation of materials to be returned 
to appellant, the burden of that screening is presently the 
measure on his First Amendment claim. Id., at 84. The ex-
tent of any such burden, however, is speculative in light of 
the Act's terms protecting appallant from improper public 
disclosures and guaranteeing him full judicial review before 
any public access is permitted. §§ 104 (a) (5), (a) (7), 105 
(a) .29 As the District Court concluded, the First Amendment 
29 Appellant argues that Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 
150-151 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965); Staub v. Baxl,ey, 
355 U. S. 313, 319-321 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 l]. S. 516, 538-
541 (1945); and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452-453 (1938) IA 
support his contention that "[a] statute which vests such proad authority 
[with respect to First Amendment rights] is unconstitutional on its face, 
and the party subjected to it may treat it as a nullity even if its actual 
implementation would not harm him." Brief for Appellant 169. The 
argument is without merit. Those cases involved regulations that per-
mitted public officials in their arbitrary discretion to impose prior re-
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claim is clearly outweighed by the important governmental 
interests promoted by the Act. 
For the same reasons, we find no merit in appellant's argu-
ment that the Act's scheme for custody and archival screening 
of the materials "necessarily inhibits [the] freedom of political 
activity [of future Presidents] and thereby reduces the 'quan-
tity and diversity' of the political speech and association that 
the Nation will be receiving from its leaders." Brief 168. 
It is significant, moreover, that this concern has not deterred 
President Ford from signing the Act into law, or President 
Carter from urging this Court's affi.rmance of the judgment of 
the District Court. 
VI 
Bill of Attainder Clause 
A 
Finally, we address appellant's argument that the Act 
constitutes a bill of attainder proscribed by Art. I , § 9 of 
the Constitution.30 His argument is that Congress acted on 
the premise that he had engaged in "misconduct,'' was an 
"unreliable custodian" of his own documents, and genera,lly 
was deserving of a "legislative judgment of blameworthiness," 
Brief for Appellant 132-133. Thus, he argues, the Act is 
pervaded with the key features of a bill of attainder: a law 
that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment 
upon an identifiable individual without provision of the pro-
concerned only with materials that record past activities and with a 
screening process guided by longstanding archival screening standards. 
so Article I , § 9, applicable to Congress, provides "No Bill of Attainder 
or ex post fac to law shall be passed," and Art. I , § 10, applicable to the 
States, provides that "No State . .. shall pass any Bill of At.taidner, ex 
post facto law . . . ." The linking of bills of attainder and ex post 
facto laws is explained by the fact that a legislative denunciation 
and condemnation of an individual, often acted to impose retroactive 
punishment. Sec Z. Chafee, Three Human E,ights in the Coll§tit~tion 
~~-93 (1956), , 
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tections of a judicial trial. See United States v. Brown, 381 
U.S. 437, 445, 447 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 
303, 315-316 (1946); Ex pa.rte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, m 
(1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (1866). 
Appellant's argument relies almost entirely upon United 
States v. Brown, supra, the Court's most recent decision ad-
dressing the scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause. It is in-
structive, therefore, to sketch the broad outline of th'at case. 
Brown invalidated § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U. S. C. § 504, that made it a 
crime for a Communist Party member to serve 85 an officer 
of a labor union. After detailing the infamous history of 
bills of attainder, the Court found that the Bill of Attainder 
Cla,USe was an important ingredient of the doctrine of "sepa,. 
ration of powers," one of the organizing principles of our 
system of government. Id., at 442--443. Just as Art. III 
confines the judiciary to the task of adjudicating concrete 
"cases or controversies," so too the Bill of Attainder Clause 
was found to "reflect ... the Framers' belief that the Legisla,. 
tive Branch is not so well suited as politically independent 
judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blame-
worthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, 
specific persons." Id., at 445. Brown thus held that § 504 
worked a bill of attainder by focusing upon easily identifiable 
members of a class, members of the Communist Party, and 
imposing on them the sanction of mandatory forfeiture of 
a job or office, long deemed to be punishment within the con-
templation of the Bill of Attainder Clause. See, e. g., United 
States v. Lovett, supra, at 316; Cummings v. Missouri, supra, 
at 320. 
Brown, Lovett, and earlier cases unquestionably gave 
.broad and generous meaning to the constitutional protection 
against bills of attainder. But appellant's proposed reading 
is far broader still. In essence, he argues that Brown estab-
lishes that the Constitution is offended whenever a law im-
; 
75-1605-OPINION 
42 NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES 
poses undesired consequences on an individual or on a class 
that is not defined at a proper level of generality. The Act 
in question therefore is faulted for singling out appellant, as 
opposed to all other Presidents or members of the government, 
for disfavored treatment. 
Appellant's characterization of the meaning of a bill of 
attainder obviously proves far too much. By arguing that an 
individual or defined group is attainted whenever it is com-
pelled to bear burdens which the individual or group dislikes, 
appellant removes the anchor that ties the bill of attainder 
guarantee to realistic conceptions of classification and pun-
ishment. His view would cripple the very process of legis-
lating, for any individual or group that is made the subject 
of adverse legislation can complain that the lawmakers 
could and should have defined the relevant affected 
class at a greater level of generality.81 Furthermore, every 
person or group made subject to legislation which it finds~ 
.HRdeP Stl::ffle may subjectively feel, and can complain, that it 
is being subjected to unwarranted punishment. United States 
v. Lovett, supra, at 324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) .32 How-
31 In this case, for example, appellant faults the Act for taking custody 
of his papers but not those of other Presidents. Brief for Appellant 130. 
But even a congressional definition of the class consisting of all Presi-
dents would have been vulnerable to the claim of being overly specific, 
since the definition might more generally include all members of the 
Executive Branch, or all members of the government, or all in possession 
of Presidential papers, or all in possession of government papers. 
This does not dispose of appellant's contention that the Act focuses 
upon him with the requisite degree of specificity for a bill of attainder, 
see infra, at 43-44, but it demonstrates that simple reference to the 
breadth of the Act's focus cannot be determinative of the reach of 
the Bill of Attainder Clause as a limitation upon legislative action 
that disadvantages a person or group. See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 
supra, at 474-475 (WHITE, J., di8,;rnting); n. 3~, infra. '1 
8 2 "The fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not 
make it punishment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may 
be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be 
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,ever expansive is the prohibition against bills of attainder, it 
surely was not intended to serve as a variant of the Equal 
Protection Clause,33 invalidating every act of Congress or 
the States that legislatively burdens some persons or groups 
but not all other plausible individuals.34 In short, while the 
Bill of Attainder Clause serves as an important "bulwark 
against tyranny," United States v. Brown, supra, at 443, it 
does not do so by limiting Congress to the choice of legislating 
enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive for such 
deprivation." 
33 We observe that appellant originally argued in his jurisdictional state-
ment that "for similar reasons" the Act violates both the Bill of Attainder 
and Equal Protectioh Clauses. J. S. 27-28. He has since abandoned 
reliance upon the Equal Protection Clause, apparently recognizing that 
mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, New Orleans 
v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 
657 ( 1966), even if the law disadvantages an individual or identifiable 
members of a group, see, e. g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 
483 (1955) (opticians); Daniel v. Famil,y Ins. Co., 336 U. S. 220 (1949) 
(insurance agents). "For similar reasons" the mere specificity of a law 
does not call into play the Bill of Attainder Clause. Cf. Comment, The 
Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 
54 Calif. L. Rev. 212, 234-236 (1966); but see Comment, The Bounds 
of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder 
Clause, 72 Yale L. J. 330 (1962). 
34 Brown recognized this by making clear that conflict-of-interest laws, 
which inevitably prohibit conduct on the part of designated individuals 
or classes of individuals, do not contravene the bill of attainder guarantee. 
Brown specifically noted the validity of § 32 of the Banking Act of 
1933, 12 U. S. C. § 78, which disqualified identifiable members of a 
group-officers and employees of underwriting organizations-from serving 
as officers of Federal Reserve banks, 381 U. S., at 453. Other valid federal 
conflict-of-interest statutes which also single out identifiable members 
of groups to bear burdens or disqualifications are collected, id., at 467-
468, n. 2 (WHITE, .J., dissenting) . See also Regional Rail Reorganization 
Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 (1974) (upholding transfer of rail properties 
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for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislat-
ing at all. 
Thus, in the present case, the Act's specificity-the fact that 
it refers to appellant by name-does not automatically offend 
the Bill of Attainder Clause. Indeed, viewed in context, the 
focus of the enactment can be fairly and rationally under-
stood. 'lt is true that Title I deals exclusively with appel-
lant's papers. But Title II casts a wider net by establishing 
a special commission to study and recommend appropriate 
legislation regarding the preservation of the records of future 
Presidents and all other federal officials. In this light, Con-
gress' action to preserve only appellant's records is easily ex-
plained by the fact that a,t the time of the Act's passage, only 
his materials demanded immediate attention. The Presiden-
' tial papers of all former Presidents from Hoover to Johnson 
were already housed in functioning Presidential libraries. 
Congress had reason for concern solely with the preservation 
of appella.nt's materials, for he alone had entered into a de-
pository agreement, the Nixon-Sampson agreement, which by 
terms called for the destruction of certain of the materials, 
Indeed, as the Government argues, "appellant's depository 
agreement . . . created an imminent danger that the tape 
recordings would be destroyed if appellant, who had con-
tracted phlebitis, were to die." Brief for Federal Appellee 41. 
In short, appellant constituted a legitimate class of one, and 
this provides a basis for Congress' decision to proceed with 
dispatch with respect to his materials while accepting the 
status of his predecessors' papers and ordering the further 
consideration of generalized standards to govern his successors. 
Moreover, even if the specificity element were deemed to be 
satisfied here, the Bill of Attainder Clause would not automa-
tically be implicated. Forbidden legislative punishment is 
not involved merely because the Act imposes burdensome 
consequences. Rather, we must inquire further whether 
Congress, by lodging appellant's ma.terials in the custody 
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ttf the General Services Administration pending their screen. 
ing by government archivists and the promulgation of further 
regulations, "inflict[ed] punishment" within the constitu-
tional proscription against bills of attainder. United Statea 
v. Lovett, supra, at 315; see also United States v. Brown, 
BUpra, at 456-460; Cummings v. Missouri, supra, at 320. 
B 
1 
The infamous history of bills of attainder is a useful start-
ing point in the inquiry whether the Act fairly can be charac-
terized as a form of punishment leveled against appellant. 
For the substantial experience of both England and the United 
States with such abuses of parliamentary and legislative 
power offer a ready checklist of deprivations and disabilities 
so disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpuni-
tive ends that they unquestionably have been held to fall 
within the proscription of Art. I, § 9. A statutory enactment 
that imposes any of those sanctions on named or identifiable 
individuals would be immediately constitutionally suspect. 
In England a bill of attainder originally connoted a par-
liamentary act sentencing a named individual or identifiable 
members of a group to death.35 Article I, § 9, however, also 
35 See, for example, the 1685 attainder of James Duke of Monmouth 
for High Treason: "Whereas James duke of Monmouth has in an hostile 
manner invaded this kingdom, and is now in open rebellion, levying 
war against the king, contrary to the duty of his allegiance; Be it 
enacted by the King's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice 
and consent of the lords spiritual and t€mporal, and commons in this 
parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That the said 
James duke of Monmouth stand and be convicted and attainted of high 
treason, and that he suffer pains of death, and incur all forfeitures as 
a traitor convicted and attaintrd of high treason." 1 Jam. 2, c. 3 (em-
phasis omitted) . 
The attainder of death was usually accompanied by a forfeiture of 
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proscribes enactments originally characterized as bills of 
pains and penalties, that is, legislative acts inflicting punish-
ment other than execution. United States v. Lovett, supra, 
at 323-324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Cummings v. Mis-
souri, supra, at 323; Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the 
Constitution 97 (1956). Generally addressed to persons con-
sidered disloyal to the Crown or State, "pains and penalties" 
historically consisted of a wide array of punishments: com-
monly included were imprisonment/0 banishment,37 and the 
punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign.38 Our 
co~ntry's own experience with bills of a.ttainder resulted in 
the addition of another sanction to the list of impermissible 
legislative punishments: any legislative enactment that bars 
specified individuals or groups from participa.tion in certain 
types of empoyment or vocations, a mode of punishment 
blood, whereby his heirs were denied the right to inherit his estate .. 
Blackstone traced the practice of "corruption of blood" to the Norman 
conquest. He considered the practice an "oppressive mark of feudal 
tenure" and hoped that it "may in process of time be abolished by act 
of parliament." 4 Blackstone Commentaries 388 ( 15th ed. 1809). The• 
framers of the American Constitution responded to this recommendation. 
Art. III, § 3. 
30 See, e. g., IO and 11 Will. 3, c. 13: "An act for continuing the 
imprisonment of Counter and others, for the late horrid conspiracy 
to assassinate the person of his sacred Majesty." 
37 See, e. g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14 (1800) ("ald and every 
persons named and included in the said aot [declaring persons guilty 
of treason] are banished from the said state [Georgia]"); 2 Wooddeson, 
A Systematical View of the Laws of England 638-639 (1792) (banish-
ment of Lord Clarendon and the Bishop Atterbury). See Kennedy v .. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168, n. 23 (1963). 
38 Following the Revolutionary War, States often seized the property 
of alleged Tory sympathizers. See, e. g., James' Claim, 1 Dall. 47 (1780} 
("John Parrock was attainted of High Treason, and his estate seized and. 
advertised for sale"); Respublica v. Gordon, 1 Dall. 233 (1788) ("at-. 
tainted of treason for adhering to the king of Great Britain, in con-
sequence of which his estate was confiscated to the use of the 
Qo1nmoti.wealth . , _"), 
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-commonly deployed against those legislatively branded as dis-
loyal. See, e. g., Cummings v. Missouri, supra (barring 
clergymen from ministry in the absence of subscribing to a 
loyalty oath); United States v. Lovett, supra (barring named 
individuals from government employment); United States v. 
Brown, supra (barring Communist Pa.rty members from of-
fices in labor unions). 
Needless to say, appellant cannot claim to have suffered 
any of these forbidden deprivations at the hands of the 
Congress. While it is true that Congress ordered the General 
Services Administration to retain control over records that 
appellant claims as his property,au § 105 of the Act makes 
provision for an award by the District Court of "just com-
pensation." This undercuts even a colorable contention that 
the Government has punitively confiscated appellant's prop-
erty, for the "owner [thereby] is put in the same position 
monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had 
not b~en taken." United States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 16 
(1970); accord United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369,373 
(1943). Thus, no feature of the challenged Act falls within 
the historical meaning of legislative punishment. 
2 
But our inquiry is not ended by the determination that 
the Act imposes no punishment traditionally judged to be 
prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause. Our treatment 
of the scope of the Clause has never precluded the possibility 
that new burdens and deprivations might be legislatively 
fashioned that a.re inconsistent with the bill of attainder 
guarantee. The Court, therefore, of ten has looked beyond 
mere historical experience and has applied a functional test 
of the existence of punishment, analyzing whether the law 
under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity of 
89 In fact , it remains unsettled whether the materials in question are 
the propert.y of appellant or of the Government. See n. 8, _supra,. 
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burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further non-
punitive legislative purposes.4° Cummings v. Missouri, 
supra, at 319'-320; Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 193-
194 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889); 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 96-97 (1958) (Warren, C. J.); 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 
(1963). Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not 
appear, it is reasonable to conclude that punishment of indi-
viduals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of 
the decisionmakers. 
Application of the functional approach to this case leads 
to rejection of appellant's argument that the Act rests upon 
a congressional determination of his blameworthiness and 
a desire to punish him. For, as noted previously, see supra, 
at 23- 25, legitimate justifications for passage of the Act are 
readily apparent. First, in the face of the Nixon-Sampson 
agreement which expressly contemplated the destruction of 
some of appellant's materials, Congress stressed the need to 
preserve "[i] nformation included in the ma.terials of former 
President Nixon [that] is needed to complete the prosecutions 
of Watergate-related crimes." H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, 93d 
Cong. , 2d Sess. , at 2 (1974). Second, again referring to the 
Nixon-Sampson agreement, Congress expressed its desire to 
safeguard the "public interest in gaining appropriate access 
to materials of the Nixon Presidency which are of general 
historical significance. The information in these materials 
4 0 In determining whether punitive or non punitive objectives underlie 
a law, United States v. Brown established that punishment is not re-
stricted purely to retribution for past events, but may include iQflicting 
-deprivations on some blameworthy or tainted indvidual in order to 
prevent his future misconduct. 381 U. S., at 458-459. This view is 
C'C\nsistent with the traditional purposes of criminal punishment, which 
also include a prevent ive aspect. See, e. g., H. Packer, The Limits of 
the Criminal Sanction 48-61 ( 1968) . In Brown the element of punish-
ment was found in the fact that " the purpose of the statute before 
us is to purge the governing boards of labor unions of those whom 
,. 
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will be of great value to the political health and vitality of 
the United States." /bid .. 41 Indeed, these same objectives 
are stated in the text of the Act itself, § 104 (a), 44 U. S. C. 
§ 2107 (Supp. 1976), where Congress instructs the General 
Services Administration to promulgate regulations that fur-
ther these ends and at the same time protect the constitutional 
and legal rights of any individua.l adversely a.fleeted by the 
Administrator's retention of appellant's ma,terials. 
Evaluated in terms of these asserted purposes, the law 
plainly must be held to be an act of nonpunitive legislative 
policymaking. Legislation designed to guarantee the avail-
ability of evidence for use at criminal trials is a fair exercise of 
Congress' responsibility to the "due process of law in the fair 
administration of justice," United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683, 713 ( 1974), and to the functioning of our adversary legal 
system which depends upon the availability of relevant evi-
dence in carrying out its commitments both to fair play and 
to the discovery of truth within the bounds set by law. 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 688 (1972); Blackmer v. 
Congress regards as guilty of subversive acts and associations and there-
fore unfit to fill [union] positions .... " 381 U. S.; at 460. Thus, 
Brown left undisturbed the requirement that one who complains of being 
attainted must establish that the legislature's action constituted punish-
ment and not merely the legitimate regulation of conduct,. Jndeed, just 
three Terms later, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 n. 30 
( 1968), also authorPd by Chief Justice Warren, reconfirmed the need 
to examine the purposes served by a purported bill of attainder in 
determining whether it in fact represents a punitive law. 
41 The Senate pointed to these same objectives in nullifying the Nixon-
Sampson agreement: "[1] To begin with, prosecutors, defendants and 
the courts probably would be deprived of crucial evidence bearing on 
the defendants' innocence or guilt of the Watergate crimes for which 
they stand accused. [2] Moreover, the American people would pe denied 
full access to all facts about the Watergate affair, and the efforts of 
Congress, the executive branch, and others to take measures to prevent 
a recurrence of the Watergate affair may be inhibited." S. Rep. No. 
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United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 ( 1932); Blair v. United 
States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 ( 1919). Similarly, Congress' in~ 
terest in and expansive authority to act in preservation of 
monuments and records of historical value to our national 
heritage are fully established. United States v. Gettysburg 
Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896); Roe v. Kansas, 278 
U. S. 191 (1929) ·12 A legislature thus acts responsibly in 
seeking to accomplish either of these objectives. Neither 
supports an implication of a legislature policy designed to 
inflict punishment on an individual. 
3 
A third recognized test of punishment is strictly a motiva~ 
tional one: inquiring whether the legislative record evinces a 
congressional intent to punish. See, e. (I., United States v. 
Lovett, supra, at 308-314; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
supra, at 169-170. The District Court unequivocally found 
that " [ t] here is no evidence presented to us, nor is there any 
to be found in the legislative record, to indicate that Con .. 
gress' design was to impose a penalty upon Mr. Nixon ... 
as punishment for alleged wrongdoings . . . . The legislative 
history leads to only one conclusion, namely, that the Act 
before us is regulatory and not punitive in character." 408 
F. Supp., at 373 ( emphasis omitted). We find no cogent 
reason for disagreeing with this conclusion. 
First, both Senate and House Committee reports, in for~ 
mally explaining their reasons for urging passage of the Act, 
expressed no interest in punishing or p1cmalizing appellant. 
Rather, the reports justified the Act by reference to objectivee 
that fairly and properly lie within Congress' legislative com .. 
42 These cases upheld exercises of the power of eminent domain in 
pr~ ving historical monuments and like facilities for public use"' © 
The power of eminent domain, however, is not restricted to tangible 
property or realty but extends both to intangibles and to personal effects 
as involved here. See Cincinnati v. Louisville & N(]}Jh. R. Co., 223 U. S, 
390, 400 ( 1912) ; Porter v. U71itec( States, 473 F , 2d 1829 (CA5 1913), 
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petence: preserving the availability of judicial evidence and 
of historically relevant materials. Supra, at 48-49, More 
specifically, it seems clear that the actions of both Houses of 
Congress were predominantly precipitated by a resolve to undo 
the recently negotiated Nixon-Sampson depository agree-
ment, the terms of which departed from the practice of former 
Presidents in that they expressly contemplated the destruc-
tion of certain Presidential materials:" Along these lines, 
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, supra, at 2, stated: "Despite the 
overriding public interest in preserving these materials ... 
[the] Administrator of General Services entered into an agree-
ment ... which, if implemented, could seriously limit access 
to these records ... and result in the destruction of a sub-
stantial portion of them." See also S. Rep. No. 93-1181, 
supra, at 4. The relevant committee reports thus cast no as-
persions on appellant's personal conduct and contain no con-
demnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punish-
ment. Rather, they focus almost exclusively on the meaning 
and effect of an agreement recently announced by the General 
Services Administration which most Members of Congress 
perceived to be inconsistent with the public interest. 
Nor do the floor debates on the measure suggest that Con-
gress was intent on encroaching on the judicial function of 
punishing an individual for blameworthy offenses. One of 
the opponents of the legislation, mischaracterizing the safe-
guards embodied in the bill/' stated that it is "one which par-
4a Particularly troublesome was the provision of the agreement re-
quiring the automatic destruction of tape recordings upon appellant's 
death . 
44 In condemning the enactment as a bll of attainder, Senator Hruska 
argued that the bill seizes appellant's papers and distributes them to 
litigants without affording appellant the opportunity judicially "to assert 
a defense or privilege to the production of the papers." 120 Cong. Rec. 
33871 ( 197 4). In fact, the Act expressly recognizes appellant's right 
to present all such defenses and privileges through an expedited judicial 
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takes of the characteristics of a bill of attainder .... " 120 
Cong. Rec. 33872 (1974) (Sen. Hruska), a key sponsor of the 
measure responded by expressly denying any intention of de-
termining appellant's blameworthiness or imposing punitive 
sanctions: 
"The bill does not contain a word to the effect that 
Mr. Nixon is guilty of any violation of the law. It does 
not inflict any punishment on him. So it has no more 
relation to a bill of attainder . . . . than my style of 
pulchritude is to be compared to that of the Queen of 
Sheba." Id., at 33959-33960 (Sen. Ervin). 
In this respect, the Act stands in marked contrast to that 
invalidated in United States v. Lovett, supra, at 312, where 
a House Report expressly characterized individuals as "sub-
versive ... and unfit ... to continue in Government employ-
ment." H. R. Rep. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st S~ss., at 6 (1943). 
We, of course, do not suggest that such a formal legislative 
announcement of moral blameworthiness or punishment is 
necessary to an unlawful bill of attainder. United States v. 
Lovett, supra, at 316. But the decided absence from the legis-
lative history of any congressional sentiments expressive of 
this purpose is probative of nonpunitive intentions and 
largely undercuts a major concern that prompted the bill of 
, attainder prohibition: the fear that the legislature, in seeking 
to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it 
expedient openly to assume the mantle of judge-or, worse 
still, lynch mob. Cf. Z. Chafee, supra, at 161.45 No such 
legislative overreaching is involved here. 
45 The Court in United States v. Brown, supra, at 444, referred to 
Alexander Hamilton';; concern that legislatures might cater to the "momen-
tary passions" of a "free people in times of heat and violence . . . ." 
In this case, it is obvious that the supporters of this Act steadfastly 
avoided inflaming or appealing to any "passions" in the community. 
Indeed, rather than seek expediently to impose punishment and to 
circumvent the courts, Congress expressly provided for access to the 
,I 
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We also agree with the District Court that "specific as-
pects of the Act ... just do not square with the claim 
that the Act was a punitive measure." 408 F. Supp., at 
373. Whereas appellant complains that the Act has for 
some two years deprived him of control over the materials 
in question, Brief for Appellant 140, the Congress placed the 
materials under the auspices of the General Services Admin-
istration, § 101, 44 U. S. C. § 2107 (Supp. 1976), the same 
agency designated in the Nixon-Sampson a.greement as deposi-
tory of the documents for a minimum three-year period, 
App. 40. Whereas appellant complains that the Act de-
prives him of "ready access" to the materials, Brief for Ap• 
pellant 140, the Act provides that "Richard M. Nixon, or any 
person whom he may designate in writing, shall at all times 
have access to the tape records and other materials ... ," § 102 
( C). The District Court correctly construed this as safeguard. 
ing appellant's right to inspect, copy, and use the materials in 
issue, 408 F. Supp., at 375, paralleling the right to "make 
reproductions" contained in the Sampson agreement, App. 
40. And even if we assume that there is merit in appel-
lant's complaint that his property has been confiscated, Brief 
for Appellant 140, the Act expressly provides for the payment 
of compensation in accord with constitutional requirements, 
§ 105 (c); see, supra, at 47. 
Other features of the Act further belie any punitive inter-
pretation. In promulgating regula.tions under the Act, the 
General Services Administration is expressly directed by 
Congress to protect appellant's or "any party's opportunity 
to assert any legally or unconstitutionally based right or priv-
ilege . ... " § 104 (a)(5). More importantly, the Act pre-
serves for appellant all of the protections that inhere in a 
judicial proceeding, for ~ 105 (a) not only assures district 
court jurisdiction and judicial review over all his legal claims, 
judiciary for resolution of any constitutional and legal rights appellant. 
might assert. S. Rep . 93- 1181, supra, at 2-3, 4-5, 5-6. 
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but commands that any such challenge asserted by appellant 
"shall have priority on the docket of such court over other 
cases." The primary sponsor of the bill emphasized that this 
expedited treatment is expressly designed "to protect Mr. 
Nixon's property, or other legal rights .... " 18 Cong. Rec. 
18239 (1974) (Sen. Ervin). Finally, the Congress has or-
dered the General Services Administration to establish reg-
ulations that recognize "the need to give to Richard M. Nixon, 
or his heirs, for his sole custody and use, ta.pe recordings and 
other materials which are not likely to be related to" the 
-articulated objectives of the Act, § 104 (a) (7). While appel-
lant obviously is not set at ease by these precautions and 
safeguards, they confirm the soundness of the opinion given 
the Senate by the law division of the Congressional Research 
Service: "[B]ecause the proposed bill does not impose crim-
inal penalties or other punishment, it would not f.Lppear to 
violate the Bill of Attainder Clause." 18 Cong. Rec. 18238 
(1974).46 
One final consideration should be mentioned in light of the 
unique posture of this controversy. In determining whether 
a legislature sought to inflict punishment on an individual, it 
is often useful to inquire into the existence of less b4rdensome 
alternf-1,tives by which the Congress could have achieved its 
legitimate nonpunitive objectives. Today, in framing his 
challenge to the Act, appellant contends that such an al-
ternative was readily available : 
"If Congress had provided that the Attorney General or 
the Administrator of General Services could institute a 
civil suit in an appropriate federal court to enjoin disposi-
tion ... of presidential historical materials ... by any 
46 In brief, the legislative history of the Act offers a paradigm of a 
Congress aware of constitutional constraints on its power and carefully 
seeking to act within those limitations. See generally Brest, The Con-
scientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. 
L . Rev. 585 (1975). 
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person who could be shown to be an 'unreliable custodian' 
or who had 'engaged in misconduct' or who 'would viola.te 
a criminal prohibition,' the statute would have left to 
judicial determination, after a fair proceeding, the factual 
allegations of Mr. Nixon's blameworthiness." Brief for 
Appellant 137. 
We have no doubt that Congress might have selected this 
.course. It very well may be, however, that Congress chose 
not to do so on the view that a full-fledged judicial inquiry 
into appellant's conduct and reliability would be no less puni-
tive and intrusive than the solution actually adopted. For 
Congress H:oJ;doubt was well aware that just three months ~ 
earlier, appellant had resisted efforts to subject himself and 
his records to the scrutiny of the Judicial Branch, United 
States v. Nixon, supra, a position apparently maintained to 
this day, 17 A rational and fairminded Congress, therefore, 
might well have decided that the carefully tailored law that it 
enacted would be less objectionable to appellant than the 
alternative that he today appears to endorse. To be sure, if 
the record were unambiguously to demonstrate that the Act 
represents the infliction of legislative punishment, the fact 
that the judicial alternative poses its own difficulties would be 
of no constitutional significance. But the record suggests the 
contrary, and the unique choice that Congress faced but-
tresses our conclusion that the Act cannot fairly be read to 
inflict legislative punishment as forbidden by the Constitution. 
We, of course, are not blind to appellant's plea that we 
recognize the socia.l and political realities of 1974.. It was a 
period of political turbulence unprecedented in our history. 
47 For example, in his deposition taken in this case, appellant refused 
to answer questions pertaining to the accuracy and reliability of his prior 
public statements as President concerning the contents of the tape 
recordings and other materials in issue. He invoked a claim of privilege 
and asserted that the questions were irrelevant to the judicial inquiry. 
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But this Court is not free to invalidate acts of Congress based 
upon inferences that we may be asked to draw from our 
personalized reading of the contemporary scene or recent 
history. In judging the constitutiona1ity of the Act, we may 
only look to its terms, to the intent expressed by Members of 
Congress who voted its passage, and to the existence or non-
existence of legitimate explanations for its apparent effects. 
We are persuaded that none of these factors is sµggestive that 
the Act is a punitive bill of attainder, or otherwise facially 
unconstitutional. The judgment of the Courts of Appeals 
is 
Affirmed. 
, o 13 .. I 6 "FN-1 > FN -,l; 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment. 
I 
I join the judgment of the Court and all but 
Parts IV ana V of its opinion. For the reasons stated by 
the Court, I agree that the Act on its face does not 
violate appellant's rights under the First, Fourth, and 
f Fifth Amendments and the Bill of Attainder Clause.
1 
For reasons quite different from those stated by the 
Court, I also would hold that the Act is consistent on its 
face with the separation of powers. 
I 
The Court begins its analysis of the issues by 
limiting its inquiry to those constitutional claims that 
are addressed to "the facial validity of the provisions of 
the Act requiring the Administrator to take the recordings 
and materials into the Government's custody subject to 
2. 
screening by Government archivists." Ante, at 11. I 
agree that the inquiry must be limited in this manner, but 
I would add two qualifications that in my view further 
restrict the reach of today's decision. 
First, Title I of the Act does not purport to 
be a generalized provision addressed to the complex 
problem of disposition of the accumulated papers of 
Presidents or other Federal officers. Unlike Title II, 
which authorizes a study of that problem, Title I is 
specifically and narrowly addressed to the need to 
preserve the papers of former President Nixon after his 
resignation under threat of impeachment. It is 
legislation, as the Court properly observes, directed 
against "a legitimate class of one." Ante, at 44. 
President Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974. 
Less than two weeks earlier, the House Judiciary Committee 
had voted to recommend his impeachment, H.R. Rep. No. 
93-1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1974), including among 
the charges of impeachable offenses allegations that the 
President had obstructed investigation of the Watergate 
break-in and had engaged in other unlawful activities 
I during his Administration. Id., at 1-4. One month after 
President Nixon's resignation, on September 8, 1974, 
President Ford granted him a general pardon for all 
offenses against the United States that he might have 
I committed in his term of off ice. 
r 
3. 
On the same day, the Nixon-Sampson agreement 
was made public. The agreement provided for the materials 
to be deposited temporarily with the General Services 
Administration, in a California facility, but gave the 
former President the right to withdraw or direct the 
destruction of any of the materials after an initial 
period of three years or, in the case of tape recordings, 
five years. During this initial period access would be 
limited to President Nixon or to persons authorized by 
him, subject only to legal process ordering materials to 
be produced. Upon President Nixon's death, the tapes were 
to be destroyed immediately. 10 Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents 1104-1105 (1974). 
Those who drafted and sponsored Title I of the 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act in 
Congress uniformly viewed its provisions as emergency 
legislation, necessitated by the extraordinary events that 
led to the resignation and pardon and to the former 
President's arrangement for the disposition of his 
papers. Senator Neli6n, for example, referred to the Bill 
as "an emergency measure" whose principal purpose was to 
assure "protective custody" of the materials, 120 Cong. 
Rec. s. 18233, s. 18235 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1974): 
"[T]here is an urgency in the 
situation now before us. Under the 
existing agreement between the GSA 
and Mr. Nixon, if Mr. Nixon died 
tomorrow, these tapes -- if I read the 
agreement correctly -- are to be 
destroyed immediately; it is also 
possible that the Nixon papers could be 
'
destroyed by 1977. This would be a 
catastrophy [sic] from an historical 
standpoint." Id., at S. 18242. 
Senator Ervin similarly remarked: 
"This bill really deals with an 
emergency situation, because some of 
these documents are needed in the 
courts and by the general public in 
order that they might know the full 
story of what is known collectively as 
the Watergate affair." Id., at 
s. 18240. -
Efforts to apply the legislation more generally to all 
Presidents or to other Federal officers were resisted on 
the Senate floor. Thus, speaking again of the unique 
needs created by the Nixon-Sampson agreement and the 
Watergate scandals, Senator Javits stressed that "we seek 
to deal in this particular legislation, only with this 
particular set of papers of this particular 
ex-President." Id.,. a .t S. 18244. See generally S. Rep. 
No. 93-1181, 93dCong., 2dSess. (1974). 
It is essential in addressing the 
constitutional issues before us, not to lose sight of the 
limited justification for and objectives of this 
legislation. The extraordinary events that led to the 
resignation and pardon, and the agreement providing that 
the record of those events might be destroyed by 
President Nixon, created an impetus for Congressional 
action that may -- without overstatement -- be termed 
4. 
unique. I therefore do not share my Brother Rehnquist's 
foreboding that this Act "will daily stand as a veritable 
sword of Damocles over every succeeding President and his 
advisors." Post, at 1. If the study authorized by Title 
II of the Act should lead to more general legislation, 
there will be time enough to consider its validity if a 
proper case comes before us. 
My second reservation follows from the first. 
5. 
Because Congress acted in what it perceived to be an 
emergency, it concentrated on the immediate problem of 
establishing governmental custody for the purpose of safe-
guarding the materials. It deliberately left to the rule-
making process, and to subsequent judicial review, the dif-
ficult and sensitive task of reconciling the long-range 
interests of President Nixon, his advisors, the three 
branches of Government, and the American public, once 
custody was established. As the District Court observed, 
"The Act in terms merely directs GSA 
to take custody of the materials that 
fall within the scope of section 101, 
and to promulgate regulations after 
taking into consideration the seven 
factors listed in section 104(a). 
Those factors provide broad latitude 
to the Administrator in establishing 
the processes and the standards under 
'
which the materials will be reviewed 
and public access to them assured .. 
• • " 4 0 8 F . Su pp . 3 21 , 3 3 5 ( 19 7 6 ) 
(footnote omitted). 
In view of the latitude that the Act gives to GSA in 
framing regulations, I agree with the District Court that 
6. 
the question to be resolved in this case is a narrow one: 
"Is the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress 
unconstitutional without reference to the content of any 
conceivable set of regulations falling within the scope of 
the Administrator's a,uthority under section 104(a)?" Id., 
I at 334-335. 
No regulations have yet taken effect under 
§ 104(a). Ante, at 9. In these circumstances, I believe 
it is appropriate to address appellant's constitutional 
claims, as did the District Court, with an eye towards the 
kind of regulations and screening practices that would be 
consistent with the Act and yet that would afford protec-
tion to the important constitutional interests asserted. 
Section 104 (a) (5) of the Act directs the Administrator to 
take into account: 
"the need to protect any party's 
opportunity to assert any legally or 
constitutionally based right or 
privilege which would prevent or 
otherwise limit access to such 
recordings and materials." 
The District Court observed that in considering this 
factor, the Administrator might well provide for 
meaningful participation by appellant in the screening 
process and in the selection of the archivists who would 
review the materials. The court also observed that 
procedures might be adopted that would minimize any 
intrusion into private materials and that would permit 
appellant an opportunity to obtain administrative and 
judicial review of all proposed classifications of the 
( materials. 408 F. Supp., at 339-340.
2 
Finally, the 
court noted that substantive restrictions on access might 
be adopted, consistent with traditional restrictions 
placed on access to Presidential papers, and that such 
restrictions could forbid public disclosure of any 
confidential communications between appellant and his 
advisors "for a fixed period of years, or until the death 
7. 
\ 
of Mr. Nixon and others partic:pating in or the subject of 
communications." Id., at 338. 
I have no doubt that procedural safeguards and 
substantive restrictions such as these are within the 
authority of the Administrator to adopt under the broad 
mandate of§ 104(a). While there can be no positive 
assurance that such protections will in fact be afforded, 
we nonetheless may assume, in reviewing the facial 
validity of the Act, that all constitutional and legal 
rights will be given full protection. Indeed, that 
assumption is the basis on which I join today's judgment 
upholding the facial ·validity of the Act. As the Court 
makes clear in its opinion, the Act plainly requires the 
Administrator, in designing the regulations, to 0 consider 
the need to protect the constitutional rights of appellant 
and other individuals against infringement by the 
processing itself or, ultimately, by public access to the 
materials retained." Ante, _at 8. 
8. 
II 
I agree that Title I of the Act cannot be held 
unconstitutional on its face as a violation of the 
principle of separation of powers or of the Presidential 
privilege that derives from that principle. This is not a 
case in which the Legislative Branch has exceeded its 
enumerated powers by assuming a function reserved to the 
Executive under Article II. ~, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 , U.S. 52 
(1926). The question of Governmental power in this case 
is whether the Act, by mandating seizure and eventual 
public access to the papers of the Nixon Presidency, 
impermissibly interferes with the President's power to 
carry out his Article II obligations. In concluding that 
the Act is not facially invalid on this ground, I consider 
I it dispositive in the circumstances of this case that the 
President has represented to this Court, through the 
Solicitor General, that the Act serves rather than hinders 
the Article II fun9tions of the Chief Executive. 
I would begin by asking whether, putting to one 
side other limiting provisions of the Constitution, 
Congress has acted beyond the scope of its enumerated 
powers. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 70 (1957) (Harlan, 
J., concurring). Apart from the legislative concerns 
9 • 
mentioned by the Court, ante, at 49-50, I believe that 
Congress unquestionably has acted within the ambit of its 
broad authority to investigate, to inform the public, and, 
ultimately, to legislate against suspected corruption and 
abuse of power in the Executive Branch. 
This Court has recognized inherent power in 
Congress to pass appropriate legislation to "preserve the 
departments and institutions of the general government 
from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by 
force or by corruption." Burroughs v. United States, 290 
U.S. 534, 545 (1934). Congress has the power, for 
example, to restrict the political activities of civil 
servants, e.g., CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 
(1973); to punish bribery and conflicts of interest,~, 
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906), to punish 
obstructions of lawful governmental functions, Haas v. 
Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910), and -- with important 
exceptions -- to make available Executive documents to the 
public, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). The court also 
has recognized that - in aid of such legislation Congress 
has a broad power "to inquire into and publicize 
corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in the 
agencies of the Government." Watkins v. United States, 
354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S., at 137-138; Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). 
10. 
The legislation before us rationally serves 
these investigative and informative powers. Congress 
legitimately could conclude that the Nixon-Sampson 
agreement, following the recommendation of impeachment and 
the resignation of President Nixon, might lead to 
destruction of those of the former President's papers that 
would be most likely to assure public understanding of the 
unprecedented events that led to the premature termination 
of the Nixon Administration. Congress similarly could 
conclude that preservation of the papers was important to 
its own eventual understanding of whether that 
Administration had been characterized by deficiences 
susceptible of legislative correction. Providing for 
retention of the materials by the Administrator and for 
the selection of appropriate materials for eventual 
disclosure to the public was a rational means of serving 
these legitimate Congressional objectives. 
Congress still might be said to have exceeded 
its enumerated powers, however, if the Act could be viewed 
as an assumption by the Legislative Branch of functions 
reserved exclusively to the Executive by Article II. In 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952), for example, the Court buttressed its conclusion 
that the President had acted beyond his power under 
Article II by characterizing his seizure of the steel 
mills as an exercise of a "legislative" function reserved 
\ 
11. 
exclusively to Congress by Article I. Id., at 588-589. 
And last Term we reaffirmed the fundamental principle that 
the appointment of executive officers is an "executive" 
function that Congress is without power to vest in 
itself. Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 85-143. But the Act 
before us presumptively avoids these difficulties by 
entrusting the task of ensuring that its provisions are 
faithfully executed to an officer of the Executive 
4 
Branch. 
I therefore conclude that the Act cannot be 
held invalid on the ground that Congress has exceeded its 
affirmative grant of power under the Constitution. But it 
is further argued that Congress nonetheless has 
contravened the limitations on legislative power 
implicitly imposed by the creation of a co-equal Executive 
Branch in Article II. It is said that by opening up the 
operations of a past Administration to eventual public 
scrutiny, the Act impairs the ability of present and 
future Presidents to obtain unfettered information and 
candid advice and thereby limits Executive power in 
contravention of Article II and the principle of 
separation of powers. I see no material distinction 
between such an argument and the collateral claim that the 
Act violates the Presidential privilege in confidential 
communications. 
12. 
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), 
we recognized a presumptive, yet qualified, privilege for 
confidential communications between the President and his 
advisors. Observing that "those who expect public 
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with 
a concern for appearances and for their own interests to 
the detriment of the decisionmaking process," id., at 
705, we recognized that a President's generalized interest 
in confidentiality is "constitutionally based" to the 
extent that it relates to "the effective discharge of a 
President's powers." Id., at 711. We held nonetheless 
that "[t]he generalized assertion of privilege must yield 
to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a 
pending criminal trial." Id., at 713. 
Appellant understandably relies on Nixon I. 
Comparing the narrow scope of the judicial subpoenas 
considered there with the comprehensive reach of this Act 
-- encompassing all of the communications of his 
Administration -- appellant argues that there is no 
"demonstrated, speciiic need" here that can outweigh the 
extraordinary intrusion worked by this legislation. On 
the ground that the result will be to destroy "the 
effective discharge of the President's powers," appellant 
urges that the Act be held unconstitutional on its face. 
These arguments undoubtedly have considerable 
force, but I do not think they can support a decision 
13. 
Jinvalidating this Act on its face. Section 1 of Article 
II vests all of the Executive power in the sitting 
-
President and limits his term of office to four years. It 
is his sole responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed." Art II., § 3. Here, President 
Carter has represented to this Court through the Solicitor 
General that the Act is consistent with "the effective 
discharge of the President's powers": 
"Far from constituting a breach of 
executive autonomy, the Act ... is 
an appropriate means of ensuring that 
the Executive Branch will have access 
to the materials necessary to the 
performance of its duties." Brief 
for the Federal Appellees 29. 
This representation is similar to one made earlier on 
behalf of President Ford, who signed the Act. Motion of 
the Federal Appellees to Affirm 15. I would hold that 
I 
these representations must be given precedence over 
appellant's claim of Presidential privilege. Since the 
incumbent President views this Act as furthering rather 
than hindering effective execution of the laws, I do not 
believe it is within the province of this Court to hold 
otherwise. 
This is not to say that a former President 
lacks standing to assert a claim of Presidential 
privilege. I agree with the Court that the former 
14. 
President may raise such a claim, whether before a court 
In some circumstances the I or a Congressional committee. intervention of the incumbent President will be 
impr~ctical or his views unknown, and in such a case I 
assume that the former President's views on the effective 
operation of the Executive branch would be entitled to the 
greatest deference. It is uncontroverted, I believe, that 
the privilege in confidential Presidential communications 
survives a change in administrations. I would only hold 
that in the circumstances here presented the incumbent, 
having made clear in the appropriate forum his opposition 
to the former President's claim, alone can speak for the 
5 
Executive Branch. 
I am not unmindful that "[i]t is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, l Cranch 137, 177 
(1803). As we reiterated in Nixon I, 
"Deciding whether a matter has in any 
measure been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of 
government ... is itself a delicate 
exercise ' iri constitutional 
interpretation, and is a 
responsibility of this Court as 
ultimate interpreter -of the 
Constitution." 418 U.S., at 704, 
quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
211 (1962). --
My position is simply that a decision to waive the 
privileges inhering in the Office of the President with 
respect to an otherwise valid Act of Congress is the 
1President's alone to make under the Constitution. 6 
III 
15. 
The difficult constitutional questions lie 
ahead. The President no doubt will see to it that the 
interests in confidentiality so forcefully urged by my 
dissenting Brethren are taken into account in the final 
regulations that are promulgated under§ 104(a). While the 
President has supported the constitutionality of the Act 
as it is written, there is no indication that he will 
oppose appellant's assertions of Presidential privilege as 
they relate to the rules that will govern the screening 
I process and the timing of disclosure, and particularly the 
restrictions that may be placed on certain documents and 
I record1ngs. I emphasize that the validity of such 
assertions of Presidential privilege is not properly 
before us at this time. 
Similarly, difficult and important questions 
concernirig individual rights remain to be resolved. At 
stake are not only the rights of appellant but also those 
I of other individuals whose First, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendment interests may be implicated by disclosure of 
\ communications as to which a legitimate expectation of 
privacy existed. I agree with the Court that even in the 
councils of Government an individual "has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his personal communications," 
16. 
(ante, at 37, and also that compelled disclosure of an 
individual's political associations, in and out of 
Government, can be justified only by "a compelling public 
need that cannot -be met in a less restrictive way," id., 
at 39. Today's decision is limited to the facial validity 
of the Act's provisions for retention and screening of the 
materials. I do not understand the Court's discussion of 
the interests served by those provisions to foreclose in 
any way the search that must yet be undertaken for means 
of assuring eventual access to important historical 
records without infringing individual rights protected by 
( the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. 
FOOTNOTES 
1/ 
- Although I agree with much of Parts IV 
and V, I am unable to join those parts of the Court's 
opinion because of my uncertainty as to the reach of its 
extended discussion of the competing constitutional 
interests implicated by the Act. 
2/ 
- By way of illustration, the District 
Court observed that the following archival practices might 
be adopted to limit invasion of appellant's 
constitutionally protected interests: 
"l. A practice of requiring 
archivists to make the minimal 
intrusion necessary to classify 
material. Identification by 
signature, the file within which 
material is found, general nature (as 
with diaries, or dictabelts serving 
the same function), a cursory glance 
at the contents, or other means could 
significantly limit infringement of 
plaintiff's interests without 
undermining the effectiveness of 
screening by governmental personnel. 
Participation by Mr. Nixon in 
preliminary identification of 
material that might be processed 
without word-by-word review would 
facilitate such a procedure. 
2. A-practice of giving Mr. Nixon 
some voice in the designation of the 
personnel who will review the 
materials, perhaps by selecting from 
a body of archivists approved by the 
government. 
I White in 
3. A practice of giving Mr. Nixon 
notice of all proposed 
classifications of materials and an 
opportunity to obtain administrative 
and judicial review of them, on 
constitutional or other grounds, 
before they are effectuated." 408 F. 
!supp. 321, 339-340 (1976) (footnotes 
omit tea) . 
I agree with the views expressed by Mr. 
FN-2 
Justice 
his concurring opinion on the need to return 
private materials to appellant. 
3/ h · · d h . t f - Te D1str1ct Court note t e ex1s ence o 
"a basic set of donor-imposed access 
restrictions that was first formulated by 
Herbert Hoover [and] followed by 
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson. Under this scheme the following 
materials would be restricted: 
1) materials that are 
security-classified; 
2) materials whose disclosure would 
be prejudicial to foreign affairs; 
3) materials containing statements 
made by or to a President in 
confidence; 
4) materials relating to the 
President's family, personal, or 
business .affairs or to such affairs 
of individuals corresponding with the 
President; 
5) materials containing statements 
about individuals that might be used 
to embarrass or harass them or 
members of their families; 
6) such other materials as the 
President or his representative might 
designate as appropriate for 
restriction. 
President Franklin Roosevelt imposed 
restrictions very similar to numbers 1, 2, 
4, and 5, and in addition restricted 
(a) investigative reports on individuals, 
(b) applications and recommendations for 
positions, and (c) . documents containing 
derogatory remarks about an individual. 
President Truman's restrictions were like 
those of Hoover, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson, except that he made no provision, 
like number 6 above, for restriction 
merely at his own instance." Id., at 338 
n. 19 (citations omitted). --
!/ The validity of the provision of 
FN-3 
§ 104(b) for possible disapproval of the Administrator's 
regulations by either House of Congress is not before us 
at this time. See id., at 338, n. 17 (1976); Brief for 
the Federal Appellees 26 and n. 11. 
5/ 
- There is at least some risk that 
political, and even personal, antagonisms could motivate 
Congress and the President to join in a legislative 
seizure and public exposure of a former President's papers 
without due regard to the long-range implications of such 
action for the Article II functions of the Chief 
Executive. Even if such legislation did not violate the 
separation of powers, it might well contravene the Bill of 
Attainder Clause. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 
[ 303 (1946). But this is not the case before us. In 
passing this legislation, Congress acted to further 
legitimate objectives in circumstances that were wholly 
unique in the history of our country. The legislation was 
FN-4 
approved by President Ford, personally chosen by President 
Nixon as his successor, and is now also supported by 
President Carter. 
~/Cf.Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
\ Sawyer, 343U.S. 579, 635-637 (1952)(Jackson, J., 
concurring): 
"When the President acts pursuant to 
an express or implied authorization 
of Congress, his authority is at its 
maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all 
that Congress can delegate. In these 
circumstances, and in these only, may 
he be said (for what it may be worth) 
to personify the federal 
sovereignty. If his act is held 
unconstitutional under these 
circumstances, it usually means that 
the Federal Government as an 
undivided whole lacks power .... " 
(footnote omitted) 
See also Williams v. The Suffolk Insurance Co., 13 Pet. 
415, 420 (1839): 
"[T]his Court ha[s] laid down the 
rule, that the action of the 
political -branches of the government 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment. 
I join the judgment of the Court and all but Parts IV 
\ and V of its opinion. For substantially the reasons stated 
by the Court, I agree that the Act on its face does not 
violate appellant's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments and the Bill of Attainder Clause.1 For reasons 
quite different from those stated by the Court, I also would 
hold that the Act is consistent on its face with the separation 
of powers. 
I 
The Court begins its analysis of the issues by limiting 
its inquiry to those constitutional claims that are addressed 
to "the facial validity of the provisions of the Act requiring 
the Administrator to take the recordings and materials into 
the Government's custody subject to screening by Govern-
ment archivists." Ante, at 11. I agree that the inquiry 
must be limited in this manner, but I would add two qualifi-
cations that in my view further restrict the reach of today's 
decision . 
First. Title I of the Act docs not purport to be a generalized 
1 Although I agrrr with much of Part:- IV and V, I am unable to join 
I ho:-:t• parts of thP Courl 's opinion bPcau~P of mr 1mcPrtainty as to the 
re:wh of its c·xtendrd disrm;sioll or the eompcting con:stitutional interests 
tmpheatecl by the Al'l . 
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provision addressed to the complex problem of disposition 
of the accumlla.ted papers of Presidents or other federal 
officers. Unlike Title II, which authorizes a study of that 
problem, Title I is specifically and narrowly addressed to 
the need to preserve the papers of former President Nixon 
after his resignation under threat of impeachment. It is 
legislation, as the Court properly observes, directed against 
"a legitimate class of one." Ante, at 44. 
President Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974. Less than 
two weeks earlier, the House Judiciary Committee had voted 
to recommend his impeachment, H. R. Rep. No. 93-1305, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (1974), including among the 
charges of impeac~able offenses allegations that the President 
had obstructed investigation of the Watergate break-in and 
had engaged in other unlawful activities during his Admin-
istration. Id., at 1-4. One month after President Nixon's 
resignation, on September 8, 1974, President Ford granted 
him a general pardon for all offenses against the United 
States that he might have committed in his term of office. 
On the same day, the Nixon-Sampson agreement was made 
public. The agreement provided for the materials to be 
deposited temporarily with the General Services Administra-
tion, in a California facility, but gave the former President 
the right to withdraw or direct the destruction of any mate-
rials after an initial period of three years or. in the case 
of tape recordings, five years. During this initial period ac-
cess would be limited to President Nixon or to persons 
authorized by him, subject only to legal process ordering 
materials to be produced. Upon President Nixon's death, 
the tapes were to be destroyed immediately. 10 Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents 1104-1105- (1974). 
Those who drafted and sponsored Title I of the Presidential 
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act in Congress uni-
formly viewed its provisions as emergency legislation, neces-
sitated by the extraordinary events that led to the resignation 
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-and pardon and to the former President's arrangement for 
the disposition of his papers. Senator Nelson, for example, 
• referred to the Bill as "an emergency measure" whose prin-
~cipal purpose was to assure "protective custody" of the 
materials, 120 Cong. Rec. S. 18233, S. 18235 ( daily ed. 
Oct. 3, 1974). 
"[T] here is an urgency in the situation now before us. 
Under the existing agreement between the GSA and 
Mr. Nixon, if Mr. Nixon died tomorrow, these tapes-
if I read the agreement cot-rectly-are to be destroyed 
immediately; it is also possible that the Nixon papers 
papers could be destroyed by 1977. This would be a 
catastrophy [sic] from an historical standpoint." Id., 
at S. 18242. 
Senator Ervin similarly remarked: 
"This bill really deals with an emergency situation, 
because some of these documents are needed in the 
courts and by the general public in order that they 
might know the full story of what is known collectively 
as the Watergate affair." Id., at S. 18240. 
Efforts to apply the legislation more generally to all Presi-
dents or to other federal officers were resisted on the Senate 
floor. Thus, speaking again of the unique needs created 
by the Nixon-Sampson agreement and the Watergate scan-
dals, Senator ,Javits stressed that "we seek to deal in this 
particular legislation. only with this particular set of papers 
of this particular ex-President." Id., at S. 18244. See gen-
erally S. Rep. No. 93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
It is essential in addressing the constitutional issues be-
fore us, 11ot to lose sight of the limited justification for and 
objectives of this legislation. The extraordinary events that 
led to the resignation and pardon, and the agreement pro-
viding that the record of those events might be destroyed by 
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that may-without overstatement-be termed unique. I 
therefore do not share my Brother REHNQUIST's foreboding 
that this Act "will daily stand as a veritable sword of Damo-
cles over every succeeding President and his advisors." Post, 
at I. If the study authorized by Title II of the Act should 
lead to more general legislation, there will be time enough 
to consider its validity if a proper case comes before us. 
My second reservation follows from the first. Because 
Congress acted in what it perceived to be an emergency, 
it concentrated on the immediate problem of establishing 
governmental custody for the purpose of safeguarding the 
materials. It deliberately left to the rulemaking process, 
and to subsequent judicial review. the difficult and sensitive 
task of reconciling the long-range interests of President Nixon, 
his advisors, the three branches of Government, and the 
American public, once custody was established. As the Dis-
trict Court observed, 
"The Act in terms merely directs GSA to take custody 
of the materials that fall within the scope of section 
101, and to promulgate regulations after taking into 
consideration the seven factors listed in section 104 (a). 
Those factors provide broad latitude to the Administrator 
in establishing the processes and the standards under 
which the materials wi11 be reviewed and public access 
to them assured .... " 408 F. Supp. 321, 335 ( 1976) 
( footnote orni tted). 
In view of the latitude that the Act gives to GSA in framing 
regulations, I agre~ with the District Court that the question 
to be resolved in this case is a narrow one: "ls the regulatory 
scheme enacted by Congress unconstitutional without refer-
ence to the content of any conceivable set of regula.tions 
.falling within the scope of the Administrator's authority 
. under section 104 (a)'?" Id., at 334-335. 
No regulations have yet taken effect under § 104 (a). 
Ante, at 9, In these circumstances, I believe it is appro-
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priate to address appellant's constitutional claims, as did the 
District Court, with an eye towards the kind of regulations 
and screening practices that would be consistent with the 
Act and yet that would afford protection to the important 
constitutional interests asserted. Section 104 (a)(5) of the 
Act directs the Administrator to take into account: 
"the need to protect any party's opportunity to assert 
any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege 
which would prevent or otherwise limit access to such 
recordings and materials." 
The District Court observed that in considering this factor, 
the Administra.tor might well provide for meaningful par-
ticipation by appellant in the screening process and in the 
selection of the archivists who would review the materials. 
The court also observed that procedures might be adopted 
that would minimize any intrusion into private materials 
and that would permit appellant an opportunity to obtain 
administrative and judicial review of all proposed classifica• 
tions of the materials. 408 F. Supp., at 339-340.i Finally, 
2 By way of illu;;tration, the District Court observed that the follow-
ing archival practicPi:, might be adopted to limit invasion of appellant's 
constitutionally protected intere;;ti:,: 
"l. A practirP of requiring archivists to make the minimal intrusion nec-
e::,<i:,ary to clas;;if'y material. Identifica.t.ion by signature, the file within 
which material is found, general nature (as with diaries, or dictabelts serv-
ing the same function), a cursory glance at the contents, or other means 
could signifirm1tly limit infringrment of plaintiff's interests without under-
mining the rffectiveness of i:,creening by governmental personnel. Par-
ticipation by Mr. Nixon in preliminary identification of material that 
might be processed without word-by-word review would facilitate such a 
procedure. 
"2. A practice of giving Mr. Nixon some voice in the designation of the 
personnel who will review the materials, perhaps by i:;electing from a 
body of arrhi\'ists approved by the government. 
"3. A practicP of giving Mr. Nixon notice of all proposed classifications 
of ,materials and an opportunity to obtnin administrative and judicial re-
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the court noted that substa11tive restrictions on access might 
be adopted, consistent with traditional restrictions placed 
on access to Presidential papers, and that such restrictions 
could forbid public disclosure of any confidential communica-
tions between appellant and his advisors "for a fixed period 
of years. or until the death of Mr. Nixon and others par-
ticipating in or the subject of communications." Id., at 338.a 
I have no doubt that procedural safegua.rcls and substan-
tive restrictions such as these are within the authority of the 
Administrator to adopt under the broad mandate of § 104 (a) .. 
While there can be no positive assurance that such protections 
will in fact be afforded, we nonetheless may assume, in review-
view of them, on constitutional or other grounds, before they are effec-
tuated." 408 F . Supp. 321, 3;{9-a40 (1976) (footnoteis omitkd). 
I 
I agree with the views expressed by Mn. Jus'l'ICE WHITE, ante, at --
- -, on the need to return private mn.terials to a.ppellant. 
3 The Distrirt Court noted the existence of 
"a basic set of donor-imposed ::icces:s restrictions that was first formulated 
by Herbert Hoover [and] followed by Presidents Eisenhower, Kt>trnedy, 
and .Tolrnson. Under this scheme the following materials would be 
restrict rd: 
"l) matnial~ that are security-chtssified ; 
"2) matPrials who~e disrlosure would be prejudicial to foreign affairs; 
"3) material;; containin~ statements made by or to a President in 
confidence; 
"-0 matrrials relating to the President's family , personal, or business 
affairs or to surh affain; of individuals corre:;ponding with tlw President; 
';5) material s containing stl1tements about, individuals that might be 
used to embarr:is;; or harass them or members of their families; 
"6) surh other mntcrials as the Pre;;ident or his representative might 
designate as appropriate for re;;t,riction . 
"President Fmnklin Hoosevelt imposed restrictiom; very similar to 
rn1mber,; 1, 2, 4, and 5, and in addition · re,;tricted (:1,) investigative reports 
on individuals, (b) npplira,tions and recommendations for positions, and 
(c) documr11ts containing drrogatory remarks about an individual. 
Pre::;idrnt Trum:1J1 •~ rr:-trirtion:-< were like thm,e of Hoover, Eisenhower, 
:Kr1111rd)·, and .fohnson, cxrept that he made no provision, like number 6 
above, for re~( riction merely at his own instance." Id., at 338 n. 19 (cita-
tion::; omitted). 
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ing the facial validity of the Act, that all constitutional 
and legal rights will be given full protection. Indeed, that 
assumption is the basis on which I join today's judgment 
upholding the facial validity of the Act. As the Court 
_makes clear in its opinion, the Act plainly requires the 
Administrator, in designing the regulations, to "consider the 
need to protect the constitutional rights of appellant and 
other individuals against infringement by the processing it-
self or, ultimately, by public access to the materials retained." 
Ante, at 8. 
II 
I agree that Title I of the Act cannot be held unconstitu-
tional on its face as a violation of the principle of ~paration 
of powers or of the Presidential privilege that derives from 
that principle. This is not a case in which the Legislative 
Branch has exceeded its enumerated powers by assuming 
a function reserved to the Executive under Art. II. E. g., 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 
272 U. S. 52 (1926). The question of governmental power 
in this case is whether the Act, by mandating seizure and 
eventual public access to the papers of the Nixon Presidency, 
impermissibly interfers with the President's power to carry 
out his Art. II obligations. In concluding that the Act is not 
facially invalid on this ground, I consider it dispositive in 
the circumstances of this case that the President has repre-
sented to this Court. through the Solicitor General, that the 
Act serves rather than hinders the Art. II functions of the 
Chief Executive. 
I would begin by asking whether, putting to one side 
other limiting provisions of the Constitution, Congress has 
acted beyond the scope of its enumerated powers. Cf. Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 70 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
AJ)art from the legislative concerns mentioned by the Court, 
,ante, at 49- 50, I believe that Congress unquestionably has 
acted within the ambit of its broad authority to investigate, 
·, 
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to inform the public, and, ultimately, to legislate against 
suspected corruption and abuse of power in the Executive 
Branch. 
This Court has recognized inherent power in Congress to 
pass appropriate legislation to "preserve the departments and 
institutions of the general government from impairment or 
destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption." 
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 545 (1934). 
Congress has the power, for example, to restrict the political 
activities of civil servants, e. g., CSC v. Letter Carriers, 
413 U. S. 548 (1973); to punish bribery and conflicts of 
interest, e. g., Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906), 
to punish obstructions of lawful governmental functions, 
Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462 (1910), and-with important 
exceptions--to make available Executive documents to the 
public, EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973). The Court also 
has recognized that in aid of such legislation Congress has 
a broad power "to inquire into and publicize corruption, 
n'laladministration or inefficiency in the agencies of the Gov-
ernment." Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 200 
(1957). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S .. at 137-138; 
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 
(1975). 
The legislation before us rationally serves these investiga-
tive and informative powers. Congress legitimately could 
conclude that the Nixon-Sampson agreement, following the 
recommendation of impeachment and the resignation of Presi-
dent Nixon, might lead to destruction of those of the former 
President's papers that would be most likely to assure public 
understanding of the unprecedented events that led to the 
premature termination of the Nixon Administration. Con-
gress similarly could conclude that preservation of the papers 
was important to its own eventual understanding of whether 
that Administration had been characterized by deficiencies 
susceptible of legislative correction. Providing for retention 
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of the materials by the Administrator and for the selection 
of appropriate materials for eventual disclosure to the public 
was a rational means of serving these legitimate congres-
sional objectives. 
Congress still might be said to have exceeded its enumerated 
powers, however, if the Act could be viewed as an assumption 
by the Legislative Branch of functions reserved exclusively 
to the Executive by Art. II. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 ( 1952), for example, the Court 
buttressed its conclusion that the President had acted beyond 
his power under Art. II by characterizing his seizure of the 
steel mills as an exercise of a "legislative" function reserved 
exclusively to Congress by Art. I. Id., at 588-589. And 
last Term we reaffirmed the fundamental principle that the 
appointment of executive officers is an "executive" function 
that Congress is without power to vest in itself. Buckley v. 
Valeo, supra, a,t 85-143. But the Act before us presump-
tively avoids these difficulties by entrusting the task of en-
suring that its provisions are faithfully executed to an officer 
of the Executive Branch:1 
I therefore conclude that the Act cannot be held invalid 
on the ground that Congress has exceeded its affirmative 
grant of power under the Constitution. But it is further 
argued that Congress nonetheless has contr{tvened the limita-
tions on legislative power implicitly imposed by the creation 
of a coequal Executive Branch in Art. II. It is said that 
by opening up the operations of a past Administration to 
eventual public scrutiny, the Act impairs the ability of 
present and future Presidents to obtain unfettered infor-
ma,t,ion and candid advice and thereby limits executive power 
in contravention of Art. II and the principle of separation 
1 Thr validity of the provi,,;ion of § 104 (b) for possible disapproval of 
!hr Administrator's regulations by either Howse of Congre ·::; is not before 
lit; at this timr. See id., at 338 n. 17 (1976); Brief for the Federal Ap-
JlPllee~ 26, and n. 11. 
• I 
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of powers. I see no material distinction between such an 
argument and the collateral claim that the Act violates the 
Presidential pri~ilege · in confidential communications. 
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), we recog-
nized a presumptive. yet qualified, privilege for confidential 
communications between the President and his advisors. 
Observing that "those who expect public dissemination of 
their remarks may well temper candor with a co11cem for 
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment 
of the decisionmaking process," id., at 705, we recognized that 
a President's generalized interest in confidentiality is "con-
stitutionally based" to the extent that it relates to "the 
effective discharge of a President's powers." Id., at 711. 
We held nonetheless that " [ t] he generalized assertion of 
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specified need for 
evidence in a pending criminal trial." Id., at 713. 
Appellant understandably relies on Nixon I. Comparing 
the narrow scope of the judicial subpoenas considered there 
with the comprehensive reach of this Act-encompassing 
all of the communications of his Administration-appellant 
argues that there is no "demonstrated, specific need" here 
that can outweigh the extraordinary intrusion worked by this 
legislation. 011 the ground that the result will be to destroy 
"the effective discharge of the President's powers," appellant 
urges that the Act be held unconstitutional on its face. 
These argu1~ents undoubtedly have considerable force, but 
1 do not think they can support a decision invalidating this 
Act on its face. Section 1 of Art. II· vests all of the ex-
ecutive power in the sitting President and limits his term 
of office to four years. It is his sole responsibility to "take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. IL. § 3. 
Here. President Carter has represented to this Court through 
the Solicitor General that the Act is consistent with "the 
-effective discharge of the President's powers": 
"Far from constituting a breach of executive autonomy, 
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the Act . . . is an appropriate means of ensuring that 
the Executive Branch will have access to the materials 
necessary to the performance of its duties." Brief for 
the Federal Appllees 29. 
This representation is similar to one made earlier on behalf 
of President Ford. who signed the Act. Motion of the Federal 
Appellees to Affirm 15. I would hold that these representa-
tions must be given precedents over appellant's claim of 
Presidential privilege. Since the incumbent President views 
this Act as furthering rather than hindering effective execu-
tion of the laws. I do not believe it is within' the province 
of this Court to hold otherwise. 
This is not to say that a former President lacks standing 
to assert a claim of Presidential privilege. I agree with the 
Court that the former President may raise such a claim, 
whether before a court or a congressional committee. In 
some circumstances the intervention of the incumbent Presi-
dent will be impractical or his views unknown, and in such 
a case I assume that the former President's views on the 
effective operation of the Executive Branch would be entitled 
to the greatest deference. It is uncontroverted, I believe, 
that the privilege in confidential Presidential communications 
survives a change in administrations. I would only hold that 
in the circumstances here presented the incumbent, having 
made clear in the appropriate forum his opposition to the 
former President's claim, alone can speak for the Executive 
Branch.:; 
" TIH'n' is at lea:st some risk that politiC"al, and even per,·.onn.1 antag-
011i:sms Pottld motivat<' Congrcvs; nnd the President to join in 11, legisln-
tivP ~eizure and public exposure of a former President's paper;; without 
dttr rega.rd to t.he long-range implicationb" of :such n.ction for the Art. II 
'
funrtions of the Chief Exrctttiw. Even if such legislation did not violate 
the srparntion of power~, it, rrught well infringe individual liberties pro-
lt•cted b~· the Bill of Attninder Clau;:e or thr Bill of Rights. Bttt this is 
110t the case before us. In pa~:sing this lrgislation, Congrf'ss acted to fur-
Uwr legitimate ol:ljectives in .r.in·um~tance:s tlrnt were wholly unique in U1e 
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I am not unmindful that "[i] t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.'t 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). As we re-
iterated in iVixon II, 
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been 
committed by the Constitution to another branch of 
government ... is itself a delicate exercise in constitu-
tional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court 
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." 418 U. S., 
at 704, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 211 (1962), 
My position is simply tha.t a decision to waive the privileges 
i11heri11g in the Office of "the President with respect to valid 
Act of Congress is the President's alone to make under the 
Constitution.0 
III 
The difficult constitutional questions lie ahead. The Presi-
de11t no doubt will see to it that the interests i11 co11fiden-
hi1Stor~· of our country. ThC' legii,-lation was approved by President Ford, 
prnmnally rho:;en by Pre:;idrnt Nixon as his successor, and i:; now al8o 
l
~upported by Prr:,ident Carter. In view of the circumst:mces leading to 
iti-1 pa;;sage and the protection it provides for "any ... constitutionally 
based right or privilege." p. 6, supra. t hi;.: Act on it;; face dews not violate 
the per~onal ('Oll8titutional right,-; a;;sPrted br appellant. 
6 Cf. Youngstow11 ::.heet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-637 
(1952) (Jack8ou, J., concurring): 
·· When the PrP,-;ide11t acts pur:;uant to an exprPs:s or implied authoriza-
l 1011 of Congre:s:s, hi:; authorit~· is at its maximum, for it include:; nil that 
hC' posse:,;i:ie:,; in hi~ ow11 right plus all that Congre8;; can delegate. In 
tbesr rirc11m;.:tancr:,;, aud in tht>:se only, may hr be said (for what it may 
he worth) to personify t hi' frdrral sovrreignt y. If his act is held unconsti-
tutional undrr tlw:-:t> circumstances, it usually means tlrnt thr Fedrral Gov-
c•rnnwut. a::< ,111 11ndividPd wholr lack:, power ..... " (Footnoe omittnl.) 
SN' also Williams v. The Suffolk !nsuraucr Co ., 13 Pet. 415,420 (1839): 
" I 1' I hi:- Court ha I s·I laid down the rule, that the action of the political 
hranrhr~ of th<' O'ovrrnment in a matter that belo11gs to them, ~ 
<·onch1:;;ive," 
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tiality so forcefully urged by my dissenting Brethren are 
taken into account i11 the final regulations that are promul-
gated under ~ 104 ( a). While the Pm, ,de11t ha~ ~llf'l'L'rtl'cl 
thr constitutiouality of the Act as it is writte11. l!wi·e ::.- nu 
indicatiou that he will oppose appellant's assertions o;: PrH;i-
c!Pntial privilege as they relate to the rules that will go·, nn 
the ~<'rt'P11iug process and tht> timing of c.lisclosure. and par-
ti<·1il:11 I_, I IJ,, rP:-trictions that Ill/\}' b" plar,,J () 11 c•prtain doru-
ments anc.l recordings. I f•mphasi.ze that the validity of such 
l:l"' ('rtwn::, of P, <·-icleutial privilege i:· not p1'op1·1'1~ h(-'lur, , u~ 
at this time. 
Similarly. dith<·ult and important questions concerning in-
dividual rights remain to be resolved. At stake are not 
only the rights of a.pµella11t but also those of other individmtls 
whose First. Fourth. all(! F'ifth Amendment iuterests may 
be implicated by disclosun· of communications as to which 
a legitimate expectation of privacy existed. I agree with 
the Court that even in th<· C'ouncils of governmnet an indi-
vidual "has a legtimate expecta.tion of privacy in his personal 
communications," ante, at 37. and also that compelled disclo-
sure of an individual's political associations, in and out of 
government, can be justified only by "a compelling public 
need that cannot be met in a less restrictve way," id., at 39. 
Today's decision is limited to the facial validity of the Act's 
provisions for retention and screening of the materials. I 
do not understand the Court's discussion of the interests 
served by those provisions to foreclose in any way the 
search that must yet be undertaken for means of assuring 
eventual access to important historical records without in-
fringing i11dividual rights protected by the First, Fourth, 
a nd- Fifth Amendments, 
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• A f h U . J ~.JJ~ n ppeal rom t e mted ;,:-r..__ 
v. States District Court for the ~ ~ 
Administr~tor of General District of Columbia. ,t/fJ., ~ A L 
Services et al. Fr -, '1f/U',,II. -
[June -, 1977] #/ ~ ~f-
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. -¼" ~ 
I dissent. I see the Court's holding as a grave repudiation ~ j ~ 
of nearly 200 years of judicial precedent and historical prac- <hr,~~ . 'i,;:t- ~ . ...1~ . 
tice. That repudiation arises out of an Act of Congress passed If'--.., 
in the aftermath of a great national crisis which culminated in ~ ~ '-i--
the resignation of a President. The Act i,s special legislation, L f_,,, • 
applying only to one former President by name, and violates -~ u--,,._. 
firmly established constitutional principles. ~ k~ 
I find it very disturbing that significant and fundamental I)'::: ___ _ 
principles of constitutional law are subordinated to what ~~~,,, _ 
seem the needs of a particular situation. That moments of .. ~• 
public distress give rise to passions leading to unwise actions J Al~~ .. ~ ,,, . _ 
reminds us why the three Branches of government were 
created as separate and coequal, each intended as a check, in "f L.fc"/4,,u•· A, _;1 turn, on possible excesses by one or both of the others. e I 
Any case in this Court calling upon principles of sep~ration ~ c,..., ~
of powers, rights of privacy, the prohibitions against bills of~~ c..:._.. 
attainder and denial of due process, whether urged by a ~ ;.._~ 
former President or an ordinary person, is inevitably a major 43'.- E,,., __ . _ 
constitutional case. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking of the -~ 
tendency of "great cases like hard cases [to make] bad law,"~ 
went on to observe the dangers inherent when ~ ..fl ~ 
"some accident of immediate overwhelming interest, ... ~,/- , . 
appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These L,c,., __ 
immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure • 
c.~. J...U.., -....u.•---4r 9 ~, k..f ~ --t..9-,p 
~ ''-1-e> ?~.J.7,JZ-
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which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful 
and before which even well settled principles of law will 
bend." Holmes, J., dissenting, Northern Securities Co, 
v. United States, 193 U. S., at 400-401 (1903). 
That risk is inherent in sucfi a case as this. 
I 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Appellant urges that, even though naming only him, the 
measure represents an unconstitutional intrusion by Congress 
into the internal workings of the office of the President, in 
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers. Three reasons, in my view, Sl,!Pport that conclusion. 
The well-established principles of separation of powers, as 
developed in the decisions of this Court, are violated if Con-
gress compels or coerces the President, in matters relating to 
the operation and conduct of his office.1 Next, the Act is an 
exercise of executive-not "legislative-power by foe Legisla-
tive Branch, in violation of separation-of-powers principles. 
Finally, the Act works a sweeping modification of the consti- J 
tutional privilege of confidentiality historically surrounding 
the President in the conduct of his office, both during and 
after his term. 
A 
It is important to establish the yardstick by which we are 
to measure the Act's constitutionality. If, in effect, we 
require only that the statute represent a rational means for 
achieving legitimate governmental purposes, then the Court 
could reasonably conclude that the statute on its face is 
constitutional. But neither this standard nor any similar 
benchmark is proper. Despite my strong agreement with the 
view that this Court does not sit as a super legislature or a 
1 Later, I will disct1ss the importance of the legislation's applicability 
o,:uly tQ au ex-.Pre~ident, 
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Council of Revision, see, e. (1., Trimble v. Gordon, ante, 
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), I am persuaded that prior de-
cisions of this Court command a more demanding scrutiny on 
our part. 
The presumption of constitutionality attaching to tradi-
tional forms of legisratio"n d oes not, this Court has held, apply 
with the same force in certain carefully defined areas, such as 
where the very legitimacy of the composition of representative ~ 
institutions is at stake, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 ( 1964). T • -r--.-/ 
The presumption of constitutionality likewise loses force when l -----
le islation directly impinges upon the basic tripartite structure ,) 
of our governmen . 
I his prmc1ple is by no means novel. It engaged the atten-
tion of the authors of The Federalist: 
"The legislative department derives a superiority in 
our government from other circumstances. Its consti-
tutional powers being at once more extensive and less 
susceptible of precise limits, it can with the greater 
facility, m~sk under complicated and indirect measures, 
the encroachments which it ml:\kes on the co-ordinate de-
partments." The Federalist, No. 48. See also The Fed-
eralist, No. 51. 
The Court in Kilbourn v. Thome.son, 103 U. S. 168 (1880), 
therefore cautioned that the exercise of power by Congress 
directly affecting the potential independence of another 
branch "should be watched with vigilance, and when called in 
question before any other tribunal . . . should receive the 
most careful scrutiny." 103 U. S., at 192. The judicial role 
in this context, therefore, is akin to that which obtains when 
reviewing legislation that touches on First Amendment rights. 
See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976). Since our 
system of separation of powers was designed, above all, to 
secure and protect liberty , The Federalist, No. 49, nothing less 
than "the most careful scrutiny" of the legislation before us is 
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B 
Separation of powers is in no sense a formalism. Along 
with federalism, separation of powers among the branches of 
government is "one of the two great structural principles of 
the American constitutional system .... " E. Corwin, The 
President 9 (1957). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U. S. 479, 501 (Har1an, J., concurring). In pursuit of that 
principle, the Framers created three coordinate branches of 
government, each having defined powers. Executive oower 
Wa.§ vested in the President; no other offices in the Executive 
Brancli, ~ er than the Vice Presidency,2 were created or 
mandated by the Constitution. In the entire Execl!tive 
Branch, consequently, only two offices are creatures of the 
Coii'stitution; aU other departments and agencies, from the 





creatures of the Congress, owing their very existence to the J..-~I 
Legislative Branch. Congress can, and has, directed action on c::::t, ~-,-
the part of heads of departments, which those officials are ("'-f / ~ ~ 
duty bound to obey.3 - -,r-- ~ - J 
The Presidency, in contrast, stands on a very different foot~ S / ~ ' 
ing. Unlike the vast array of departments which the Presi- ) 
2 The Vi ce Prn,ident performs not only such executive functions as may 
bP as;;igned by the Pre::;ident, from time to time, but legisla,t,ive functions 
.is well. 
a Statutes relating to departments or agencies created by Congress 
frequently are phrased in mandatory terms. For example, in the 1949 
legislation crea.ting the General Services Administration, Congress pro-
vided as follows: 
"The Administrator is authorized and directed to coordinate and provide 
for the . . . effi cient purchase, lease and maintenance of ... equipment 
by Federal agencies." 40 U. S. C. § 759 (a) . 
Even with respect to international relations, Congress has affirmatively 
imposed certa in requiremen ts on the Secretary of Sta te: 
"The Secretary of State shall furnish to the Public Printer a correct 
<'.O])Y of every t reaty between t he United States and any foregin govern-
tnent., . . " 22 U. S. C. § 2660 (1970) . 
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dent oversees, the Presidency is in no sense a creature of the 
Legislature. T1!,_e Presidentli 2ow~ s originate not from stat-
ute, but from the constitutional command to "take Care that 
the Laws ""be faTtlrruily'executed .... " These independent, 
constitutional origins of the Presidency have an important 
bearing on determining the appropriate extent of congressional 
power over the Chief Executive or his records and work papers. 
For, although the branches of government are obviously not 
divided into "watertight compartments," Springer v. Philip-
pine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 211 (1928) (Holmes, J.) , the 
office of the Presidency, as a constitutional equal of 'Congres~, 
must as a general proposition be free from Congress' coercive 
powers, if the constitutional autonomy of the Executive 
Branch is not to be compromised.4 This is not simply an 
abstract proposition of political philosophy; it is a prohibi-
. tion plainly established by the decisions of this Court. 
A unanimous Court (which included Chief :Justice Taft 
and Justices Holmes and Brandeis) stated: 
"The general rule is that neither department [ of govern-
ment] may . .. control, direct or restrain the action of 
the other:" Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 
( 1923) . 
Similarly, in O'Donoghue v. United States, 209 U. S. 516, 530 
(1933) , the Court emphasized the need for each branch of 
government to be free from the coercive influence of the 
other branches : 
"[E] ach department should be kept completely inde-
pendent of the others- independent not in the sense that 
they shall not cooperate to the common end of carrying 
into effect the purposes of the Constitution, but in the 
sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by, 
-1 Cf. MR. JusTICE WHITE's discussion in United States -v: Brewster, 
-!OX U. S. 510; 558 (1972), where he spoke of the "evil" of "executive 
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or be subjected, directly or indirectly to, the coercive 
influence of either of the other departments." 
Likewise, in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 
602, 629-630 ( 1935), the Court held: 
"The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the 
three general departments of government entirely free 
from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, 
of either of the others, has often been stressed and is 
hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in 
the very fact of the separation of powers .... " (Empha-
sis supplied.) 
To bring this fundamental principle closer to home, the 
unbroken practice since Washington with respect to congres-
sional demands for White House papers has been, in Chief 
Justice Taft's words, "that, while either house [of Col_!gfess] 
may remiest information, it cannot c""ompel 1t .... " Taft, The 
fri'.esidency iio7"ittt6). This tradition of noncompulsion was 
established early in the Republic. President Washington 
declined to produce papers requested by the House of Repre-
sentatives relating to important matters of foreign policy by 
·saying: 
"To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives 
to demand and to have as a matter of course all the 
papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power 
would be to establish a dangerous precedent." 1 Mes-
sages and Papers of the Presidents 194. 
In noting the first President's practice, this Court stated in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 
(1936) . that Washington's historic precedent was "a refusal 
the wisdom of which was recognized by the House itself and 
has never since been doubted." 5 
5 This Presidential preroga.t,ive has not been limited to foreign affairs, 
where of course secrecy and confident,i:ality may be of the utmost. 
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Part of o,;1~constitutional fa~ic, then, from the beginnin~ 
h3:s b ee;the P,,r_esi_gfiit 's freed°;;in from control or coercion by 
Q.Qngress.l 1.hclu~hlpts · ro- ptocure docufuents that/ 
though cleariy pertaining to matters of important govern-
tnentai interests, belong and pertaih to the President. This 
freedom from Congress; coercive influence, in the words of 
Humphrey's Executor, "is implied in the very fact of separa-
tion of powers .... H 295 U. S., at 630.6 Moreover, it is not 
significant in any constitutional sense that Congress has not, 
through Title I , dictated that the papers be turned over to it 
for examination or retention. Separation of powers is fuily 
impiicated simpiy by Congress; mandating the disposition of 
the papers of another Branch. 
The present statute is a drastic departure from the consti .. 
tutiona1 tradition of noncompufs[o;' Regardless of the for-
mer J'Sreside~rt'.'s -;rstes, the statute commands the head of a 
tei islatively cre"ated department to take and maintain custody 
of the Presidential papers, including many purely personal 
papers. Title I does not concern itself in any way with 
materials belonging to departments of the Executive Branch 
importance. See A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 79 (19-75); Taft, 
The Presidency 110 (1916) . 
G This necessity for independence of the three BraJ1ches of government, 
including control over the papers of each, lies at t.lie heart of this 
Court's broad holdings concerning the immunity of congresswnal, papers 
from outside scrntiny . The Const.itut-ion expressly grants immunity to 
Members of Congress as to any "Speech or Debate in either House .. . . "; 
yet, the Court has r,efused to constrne the Clause literally " to words 
spoken in debate .. . . " Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 500 
(1969) . Congressional papers, including Congressional reports , ha.ve been 
held protect.ed by the Clause in order " to prevent intimida.tion [of 
legisla.tors] by the <'Xccutive and accounta bility before a J~bly hostile 
judiciar)·." !bid. Iu a word, to preserve the constitutionally rooted 
independence of each Branch of government, each Branch must be ablo .. 
to control its own papers. 
! • ., . • • 
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created and controlled by the Congress.1 If the statute had 
been passed while the former President was in office ( over 
what would likely have been his veto), there is hardly room 
for doubt that the legislation would be struck down in the 
courts. 
C 
The statute, therefore. violates separation-of-powers prin-
ciples because it exercises a coercive influence b another 
Branch over the resi en . he egislation is also invalid on 
another ground pertaining to sepa.ration of powers, because it 
is an attempt by Congress to exercise powers elementary to 
and vested in the President-the power to control files, records 
and paQerS of the offls e'. 
The generaf prfnciple as to this aspect of separation of 
powers was stated in Kilbourn, supra: 
"[E]ach branch shall by the law of its creation be limited 
to the exercise of the powers a.ppropriate to its own de-: 
partment and no other . . . [A]s a general rule ... the 
:powers confided by the Constitution to one of these de-: 
partments cannot be exercised by another:" 103 U. S., 
at 191. 
Madison also expressed this maxim: 
"For this reason that Convention which passed the ordi.. I 
nance of government, laid its foundation on this basis, 
that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments 
should be separate and distinct, so that no person should 
exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same 
time." The Federalist, No. 48. 
And in the 1975 Term, in the face of a holding by a Court of 
Appeals that the separation-of-powers challenge was merit-
less, we unanimously invalidated an attempt by Congress to 
7 Tha,t i;:;,;ue, of course, is not presented, and I express no view o:q 
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exercise appointing powers constitutionally vested in the 
Chief Executive. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 109-143 
(1976). 
The, control of the President's papers is, in my view, a 
power entrusted exclusively to the President.8 The Constitu-
tion does not speak of Presidential papers, just as it does not 
speak of work papers of Members of Congress or of judges.0 
But there ca.n be no room for doubt that, up to now, it has 
been the implied prerogative of the President-as of Members 
of Congress and of judges-to memorialize matters, establish 
filing systems, and to provide uniiaterally for disposition of 
their work papers. Control of Presidential pl¼,pers is, obvi-
ously, a natural and necessary incident of the broad discretion 
vested in the President in order for him to discharge his 
duties:1° 
To be sure, we recognized a narrowly limited exception to ~~ ~ 
Presidential control of Presidential p~pers in United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). But that case permits compul- -f,..,...,. • J- ,.,,._,, 
sory judicial intrusions only when a vital constitutional func- ~ ____ -"' _,,,,.,,. J.1--
tion, i. e., the conduct of criminal proceedings, would be im- ' - / 
8 Umted States ::-;:a:,-:;-U. S. 683 (1974), as noted infra, t/,o ~ ~ 
represents a limited exception to this general ' principle, in the event 
the functjons of one branch are impaired by a, refusal of the President 
to turn over, temporarily, specific documents for an in camera inspection. 
11 As t,0 congressional papers, see n. 6, supra. Despite the Constitu-
tion's silence as to the papers of the Legislative Branch, this Court 
had no difficulty holding those papers to be protected from control by 
other Branches. See also MR. JUSTICE BRJ>:NNAN's dissenting opinion 
in United States v. B.rewster, 408 U. S. 501, 532-533 (1972), where he 
quotes approvingly from Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, and Coffin v. Coffin, 
4 Mass. 1 ( 1808). In both of those cases, written materials by legislators 
were deemed to be protected by legislative immunity from intntsion or 
seizure. 
10 This discret.ion was exercised, as we have seen, by President Wash-
ington in the face of a coqgressiona.l demand for production. 
Obviou:;ly, official documents fall into an entirely different category and. 
a.re not involved· in this case. 
' ' 
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paired and when the President makes no more "than a gen-
eralized claim of ... public interest ... " id., at 707, in 
maintaining complete control of papers and in preserving con-
fidentiality of conversations. That case, in short, is an inter-
branch conflict case, where the effective functioning of both 
Branches demanded an accommodation and where the prose-
cutorial and judicial demands upon the President were very 
· narrowly restricted with great specificity "to a limited number 
of conversations .... " Moreover, the request for production 
· was limited to materials that might themselves contain evi-
dence of criminal activity of persons then under inquiry or 
indictment. Finally, the intrusion was ca.refullv limited to an I 
in camera e~ min~tion by a single United States District 
Judge under sfrict limits: · That case does not stand for the 
propbsition that the Judiciary is at liberty to order all papers 
of a President into the custody of United States Marshals.11 
United States v. Nixon, therefore, provides no authority 
for Congress' regulation of Presidential papers simply "to 
promote the General Welfare." No showing has been made, 
nor could it, that Congress' functions will be impaired by the 
former President's being allowed to control his own Presiden-
tial papers.12 Without any threat whatever to its own func., 
tions, Congress has by this statute, as in Buckley v. Valeo, 
exercised authority entrusted to the Executive Branch. 
11 Appellees, of course, would view that sort of intrusion as an int.ra.., 
branch confrontation, since United States Marshals are officials of the 
Execut,ive Branch, at least so long as the District Judge simply ordered 
the Marsha.ls to take custody of and to review the documents without 
turning them over to the court. This is, of course, sheer sophistry. 
12 Of course, United States v. Nixon pertained only to the setting of 
judicial-executive conflict,. Nothing in our holding suggests that, even 
if Congress needed Pre.sidential documents in connection with its legis-, 
lative functions, the constitutional tradition of Presidential control over 
Presidential documents in the face of legislative demands could be 
abrogated. We express!~· stated in Nixon, "[w]e are not here concerned 
with the balance between ... the confidentia.lity interest and congr~: 
s.iQnal demandR for informatiQll, . , ," 4l8 · U. S., at 712 u. t9, 
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n ?~~Y~ 
Finally, in my view, the Act violates principles of separa• 
tion"of owe by intruding into £he confiaenh ality of 
Presid~~l ~ r~m~ mc~tions, up o now protec e e on-
stitutionallyF"asecf aoctrine of Presidential privilege. A 
unanimous Court in United States v. hi_x"on c'ottlct not have 
been clearer in its holding that a privilege guaranteeing con-
fidentiality of such communications derives from the 
Constitution, subject to disclosure only in narrowly limited 
circumstances: 
"A President and those who assist him must be free 
to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies 
and making decisions and to do so in a way many would 
be unwilling to express except privately. These are the 
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for 
Presidential communications. The privilege is funda-
mental to the operation of Government and inextricably 
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitu-
tion." 418 U. S., at 708. 
As a constitutionally based prerogative, Presidential priv• 
ilege inures to the President himself. It is a personal privilege, 
in the same sense as that against compelled self-incrimination, 
for example, which would be breached by an uninvited intru-
sion by subordinate officials of the Executive departments into 
Presidential files, even if the intrusion was for a purpose 
relating to on-going governmental business. Presidential 
privilege would be largely illusory unless it could be interposed 
by the President against the countless thousands of persons in 
the Executive Branch, and most certainly if the Executive 
officials are acting, as this statute contemplates, at the com-
mand of a different branch of government.1 8 
13 Civil service statutes aside, we know now that an Executive official 
cannot replace all of hi:s underlings on the basis of a patronage system. 





This statute requires that persons neither designated n~r I 
approved by the former President ~ill review all Presidential 
papers. Even if the government agents follow literally the 
limiting suggestions offered by the District Court in culling 
through the documents, the fact remains that their job re~ 
quires them to abrogate the Presidential privilege. Congress 
has, in essence, commanded them to review and catalog nu-
merous documents that are undoubtedly privileged and to do 
. so over the objection of the holder of the privilege. Given I 
that fact, there is no doubt that the Presidential privilege of 
~> one;pccupant of that office will have been rendered a nullity 
) "':; by an act of Congress.14 
E 
There remains another inquiry under the issue of separa~ 
tion of powers. Does the fact that the Act applies only to a 
former President after he has left office justify what would 
otherwise be an unlawful measure if applicable to , ~n 
incumbent? 
On the face of it, congressional regulation of the papers 
of a former President ~ ill have a less directly disruptive j lJl-
pact on the on-going operations of an i ncumbent President 
than an effort at regulation or control over current White 
House papers of the incumbent. But even if we characterized 
this as "remoteness," it does not by any means eliminate the 
three principal separation-of-powers aefects. First, the prin-
be at liberty to repla.ce all Executive Branch officials with persons 
who, for political reasons, enjoy the President's trust and .confidence. 
Elrod v. Burns; 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
1'l I cannot accept. the argument pressed by appellees tha.t review is 
rendered harmless by the fact that many of the documents may not be 
protected b~· Presidential privilege. How "harmless" review justifies 
manifestly "hnrmful" rc·view e,;ca.pes me. Moreover, I regard as cynical 
the Governmcni.'i,; argumrnt that the former President "commingled" 
all th~ papen; and lwnce is foreclosed from complaining. Every 
)Iember of thi :; Court "cq!Jllllingles" persQnal and judicial papers in 
thif; i-;<;ni;e, 
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ciple that a President must be free from coercion should apply 
to a former President, so long as Congress is inquiring or act-
ing with respect to operations of the government while the 
former President was in office.1 ~ 
To the extent Congress is empowered to coerce a former 
President, every future President is at risk of denial of a la.rge 
measure of the autonomy and independence contemplated by 
the Constitution and of the confidentiality attending it. 
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926). Indeed, the 
President, if he is to have autonomy while in office, needs the 
assurance that Con ress will not immediate} be endow w th 
full wer to coerce im to o en a les .nd ords and 
give an account of residential actions at the instant his 




successor is sworn in.10 Absent the validity of the expecta-
tion of privacy of such papers (save for a subpoena, under 
United States v. Nixon, supra), future Presidents and those ~ 
they consult must inevitably take into account the possibility >( d.tl,. ,.,.#'1,4,.._,,.~ 
that their most confidential correspondence, work papers, and 1~ , ,,! -;-
diaries may well be open to government review, with no time '~ ~ 
limit, should they in some way arouse the ire of Congress. J ~  
The consequences of this development on what a President . ~- . ~ I 
expresses to others in writing and orally are incalculable; ~ WJIII"'~ ~ 
perhaps even more crucial is the inhibiting impw;t on those to 
whom the President turns for information and for counsel, 
whether they are officials in the government, business or labor 
leaders, or foreign diplomats and statesmen. (The Act has 
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no doubt been the sub· ect of careful scrutiny and analysis in 
the foreign offi~ s of other countries w ose representa 1ves 
speak to a 'president on matters they will not put in writing, 
but which may be memorialized by a President or an aide.') 
Similarly,.Title I may well be a "ghost" at future White House 
conferences, with conferees choosing their words more cau-
tiously because of the enlarged prospect of their being made 
known to others. We carefully took this into account 'in 
United States v. Nixon, supra: 
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality 
of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of 
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has 
all the values to which we accord deference for the 
privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the 
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, 
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presiden-
tial decision-making." 418 U. S., at 708. 
Second, although a President may have left office, it is 
clear that legislation as to his Presidential papers is still a 
legislative exercise of what have historically been rega.rded as 
executive powers. Presidential papers do not, after all, in-
stantly lose their nature quadrenniaUy at high noon on a 
January 20. Moreover, under the challenged Act it is now 
the Congress, not the incumbent President,17 that has decided 
17 The fact that the President signs a bill into law, and thereafter 
defends it, without, more, does not mean of course tha.t, the policy· 
rrnboclied in the legislation is that of the President, nor does it even 
rnra n that. the President personally approves of the measure. When 
~igning a bill int.a law, numerous Presidents have actually expressed 
disagreement with the legislation but felt const.rained for a variety of 
rrasons to permit. the bill to becomr law. President. Roosevelt repudiated 
the "Lovett. Ridrr" later ,;truck down by this Court. in Lovett v. 
r·11ited States. 328 U.S. 303, 325 (1946). President Ford did not. request 
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what to do, not with "public" papers generally, but with all 
the papers of one named former President. 
Third, it is conceded by the Government that Presidential / 
privilege, a vital incident of our separation-of-powers system, 
does not terminate instantly upon a President's departure 
from office. The Government candidly acknowledges, "the 
pri_vile/l.e 5~the. iµ divj dual f.ry§identzJ ten w e," Brief, 
at 33, because of the vital public interests underlying the 
privilege. This principle, as all parties concede, finds explicit 
sy,pport in_history; former President Truman in 1953 refused 
to provfcte7n1"d'rmation to the Congress on matt~ ccurring 
during his Administration: 
"It must be obvious to you that if the doctrine of 
separation of powers and the independence of the Presi-
dency is to have any validity at all, it must be equally ap-
plicable to a President after his term of office has expired 
when he is sought to be examined with respect to any 
a.cts occurring while he [ was] President." 120 Cong. 
Rec. 17994 (1974). (Emphasis supplied.) 18 
Indeed, to assure institutional integrity and confidentiality, 
Presidents and their advisers must have assurance, as do 
,i udges and Members of Congress, that their internal com-
munications will not become subject to retroactive legislation 
calling for intrusions into matters as to which there was a 
well-founded expectation of privacy when the communications 
took place. Just as Mr. Truman pointedly rejected Con-
gressional power to inquire of him as to his Presidential 
activities a.fter he has left office, this Court has always assumed 
that the immunity conferred by the Speech or Debate Clause 
is available to a Member of Congress after he has left office. 
United States v. Brewster, SU'f)'ra. It would therefore be 
1 ' Sinr<' by definition the concern is with former Presidents, I see no 
ili~tinrtion in Congre:;:;' seeking t.o compel the appea.ranoe and testimony 
<ll a former Pre;;ident and in, alternatively, seeking to compel the 
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illogical to conclude that the President loses all immunity 
from legislative coercion as to his Presidential papers from 
the moment he leaves office. 
The discussion of se a 10n of powers concerns, of course, 
the structure of government, not the rights of the sole individ~ 
ual ostensibly affected by this legislation. But Title I of the 
Act before us touches not only upon the independence of a 
coordinate branch of government, it also affects, in the most 
direct way, the basic rights of one named individual. The 
statute J2,ro':ides, as we have seen, for governmental custQ_dy 
~ r-and revie~ of-all of the former President's written a d 
recorded m terials at t e time he e o ce me u m diary 
recordin an conversat10ns m 1s private residences outside 
Was mgton, D. C. 1 1 (a 
The District Court was deeply troubled by this admittedly 
unprecedented intrusion. Its opinion candidly acknowledged 
that the personal-privacy claim was the "most troublesome" 
point raised by this unique statute.10 In addition to com~ 
munications and memoranda reflecting the President's con~ 
fidential deliberations, the District Court admitted that the 
materials subject to GSA review included highly personal 
communications. 
"Among all of the papers and tape recordings falling 
within the Act, however, are some papers and materials 
containing extremely private communications between 
[Mr. Nixon] and, among others, his wife, his daughters, 
his physician, lawyer, and clergyman, and his close friends, 
as well as personal diary dictabelts and his wife's personal 
:t1J The District Court concluded its discussion of the privacy challenge 
as follows: "We would be less than candid were we to state that we 
find it as easy to dispose of Mr. Nixon's privacy claims as hjs claim 
of presidential privilege." App., at 87a. 
' ) 
s /-.,1.,.~ f-1,cM._4.,...., 
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files. Segregating those that are private from those that ,,...., J.1-;1 
are not private requires rather comprehensive screening, ~ J,,,,..,, 
and archivists entrusted with that duty will be required rr-------r 
to read or listen to private communications." App., at ~""'.-.,'-1 
71a. A 1,,aA,.lcdJ.. ? ) 
Given this admitted intr~ ion, the legislation before us 
must be subjected to the most searc.fii'ng '.kmct of udl.cial 
scrutmy. a utes t a renc on un amental Ii rties, like -those affecting significantly the structure of our government, 
are not entitled to the same pr~~umption of constitutionality 
we normally accord legislation. Moore v. City of East Cleve-
l.il!!;_d,~ lip op., at 3-4. The burdeii of justHicat10n l.s r(,Jversed; 
the burden rest upon government, not on the individual 
whose liberties are a ecte , to Justify the measure. Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education, No. 75-1153 (concurring opin-
ion). We recently reaffirmed the standard or review in such 
cases as one of "exacting scrutiny." 
"We long have recognized that significant encroach-
ments on First Amendment rights of the sort that com-
pelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere 
showing of some legitimate governmental interest ... 
[W] e have required that the subordinating interests of 
20 Although the District Court expressly concluded tha.t the fonner 
President, had a "legitimate expectation" that his Presidential materials 
would not be subject to "compulsive review by government personnel 
without his consent," App., at 74a-75a, the Court nonetheless deemed 
the compulsory intrusion permissible given the constitutionality of the 
federal wiretap stat.ute, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520, which of course 
permits substantial governmental intrusions into the privacy of individuals. 
Not only is this analogy imperfect, as the District Court, itself admitted, 
id., at Sla., but this analysis fails to apply the "exacting scrutiny" 
called for by our decisions. Above all, the present statute fails to 
provide any of the stringent :,;afeguards, including a warrant, mandated 
by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act. Indeed, the District 
C0\1.rt, flatly admitted as much. App., at Sla,. 
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the State must survive exacting scrutiny." Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 64 (1976). 
B 
Constitutional analysis must, of course, take fully into 
account the nature of the Government's interests underlying 
challenged legislation. Once those interests are identified, we 
must then focus on the nature of the individual interests af-
fected by the statute. Id., at 14-15. Finally, we must de-
cide whether the Government's interests are of sufficient 
weight to subordinate the individual's interests, and, if so, 
whether the Government has nonetheless employed unneces-
. sarily broad means for achieving its purposes. Lamont v. 
Postmast-er General, 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring). 
Two governmental interests are asserted as the justification 
for this statute: to ensure the general efficiency of the Execu-
tive Branch's operations 21 and to preserve historically signi-
ficant papers and tape recordings for posterity.22 Both these 
21 Administrative efficiency is obviously a highly desirable goal. See, 
e. g., Dixon v. Love, Slip op., at 9; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 
347-349 (1976). However, I am constrained to recall that "adminis-
trative efficiency" has not uniformly been regarded as of "overriding 
importance." Indeed, claims of administrative efficiency ha,ve been 
r,wiftly dismissed a,t times as mere "bald assertion[s]." Richardson v. 
Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 222 (1972) (BRENNAN, ,T., dissenting). Numerous 
other opinions ha,ve held that individual interests, including t.he right to 
welfare payments, '·clearly outweigh" government interests in promoting 
"administrative efficiency," Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970) 
(BRENNAN, J.). And, MH. JUSTICE MARSHALL in Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969), stated that when "fundamental" rights a.re 
at stake, such as the "right to travel," government must demonst,rate 
a "compelling" interest, not merely a "rational relationship between 
[the underlying statute] and [the] .. . admit.tedly permissible state 
objectives . . . ." 
2·2 The initial interest in prer,erving tJ1e materials for judicial purposes 
has diminished substantially. Since the Special -Prosecutor has disclajmed 
any fl_lrther interest in the ma,teria.ls for purposes of pos.sible criminal 
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purposes are legitimate and important. Yet, there was no 
Berious suggestion by Congress that the operations of the 
Executive Branch would actually be impaired unless, contrary 
to nearly 200 years' past pra.ctice, all Presidential papers of 
the one named incumbent were required by law to be im-
pounded in the sole control of government agents. The stat-
ute on its face, moreover, does not purport to address a partic-
ularized need, such as the need to Se<)ure Presidential papers 
concerning the Middle East, the SALT talks, or problems in 
Panama.23 Indeed, the congressionally perceived "need" is a 
fa.r more "generalized need" than that rejected in United 
States v. Nixon by a unanimous Court. 
As to the interest in preserving historical materials, there 
is nothing whatever in our national experience to suggest that 
existing mechanisms, such as the 20-year-old Presidential 
Libraries Act, were insufficient to achieve that purpose.24 In 
·any event, the interest in preserving "historical materials" 
·cannot justify seizing, without notice or hearing, private papers 
preliminary to a line-by-line examination by government 
.~ I In contrast to Congress' purposes underlying the statute, 
this Act intrudes significantly on two areas of traditional 
invest.igations, the only conceivably rema.ining judicial need is to preserve 
the materials for possible use in civil litigation between private parties. 
The admittedly important interests in the enforcement of the criminal 
law, recognized in United States v. Nixon, supra, are no longer pressed 
by the Government. 
23 If there were a particula,rized need, the statute suffers from greater 
overbreadth than others we have inva.Jidated. 
2 4 At, the time the statute was passed, appellant had made tentative 
arrangements with the University of Southern California in Los Angeles 
for the establishment of a Presidential Library, under the terms of the 
Presidential Libraries Act,. Appendix, a,t 167-168. That has now 
r ipened into a formal agreement so that in the event Title I is invalidated, 
appellant 's historical materials will be housed in a facility on the USC 
campus under terms applicable to other _fresident.ial Libraries of _pa.&t 
Presidents. 
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privacy interests of Presidents. One embraces Presidential 
papers relating to his decisions, development of policies, ap-
pointments, and communications in his role as leader of a 
political party; the other encompasses purely private matters 
of family, property, investments, diaries and intimate con-
versations. Both interests are of the highest order, with 
perhaps some primacy for family papers.25 Cf. Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, Slip op., at 4. 
Title I thus touches directly on what MR. JUSTICE PowELL 
once referred to as the "intimate areas of an individual's 
personal affairs," California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 
21, 78 (concurring opinion). The papers in both of these 
areas-family and political decisionmaking-are of the most 
private na.ture, enjoying an almost sacred status under our 
law. MR. JusTICE BR~NNAN recently put it this way: "Per- , 
sonal letters ?onstitute a_n integral aspect of a person's private 
enclave." Fisher v. United Sta.tes, 425 U. S. 391, 427 (1976) 
(concurring opinion). An individual's papers, he said, are 
"an extension of his person." Id., at 4~0. 'MR. ·JusTICE 
MARSHALL made the same point: "Dairies and personal ·let~ I 
ters that record orily their author's personal thoughts lie at 
the heart of our sense of privacy." Couch v. United -States, 
409 U. S. 322, 350 (1973). In discussing private papers, he 
ref erred even more emphatically to the "deeply held belief 
on the part of the Members of this Court throughout its his~ 
tory that there are certain documents no person ought to be 
compelled to produce at the Government's request." Fisher 
v. United States, supra, at 431-432. This echoes Lord Cam-
den's oft-quoted description of personal papers as a man's 
"dearest property." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S., at 628 
(1885). (I have frequently quoted this in distinguishing· 
"papers" from weapons and contraband. See, e. g., Stone y .. 
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 497-498 (concurring opinion).) 
25 Intru:;iom; i11to bu:;iness premises, however, implicate privacy -in-
terr:;t;; consistently protected by this Court. See G. M. Leci~ing Corp .. 
v. United States, No, 75-235\ decicled.Januaq, 121 1977.. 
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One point emerges clearly: the papers here involve the 
most fundamental First and Fourth Amendment interests. 
Since the Act asserts exclusive government custodY. over 
all papers of a former President, the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is surely 
implicated.20 Indeed, where papers or books are the subject 
of a government intrusion, our cases uniformly hold that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition against a general search re-
quires that warrants contain descriptions reflecting "the most 
scrupulous exactitude ... ," Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 
476, 485 (1965). Those cases proscribe general language in a 
warrant-or a statute-of "indiscriminate sweep .... " Id., 
at 486. Title I , commanding seizure followed by permanent 
control of all materials having "historical or commemora-
tive value," evidences the "indiscriminate sweep" we have long 
denounced. This "broad broom" statute provides virtually 
no standa.rd at all to guide the government agents combing 
through the papers; the agents are left to roam a.t large 
through confidential materials, something to which no other 
President, no Member of Congress ~r of the Judicial Branch 
has been subjected. 
In addition to Fourth Amendment considerations, highly 
important First Amendment interests pervade all Presidential 
papers, since they include expressions of privately held views 
about politics, diplomacy or peoplr of all walks of life, within 
a.nd outside this country. The former President's freedom of 
association is also implicated, since his recordings and papers 
will likely reveal much aboµt his relationships with both in-
20 The fact tha.t GSA initially secured possession of the Presidential 
paper::; through the agreement with the former President does not change 
the fact that t,he agency wru; commanded by Congress to take exclusive 
custody of and retain all Presidential historical materials. Moreover, 
ewryone admits that the Act contemplates a careful screening process 
b~· government, agent:;. The fact that the governmental intrusion is non-
criminal in n,tture does not, of course, render the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibit ions inapplicable. See South Dakota v. Opperman1 428 U. S. 
:3 14 (1976) . 
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dividuals and organizations. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 
U. S. 449, 462 (1958), the Court said: 
"This Court has recognized the vital relationship between 
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations." 
Thus, in passing on a statute compelling disclosure of political 
contributions, the Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, imposed the 
strict standard of "exacting scrutiny" because of the signifi .. 
cant impact on First Amendment rights. 
The fact that the former President was an important na,.. ) 
tional and world political figure obviously does not diminish 
the traditional priva.cy interest in his papers. Forced dis--
closure of private information, even to Government officials, 
is by no means sanctioned by this Court's decisions, except for 
the most compelling reasons. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, - U. S, 
-- (1977). I do not tl)ink, for example, that this Court 
would readily sustain, as a condition to holding public office, 
a requirement that a candidate reveal publicly membership in 
every organization, religious, social, or pol~tic~l. After aU, 
our decision in NAACP v. Alabama, supra, was presumably 
intended to protect from compelled disclosure members of 
the organization who were actively involved in public affairs 
or who held public office in Alabama. 
C 
In short, a former President up to now has had essentially 
the same expectation of privacy with respect to his papers: 
and records as every other person. This expectation is 
soundly based on two factors: first, under our constitutional 
t raditions, Presidential papers have been, for more than 180 
years, deemed by the Congress to belong to the President. 
Congress ratified this tradition by specific acts: (a,) Congres-
sional appropriations following authoriza.tion to purchase, 
Presidential papers; (b) Congressional enactment of a non-
mandatory system of Presidential libraries; and ( c) statutes 
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papers of Presidents donated to the United States or to 
nonprofit institutions. 
Second, in the absence of any legislation to the contrary, 
there was no reason whatever for a President to take time 
from his official duties to ensure that there was no "commin-
gling" of "public" and private papers. Indeed, the fact that 
the former President commingled Presidential and private 
family papers, absent any then-existing laws to the contrary, 
points strongly to the conclusion that he did in fact have an 
expectation of privacy with respect to both categories of 
papers, based on constitutional principles, on Acts of Con-
gress and on common law. 
On the basis of this Court's holdings, I am unable to under-
stand why the former President's privacy interests do not 
outweigh the generalized, undifferentiated goals sought to be 
achieved by this unique statute. Without a more carefully I 
defined focus, these legislative goals do not represent "para-
mount government interests," to use MR. JUSTICE PowELL's 
term in his concurring opinion in Abood, supra, nor is this 
particular piece of legislation needed to achieve those goals, 
even if we assume, arguendo, they are of a "compelling" or 
"overriding" nature. But even if other Members of the Court 
strike the balance differently , the Government has nonetheless 
failed to choose narrowly tailored means of ca.rrying out its 
purposes so as not to unnecessarily invade important First and 
Fourth Amendment liberties. The Court demanded no.less in 
Buckley v. Valeo, supa, and nothing less will do here. Cf. 
Hynes v. Mayor of Borough of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610, 620 
(1976). 
The Government points to two factors as mitigating the 
effects of this admitted intrusion. First, in its view, most 
of the President's papers and conversations relate to the 
business of government, rather than to personal or family 
matters. Second, the intrusion is limited as much as possible, 
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Even if the Government has a valid interest in identifying 
the governmentally related papers in order to preserve them 
for histprical purposes, that interR.._t., canpJU,.jus.tif>:: a seizure ( 
and sear~h oLeJ,. the. papers taken here. Since compulsory 
review oTpersonal a nd family papers and tape recordings is an 
admittedly improper invasion of privacy, no constitutional 
principle justifies an intrusion into admittedly protected areas 
in order to carry out the "generalized" sta,tutory objective. 
Second, the intrusion cannot be saved by the credentials, I 
however impeccable, of the government a.gents. The initial 
problem with this justification is that no one knows whether 
these agents are, as the Government contends, uniformly 
discreet. Despite the lip service pa.id by the District Court 
and appellees to the record of archivists generally, there is 
nothing before us to justify the conclusion that each of the 
more than 100 persons who will have access to, and will 
monitor and examine, the materials is indeed reliably discreet.
1 The Act, furthermore, provides GSA with no mea,ningf ul st_!l,ndard,§, to minimize the extent of intrusions ·upon appel-lant's privacy. We are thus faced with precisely the same 
standardless discretion vested in governmental officials which 
this Court has unhesitatingly struck down in other First 
Amendment areas. See, e. g., Hynes v. ·Mayor of Borough 
of Oradell, supra. In the absence of any meaningful statutory 
standards. which might help secure the privacy interests at 
stake, I question whether we ca.n assume, as a matter of law, 
that government agents will be able to formulate for them-
selves constitutionally valid standards of review in examin-
ing, segregating and cataloging the papers of the former 
President. 
Nor does the possibility that, had Title I not been passed, 
appellant would perhaps use government specialists to help 
classify and catalog his papers eliminate the objections to this 
intrusion. Had appellant, like all his recent predecessors, 
been permitted to deposit his papers in a Presidential library, 
government archivists would have been working directly under 
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11,ppellant's guidance and direction, not solely that of Congress 
or GSA. He, not Congress, would have established standards 
for preservation, to ensure that traditional privacy would 
be protected. Similarly, he would have been able to partici-
pate personally in the reviewing process and could th us assure 
that any governmental review of purely personal papers was 
minimized or entirely eliminated. He, not Congress, would 
have controlled the selection of which experts, if any, would 
have access to his papers. Finally, and most important, the 
"intrusion" would have been consented to, eliminating any 
constitutional question. But the possibility of a consent 
intrusion cannot, under our law, justify a nonconsensual 
invasion. Actual consent is required, cf. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218 ( 1973), not the mere possibility of 
consent under drastically different circt~mstances. 
Finally, even if the government agents are completely dis-
creet, they are still government officials charged with review-
ing highly private papers and tape recordings. Unless we are 
to say that a police seizure and examination of private papers 
is justified by the "impeccable" record of a discreet police 
officer, I have considerable difficulty understanding how a 
compulsory review of admittedly private papers by govern-
ment agents is constitutionally permissible. 
III 
BILL OF ATTAINDER 
A 
Under Art. I , § 9, cl. 3, as construed and applied by this 
Court since the time of Chief Justice Ml\.rshall, Title I violates 
the Bill of Attainder Clause. In contrast to Title II of the 
Act, which establishes a National Study Commission to study 
questions concerning the preservation of records of all Fedetal 
officials, Title I commands the Ad1ninistrator to seize all tape 
recordings "involv[ing] former President Richard M. Nixon 
~nd all Presidential historic.al materials of Richard M. 
'v 
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Nixon .... " § 101 (a)(l), (b)(l). By contrast with Title 
II, which is general legislation, "Title I is special legislation 
sjngling out one individual as the target. 
Title I must therefore be tested against the prohibition 
of Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Although the prohibition against bills 
of attainder has been addressed only infrequently by this 
Court, it is now settled beyond dispute that a bill of attainder, 
within the meaning of Art. I, · is, li~e double jeopardy, by 
no means the same as a bill of ~ttainder at common law. 
The definition departed frolll the common-law concept very 
early in our history, in a most fundamental way. At com-
mon law, the bill was a legislative death sentence. Anything 
Jess than death was not a bill of attainder, but was, rather, 
"a bill of pains and penalties." This restrictive definition was 
recognized tangentially in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cran ch 
137, 179 (1803),27 but the Court soon thereafter rejected 
conclusively any notion that only a legislative death sentence 
or legislatively imposed incarceration on nitmed individuals fell 
within the prohibition. Chief Justice Marshall firmly settled 
the matter in 1810, holding that legislative punishment in the 
form of a deprivation of property was prohibited by the Bill 
of Attainder Clause : 
"A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, 
or may confiscate his property, or may do both.'> 
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138 (1810). (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The same point was made 17 years later in Ogden v. Saunders,. 
12 Wheat. 213, 286 (1827), where the Court stated: 
"By classing bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and 
n "The constitution declares that no 'bill of atta.inder or ex post facto, 
law shall be passed.' 
" If, however , such a bill should be passed and a person should be 
prosecuted under it, must the court condemn to death those victililS' 
whom the constitu.tion endeavors to .{>resetv~." Marbur11 v. MadisQT!.,, 
:Jtt 179, 
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laws impairing the obligation of contracts together, the 
general intent becomes very a.ppa.rent; it is a general 
provision against arbitrary and tyrannical legislation over 
existing rights, whether of person or property." (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
It is clear beyond doubt, therefore, tha.t in interpreting Art. I, 
~ 9, cl. 3, neither incarceration nor death is a requisite element 
of bills of attainder. More than 100 years ago this Court 
struck down statutes which had the effect of preventing 
defined c11tegories of persons from practicing their profes-
sions. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 177 (1866) (a priest); 
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1966) (a lawyer). Those 
two cases established more broadly that "punishment" for 
purposes of bills of attainder is not limited to criminal sanc-
tions; rather, "[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil, or politi-
cal, previously enjoyed, may be punishment .... " 4 Wall., 
at 320. 
Chief Justice Warren pointed out that the Constitution, in 
prohibiting bills of attainder, did not envision "a narrow, tech-
nical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition ... . " 
United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 442 (1965). To the 
contrary, the evil was a legislatively imposed deprivation of 
existing rights, including property rights, directed at named 
individuals. Mr. Justice Black, in United States v. Lovett, 
328 U. S. 303, 316 (1946) , stated that: 
" [The cases] stand for the proposition that legislative 
acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to 
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members 
of a group in such a way as to infli,ct punishment on them 
without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by 
the Constitution." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The only "punishment" in Lovett, .in fact, was the deprivation 
of Lovett's salary as a government employee-an indirect 
pmiishment for his "bad" associations. 
•' 
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Under our cases, therefore, bills of attainder require two 
elements: first, a specific designation of persons or groups as 
subjects of the legislation, and, second, a Garland, Cummings, 
Lovett-type deprivation, including of property rights, without 
notice, trial or other hearing. No one disputes that Title I 
of the Act before us suffers from the first infirmity, since it 
applies only to one former President. The issue that remains 
is whether there has been a legislatively mandated deprivation 
of an existing right. 
B 
Since George Washington's Presidency, our constitutional l 
tradition, without a single exception, has treated Presidential 
papers as the President's personal pro rty. This view has 
been congressionally an JU ic1a y ratI ed, both as to the 
ownership of Presidential papers, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 
342 (C. C. D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J., sitting as Circuit 
Justice), and, by the practice of Justices as to ownership of 
their judicial papers. 
Congress itself has consistently legislated on this assump-
tion. I have noted earlier that appropriation legislation has 
been enacted on various occasions providing for Congress' 
purchase of Presidential papers. See Hearings on H. J. Res. 
330, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1955). Those hearings led 
Congress to establish a nonmandatory system of Presidential 
libraries, again explicitly recognizing that Presidential papers 
were the personal property of the Chief Executive. In the 
floor debate on that measure, Congressman John Moss, a 
supporter of the legislation, stated: "Finally, it should be 
remembered that Presidential papers belong to the Presi-
dent .... " 101 Cong. Rec. 9935 (1955). Indeed, in 1955 
in testimony pertaining to this proposed legislation, the 
Archivist of the United States confirmed that: 
"The papers of the Presidents have always been considered 
to be their personal property, both during their in-
QlJ,mb~ncy a,nd Mterward. This bas the sanction of law 
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and custom and has never been authoritatively chal-
lenged." Hearing on H. J. Res. 330, 84th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 32 (1955). 
Similt\-rly, the GSA Administrator testified: 
"As a matter of ordinary practice, the President has 
removed his papers from the White House at the end 
of his term. This has been in keeping with the tradition 
and the fact that the 'f)Q,pers are the personal property 
of the retiring Presidents." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Hearing on H. J. Res. 330, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 
(1955). 
In keeping with this background, it was not surprising that 
the Attorney General stated in an opinion in September 
1974: 
"To conclude that such materials are not the prop-
erty of former President Nixon would be to reverse what 
has apparently been the almost universal understanding 
of all three branches of Government since the beginning 
of the Republic, and to call into question the practices 
of our Presidents from the earliest times." Appendix, 
at 220-221. 
I see no escape, therefore, from the qonclusion that, on the 
basis of more than 180 years' history, the former President 
has been deprived of a property right enjoyed by all Presi-
dents after leaving office, namely, the control of his Presi-
dential papers. 
Even more starkly, Title I deprives only one former Presi-
dent of the right vested by statute in other former Presi-
dents by the 1955 Act-the right to have a Presidential 
Library at a facility of his own choosing for the deposit 
of such Presidential papers as he unilaterally selects.28 Title 
28 While he was President, Lyndon Johnson wrote the following to 
t,lle GSA Administrator : "[S]ince the President ... is the recipient 
' Ii' 
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I did not purport to repeal the Presidential Libraries Act: 
that statute remains in effect, available to present a,nd future 
Presidents, and has already been av.ailed of by former Presi-
dent Ford. The operative effect of Title I, therefore, is . to 
-exclude, by name, one former President and deprive him 
of what his predecessors- and his successor-have already 
been allowed. This invokes what Mr. Ju.stice Black said. in 
Lovett, supra, could not be constitutio1ially done: 
"Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the 
danger inherent in speci,al legisla,tive acts which ·take 
away the life, liberty, or property of particular named 
persons because the legislature thinks them guilty · of 
conduct which deserves punishment. They intended to 
safeguard the people of this country from punishment 
without trial by duly constituted courts." 328 U. S.1 
at 317. (Emphasis supplied.) 
But apart from Presidential papers generally, Title I on 
its face contemplates that even the former President's purely 
family and persona,} papers and tape recordings are like\Xise 
t o be taken into custody for whatever period of time is re-
quired for review. Some items, such a.s the originals ,, of 
tape recordings of the former President's conversations, will 
never be returned to him under the Act. ' 
I need not, and do not, inquire into the motives of Con .. 
gress in imposing this deprivation on only one named person, 
Our cases plainly hold that retribution and vindictiveness ar& 
not requisite elements of a bill of attainder. Chief Justice 
of many confidences from others, and since the inviolability of such 
confidence is essential to the funct.ioning of the constitutional office of 
t,he Presidency, it will be necessa.ry to withhold from public scrutiny 
certain papers and classes of papers for varying periods of time. There-
fore . . . I re.;erve the right, to restrict the use and avajlability of 
any materials . . . for such time as I, in my solP discretion, may . .•. 
specify . . . . " Hearing on H. ,J. Res. 632, Subcomm. of House GoverP,-: 
nient Operations Comm., 89th Con~s., ls~~~., l7 (1965) •. 
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Warren in Brown v. United States, supra, concluded, for ex-
tt,mple, that retributive motives on the part of Congress were 
irrelevant to bill-of-attainder analysis. To the contrary, he 
said flatly: It would be archaic to limit the definition of 
punishment to 'retribution.' " Indeed, he expressly noted that 
bills of attainder had historically been enacted for regulatory 
,or preventive purposes: 
"Historical considerations by no means compel restric-
tion of the bill of attainder ban to instances of retribu-
tion. A number of English bills of attainder were 
enacted for preventive purposes-that is, the legislature 
made a judgment, undoubtedly based largely on past acts 
and associations ... that a given person or group was 
likely to cause trouble ... and therefore inflicted depriva-
tions upon that person or group in order to keep it from 
bringing about the feared event.'' 381 U. S., at 458-459. 
Under the long line of our decisien.s, therefore, 'the Court 
·has the heavy burden of demonstrating that legislation whi~h 
·singles out one named individual for deprivation-without a,ny 
procedural safeguards-of what had for nearly 200 years been 
treated by all three Branches of government as private prop-
. erty, can survive the prohibition of the Bill of Attainder 
· Clause. In deciding this case, the Court provides-or it will 
reject-the basis for a future Congress to enact yet another 
'Title I, directed at some future former President, or a Mem-
ber of the House or the Senate because the individual has 
incurred public disfavor, and that of the Congress. Cf. 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969). As in Brown 
v. United States, SU'f)1"a, Title I of the present statute, in 
contrast to Title II, does "not set forth a generally applicable 
rule . .. .'' 381 U. S., at 450; it is beyond doubt special 
legislation doing precisely the evil against which the prohibi-
tions of the "bill of attainder, ex post facto laws and laws 
impairing the obligation of contracts .. ;" were aimed. 12 
"Wheat., at 286. ,_ ,.. __ _ 
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IV 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS :--t ,,-, .... ..J 
Title I of the
5 
statute "rails to provide any procedural 
safeguards, either before or after seizure of the Presidential 
papers. As I have previously suggested, under an unbroken 
constitutional tradition, Presidential papers belong to the 
President. Moreover, the lact that Congress, until receii tly, 
by its tax laws permitted a charitable-contribution deduction 
for donation of public papers-including gifts to the United 
States-confirms the solid basis for the expectation of every 
President that the Presidential papers belong to the 
Preeident.20 
In another context, MR. JusTICE STEWART once noted: 
"'[P]roperty' denotes a broad range of interests that are 
secured by 'existing rules or understandings.' " Perry 
v. Sinderrnann, 408 U. S. 593, 601 (1972). 
Again, in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 
(1972), he stated: 
"It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to 
protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily 
lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.)) 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Under our cases, where this kind of interest is recognized 
by statute/0 an individual must be afforded adequate proce-
211 This longshlJlding tax benefit, which was utilized by a large number 
of public officials, including former Presidents Tnunan, Eisenhower, and 
,Tohnson, and possibly others, was eliminated under the comprehensive 
Ta.x Reform Act of 1969. The change was effected by changing the-
definition of a "capital asset" under § 1221 (3) to exclude "a letter· 
or memorandum .... ", coupled with an amendment of § 170 of the 
Codr, governing charitable contributions. Under amended § 170 (e), 
there is no longer a tax benefit, of any consequence in donating "letters 
or memoranda," which are now ordinary a8Sf'ts for ta.x purposes. 
30 In addition to tlw longstanding charitable-contribution deduction 
pcrmiUed ur stn.tut,c 1,1ntil 1969, Hl)pellaut Wi\S, throughout his tenur~ 
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dural safeguards to assure that he will not arbitrarily be 
deprived of an interest such as MR. JusTICE STEWART de-
scribed. Compare Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), 
and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), with Meachum 
v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), and Montayne v. Haymes, 
427 U. S. 326 (1976). Title I fails to provide hornbook ele-
ments of procedural due process as required by these cases. 
The Act at the outset directs the Administrator to retain 
only those recordings and papers which are "the Presidential 
historical materials of Richard M. Nixon.'' All other papers, 
at least impliedly, are to be returned. · § 104 (a)(7). The 
statute recognizes that the former President has a property 
interest in all the papers presently in GSA custody which 
the agency ultimately determines not to have historical value, 
Thus, the statute leaves the determination of whether mate~ 
rials are of historical importance wholly in the hands of gov-
ernment agents. 
There is no provision in the Act permitting the former 
President to be heard in this decision-making process. The 
question whether certain ma.terials have 11historical" or "com-
memorative" value, as defined by 44 U.S. C. § 2101, can surely 
be a difficult one. Letters of a high public official to his 
wife, children or intimate friends and political associates may 
well be far more fascinating to historia,ns than materials on 
economics, tax or welfare reform. Moreover, determination of 
ns President, entitled to rely upon the provisions of the Presidential 
Libraries Act, which was not repealed by Title I. The net effect of tl1e 
present statute, in fact., is to permit, every former President except 
appellant to est,ablish a Library, at a facility of his choosing, for the 
housing of his Presidential papers. 
That appellnnt relied upon the provisions of tJ1e Presidential Libra.ries 
Act prior to the passage of Title I is clear beyond doubt. Under the 
11.~reement with t,he GSA Administrator, dated Sept. 6, 1974, appellant 
expr<'SS!y mdicated hi;; intent to deposit his papers in a "permanent 
PresidPntial archival depository as provide4 for in 44 U. S. C. Section 
J106, " Appendix, ,1.t 110, 
·' 
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the issue of historical significance requires a highly sophisti-
cated appraisal; probably, a substantial portion of the mate-
rials falls into a gray area as to which historians may 
disagree. 
Any individual whose property interests will be affected 
by this kind of a government determination must--at least 
so we have held up to now-be given a.n opportunity to be 
heard. Mullane v. Cen_trai ·Hanover Bank, 339 U. S. · 306 
(1950). Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said, the "right to· be 
heard before being condemned to suffer grievious loss of any 
kind, .even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships 
of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society;" 
Joint Anti-Facist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 122, 168 
(1951) (concurring opinion). Title I provides no such 
opportunity. 
A second objection from the due process perspective ia 
that the screening process fails to accommodate adequately 
the constitutionally protected rights to privacy and free as-
eociation, a matter I have 'discussed earlier. ·The Court has 
held repeatedly that the process which is due in a particular 
case must be tailored to fit the needs and interests involved. 
See, e. g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S., at 481. This re-
quires a weighing of the competing interests, with special 
deference being given to fundamental personal and privacy 
interests. In light of those competing interests, due process 
procedural requirements are to be interposed "at a meaning-
ful time and in a meaningful manner:" Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U. S. 545, 552 (1963). 
No meaningful procedure whatever is provided by this ex-
traordinary statute. Even accepting the notion that screening 
by trained government agents was otherwise constitutiona.lly 
unobjectionable, Titlf' I's procedure is plainly violative of due 
process standards because of its destructively intrusive effects 
upon appellant's fundamental interests in property, privacy 
and free association, As we previously noted, ante, at 16., 
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everyone concedes that included in the materials seized are 
many of appellant's most private and personal papers. In 
screening the materials to determine what papers have suffi-
cient historical value to justify permanent control by the 
Government, the government agents wHl be required to read 
such personal communications, thereby intruding into the 
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944). 
There is nothing inevitable about this process. Nothing in 
the Government's interest fn selecting historically significant 
materials requires wholesale seizure and screening of a former 
government official's private papers. Dµe process, in my view, 
requires a procedure far more closely tajlored to accommodate 
the fundamental privacy interests involved. 
A third obj~ction to the procedure here is that no time 
restraints are pla.ced upon GSA's decision-making process. 
This Court has consistently recognized that when dealing with 
First Amendment interests, the timing of the governmental 
decision-making process is crucial. Thus, in Freedman v. 
Mary/,a,nd, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), the Court, through MR. 
JusTICE BRENNAN, invalidated a motion picture censorship 
statute for failing to provide for a prompt resolution of ques-
tions concerning a film's legality, so that constitutionally 
protected material could be swiftly freed from governmental 
restraints and restored to its lawful owner. Even more 
clearly, in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 727 (1961), 
the Court, again speaking through MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, 
invalidated certain obscenity confiscation procedures because 
two months had gone by without a determination of the 
material's status. 
As I pointed out earlier, appellant's interest in materials 
containing private communications with his family and with 
other individuals has clear First Amendment origins. Cf. 
Stanley v. Georg'm, 394 U. S. 557 (1969). Under Freedman 
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his will, from these First Amendment protected material3 
must, it would seem, be strictly limited in a timeframe, 
The Act in question, by contrast, places no limits whatever 
with respect to GSA's retention of custody over appellant1§ 
private papers. In fact, almost thtee years have now gone 
by since the statute's enfl,Ctment, yet the record reveals . no 
~teps whatever to return constitutionally protected paperi 
to the former President. 
I have not attempted to analyze Title I a.s against the 
substantive protections afforded by the Due Process Clause. 
That serious constitutional problems are present in that re-
spect as well is beyond doubt. We have, after all, held tha,t, 
certain personal matters or decisions are so fundamental to 
free people as to be virtually beyond the power of government 
to regulate. See, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 152-153 
(1973). I would assume that those who are of the view that, 
a State's power · to define "f~mily" for regulatory purpose" 
is severely restricted, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, supra, 
would also find severe limitations on government's power to 
obtain and review private communications among family 
members. And I should also think that, as to substantive 
due process protections, legislation singling out one family only 
for compulsory reading of that family's correspondence and 
compulsory listening to that family's conversations would 
raise equally disturbing questions. Almost 100 years ago, 
the Court made this observation, on which I conclude: 
"But it is not to be supposed that these legislative 
powers are absolute ... and that the amendment pre-
scribing due process of law is too vague and indefinite 
to operate as a pra.ctical restraint. It is not every act, 
legislative in form, that is law. Law is something more 
than mere will exerted as an act of power. It must not 
be a special rule for a particular person or a particular 
.case, but [it must be a] 'general law, a law which hears 
Qf;/ore' it oondemn~ •. . so that every citizen shall hold 
. . .. ~ 
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his life, liberty, property and immunities under the pro-
tection of the general rules which govern society .... ' " 
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MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. ~ ~ 
Appellant resigned -the Office of the Presidency nearly three a •~,c,,) ~ , 
years ago, and if the issue here were limited to the right 
of Congress to dispose of his particular Presidential papers, L f- .d ~.l., ~-1..,,1 
thi1;1 c~e would not be of major constitutional significance. .L ~ _ ~
Unfortunately, however, today's decision countenances the a...T '~ 
power of any future Congress to seize the official p~pers of ~ d,d-- y-
an out-going President as he leaves the inaugural stand. In JPi~~ 
so doing, it poses a real threat to the ability , of future , ~ - - · ~: • -
Presidents to receive candid advice and to give candid in-a# ~~ 
structions. This result, so at odds with our previous case •~rifa--.~ 
'taw on the separation of powers, will daily stand as a veritable/4 /'tfl,,yj :.c;;...i~-
sword of Damocles over every succeeding President and his ~ _ 
advisors. Believing as I do that the Act is a clear violation'....--,- · 
of the constitutional principle separation of powers, I need~ ../--r:, 
not address the other issues considered by the Court.1 ~~.; /2 
1 While the entire substance of t.his dissent is devoted to the constitu- • 
tional principle of separation of powers, and not to the other issues that 
the Court addresses separately, it o:eems to me that t.he Court. is too facile 
. in ~eparating appellant 's "privacy" claims from his "separation of powers" 
claim:;, a~ if they were two srparate and wholly unrelated attacks on the 
statute. The concrpt of "priviwy" can be a coat of many colors, and 
quite differing kinds of rights t.o "privacy" have been recognized in the 
Jaw. Property ma.y be "private," in the sense tha.t the Fifth Amendment 
p rohibits the Government from seizing it without paying just compensa,-
tion . A dicta.belt tape or diary may be "private" in that sense, but may 
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My conclusion that the Act violates the principle of separa~ 
tion of powers is based upon three fundamental propositions. 
First, candid and open discourse among the President, his 
also be "private" in the sense that the Fourth Amendment, would prohibit 
an unreasonable seizure of it even though in making such a seizure the 
Government, agreed to pay for the fa:ir value of the diary as not to run 
afoul of the eminent domain clause of the Fifth Amendment. Many 
states have recognized a common law "right of privacy" first publicized 
in the fam,ous Warren and Brandeis !Lrticle, 'l'he Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. 
L._ Rev. 193 (1890). Privileges, such a::; the executive p"rivilege embodied 
in the Constitution as a result of the separation of powers, United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, and t.~e attorney-client privilege, recognized under 
case and statutory law in most jurisdictions, protect still a different form 
of privacy. The invocation of such privileges has the effect of protecting 
the priv-acy of a communication made confidentially to the President or by 
a client t-0 an at.torney; the purpose of the privilege, in each case, is t-0 
assure free communication on the part of the confidant and of the client, 
respectively. 
The Court states, ante, a.t 31, that "it is logical to assume that the ta.pe 
recordings made in the Presidential office primarily relate to the conduct 
·and business of the .Presidency." Whatever the merits of this argument 
may be against, a claim based on other types of privacy, it makes crystal 
clear that the Act is a serious intrusion upon the type of "privacy" that 
i:s protected by the principle of executive privilege. The Court's compleui 
separation of its discussion of the executive privilege claim from the 
privacy claim thus enables it to take inconsistent positions in the different 
sections of its opinion. 
The Court's position with respect to the appellant's individ_ual privacy 
heightens my concern regarding the privacy interest served by executive 
privilege. In attempting to minimize the Act's impact upon appellant.'s 
privacy, the Court concludes "purely private papers and recordings will be 
returned to appellant under § 104 (a.) (7) of the Act." Ante, at 31. How• 
ever, this conclu:sion raises more quest-ions than answers. Under § 104 (a) 
(7), the return of paper::; to the appellant, is conditioned on their being 
"not otherwise of general historical significance." Given the expansive 
nature of this phrase, see Tr. of Oral Arg., at 39, it is quite conceivable 
that virtually none of the papers will be returned, and the Court's repre. 
sentation i:s an empty gesture. See also§ 104 (a) (6). What is meant by 
"purely private paper::;"? Is a personal letter to or from the President, 
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advisors, foreign heads of state and Ambassadors, Mem-
bers of Congress, and the others· who deal with the White 
House on a sensitive basis is an absolute prerequisite to 
the effective discharge of the duties of that high office. 
Second, the effect of the Act, and of this Court's decision 
upholding its constitutionality, will undoubtedly restrain the 
necessary free flow of information to and from present and 
future . Presidents. Third, any substantial intrusion upon the 
effective discharge of the duties of the President is sufficient 
to ,violate the principle of separation of powers, and our 
prior cases do not permit the sustaining of an Act such 
as this by "balancing'' an intrusion of substantial magnitude 
ag~inst the interests assertedly fostered by the Act. 
With respect to 'the second point, it is of course true that the \ 
Act is directed solely at the papers of former President Nixon.2 
but concerning the dutfos of the President considered "priva.te," or is a 
document replete with personal communications, but containing some ref-
erence to the affairs of sta.te, "purely private"? The dictabelts of the 
President's personal recollections, dictated in diary form at the end of each 
da.y, are assumedly private, and a.re to be returned. See Tr. of Ora.I Arg., 
at · 59. But the dictabelt. dictat.ion is also recorded on the voice-activated 
White House ta.ping system, and those tapes will be retained and reviewed. 
Hence, appellant's privacy interest will not be served by the return of 
the dictabeltH, and the retention of the tapes will seriously erode Presi-
dential communications, as discus.;ed infra. By approaching these issues in 
compartmentalized fashion the Court obscures the fallacy of its result. 
I fully subscribe to most of what is said respecting the separation of 
powers in the dissent of THE CHIEF JusTICE. Indeed, it is because I so 
thoroughly agree with his observation that the Court's holding today is 
a "grave repudiation of nearly two hundred yea.rs of judicial precedent 
and historical pract.ice" that I take this opportunity to write separately 
on the subject, thinking that its importance justifies such an opinion. 
2 I am not unmindful of the excesses of Watergate, and of the impetus it 
gave to this legislation. However, the Court's opinion does not 8et forth 
a principled distinction that would limit the constitutionality of an Act 
.;uch as this to Prrsident Nixon's papers. Absent such a distinction: 
''The emotional aspC'ct:s of a case make it difficult to decide dispassionately, 
bat do not qualif · our obligation to apply the law with an eye to the fu-
; 
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Although the terms of the Act, therefore, have no direct 
application to present or future occupants of the Office, the 
effect upon candid communication to and from these future 
Presidents depends, in the long run, not upon the limited 
nature of the present Act, but ·upon the precedential effect of 
today's decision. Unless the authority of Congress to seize 
the papers of this appellant is limited only to him in some 
principled way, future Presidents and their advisors will be 
wary of a similar Act directed at their papers out of pure 
political hostility. 
We are dealing with a privilege, albeit a qualified one, that 
both the Court and the Solicitor General concede may be 
asserted by an ex-President. It is a privilege which has been 
relied upon by chief executives since the time of George 
Washington. See, e. g., the dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF 
JusTICE, ante, at 6. Unfortunately, the Court's opinion up-
holding the constitutionality of this Act is obscure, to say the 
least, as to the circumstances tha.t will justify Congress in 
seizing the papers of an ex-President.8 A potpourri of reasons 
is advanced as to why the Act is not an unconstitutional 
infringement upon the principle of separation of powers,"' but 
ture as well as the concern for the result in a particular case before 
ms." Brewer v. Williams, - U. S. -, - (Mn. Jus'l'ICE STEVENS, 
concurring). 
8 Indeed, there is nothing in the Court's logic which would invalidate 
such an Act if it applied to an incumbent President during his term of 
office. It is of course not likely that an incumbent would sign such a 
measure, but- a sufficiently determined Congress could pass it over his 
veto nonetheless. 
4 In my view, the Court.'s decision itself, by not offering any principled 
basis for distiuguishing appellant's ca.,;e from that of any future Bresident, 
has a present and future impact on the functioning of the Office of the 
Presidency. Hence the validity of the rea:sons asi;erted by the Court for 
upholding this particular Act ii; a ·ubject which I find it unneces&'lry to 
uddre~s in detail. I feel bound t-0 observe, however, that the Court's 
heavy reliance, e. g., ante, at 16, upon the fact that. the seized papers are 
t-0 br lodged with the General Services Administration, an agency created 
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the weight to be attached to any of the factors is left wholly 
unclear. 
The Court speaks of the need to establish procedures to 
preserve Presidential materials, to allow a successor President 
access to the papers of the prior President, to grant the 
American public historical access, and to rectify the present 
"hit-or-miss" approttCh by entrusting the materials to the 
expert handling of the 11,rchivists. Ante, at 24-2p. These 
justifications are equally applicable to each and every future 
President, and other than one cryptic paragraph, ante, at 25, 
the Court's treatment contains no suggestion that Congress 
might not permissibly seize the papers of any outgoing future 
President. The unclear scope of today's opinion will cause 
future Presidents and their advisors to be uneasy over the 
confidentiality of their communications t ereby restraining 
those communications. 
The position of my rothers PowELL 5 and BLACKMUN is 
that today's opinion will ___ -.;;.;=-=-- impediment to future 
Presidential communications since this case is '<unique"'-
by Congress but housed in the Executive Branch of the Government, is a 
thin reed indeed. 
Control and management of an agency such as the General Services 
Administration is shared between the incumbent President, by virtue of his 
authority to nomina.t.e its officials, and Congress, by virtue of its authority 
to ern1ct substantive legislation defining the functions of the agency. But 
the physical placement of the seized Presidential ppaers with such an 
agency does not solve the separa,tion of powers problem. The principle of 
sepa.rat.ion of powers is infringed when, by Act of Congress, Presidential 
communications are impeded because the Pre:;ident. no longer has exclusive 
control over the relea.w of his confidential papers. The fact that this Act 
places physical custody in l,he hands of the General Services Administra-
tion, rather than a congressional cq~ittee, makes little difference so far 
as divestiture of Presidential control is concerned. 
5 My Brother STEVENS, ante, 8eek:; to at.tribute a similar uniqueness to 
the precedential value of this cnse, but his observations are djrected to 
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appellant resigned in disgrace from the Presidency during 
events unique in the history of our Nation. MR. JusTICE 
PowELL recognizes that this position is quite different from 
that of the Court. Ante, at -. Unfortunately his con-
curring view tha.t the authority of Congress is limited to the 
situation he describes does not itself change the expansive 
scope of the Court's opinion, and will serve as scant consola-
tion to future Presidential advisors. For so long as the 
Court's opinion represents a threat to confidential communi-
cations, the concurrences of MR. JtJSTICE POWELL and MR. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I fear, are based on no more than wishful 
thinking. 
Were the Court to advance a principled justification for 
affirming the judgment solely on the facts surrounding appel-
lant's fall from office, the effect of its decision upon future 
presidential communications would be far less serious. But 
the Court does not advance any such justification. 
A 
It would require far more of a discourse than could 
profitably be included in an opinion such as this to fully 
describe the pre-eminent position that the President of the 
United States occupies with respect to our Republic. Suf-
fice it to say that the Presiden't is made the sole repository 
of the executive powers of the United States, and the powers 
entrusted to him as well as the duties imposed upon him 
are awesome indeed. 0 Given the vast spectrum of the deci-
6 Article II empowers him "by and with the advice and consent of tho 
Senate" to make treaties, to appoint numerous other high officials of the 
Federal Government, to rrceive ambassadors and other public ministers, 
and to commi:ssion all the officers of the United States. That· Article en-
joins him to "t,ike care that the laws be faithfully executed.," and au-
thorize;; him to "give to the Congress information on the· State of the 
1.Jnion, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall 
judge nc•ce~»ary and expedient." It is difficult to imagine a public office 
who~e occupant would be more dependent upon the confidentiality of . 
'. 
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sions that confront him-domestic affairs, relationships with 
foreign powers, direction of the military as Commander-in-
Chief-it is by no means an overstatement to conclude that 
current, accurate, and absolutely candid information is essen-
tial to the proper performance of his office. Nor is it an 
overstatement to conclude that the President must be free 
to give frank and candid instructions to his subordinates. 
the advice which he received, and the confidentiality of Hie instructions 
which he gave, for the successful execution of his duties. This is par-
ticularly true in the area of foreign affairs and international relations; in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319 this Court 
stated: 
"Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs 
in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, 
but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In 
this vast external realm, with its irpportant, complicated, delicate and 
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen 
as a representatjve of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and 
consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. In to the field of negotia-
tion the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade 
it. As Marshall said .in his great argument of March 7, 1800, ii:i, the 
House of Repre,,entatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation 
in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations:" 
Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
at a very early day in our hi~tory (February 15, 1816), reported to the 
Senate, among other things, as follows: 
"The President is the constitutional representative of the United States 
with regU;_rd to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign 
nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, 
and upon what subjects negofoition may be urged with the greatest 
prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to the Constitution. 
The committee consider this responsibility the surest pledge for the faith-
ful discharge of his du(y. They think the interference of the Senate in 
the direction of foreign negotiations calculated to diminish that respon-
sibility and thereby to impair the best security for the national safety. 
The nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires cau-
tion and· unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy 
and dispatch.' U. S. Senate, Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations, 




8 NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICm:3 
It cannot be denied that one of the principal determinant$ 
of the quality of the information furnished to the President 
will be the degree of trust placed in him by those who con-
fide in him. The Court itself, ante, at 19, cites approvingly 
the following language of the Solicitor General: 
"Unless he can• give his advisors some assurance of 
confidentiality, µ, President could not expect to receive 
the full and frank submission of facts and opinion, 
upon which effective discharge of his duties depends." 
See Brief of the . Solicitor General, at 33. 
The public papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had 
the advantage of discharging executive responsibilities first as 
the Comman.der-in-Chief of the United States forces in Eu-
rope during the Second World War and then as President of 
the United States for two terms, attest to the critical im-
portance of this trust in the President's discretion: 
"And if any commander is going to get the free, 4n-
pre,i udiced opinions of his subordinat,es, he had better 
protect what they have 1:.-9 say to him on a con-
fidential basis." Public Papers of President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, 1955, at 674 (1959). 
The effect of a contrary course likewise impressed President 
Eisenhower : 
"But when it comes to the conversations that take place 
between any responsible official and his advisers or ex_. 
change of little, mere slips of this or that, expressing 
personal opinions on the most confidential basis, those 
are not subject to investigation by anybody, and if they 
are, will wreck the Government." Ib'id. (Emphasis 
added.) 
There simply can be no doubt that it is of the utmost impor-
tance for sensitive communications to the President to be 
viewed as confidential, and generally unreachable without the 
President's consent. 
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In order to fully understand the impact of this Act upon 
the confidential communications in the White House, it must 
be understood that the Act will affect not merely former · 
President Nixon, but the present and future Presidents. 
As discussed above, while this Act itself addresses only the I 
papers of former President Nixon, today's decision upholding 
its constitutionality renders uncertain the constitutionality of 
future congressional action directed at any ex-President. 
Thus Presidential confidants will assume, correctly, that any 
records of communications to the President could be subject to 
"appropriation" in much the same manner as the present Act 
seized the records of confidential communications to and from 
President Nixon. When advice is sought by future Presidents, 
no one will be unmindful of the fact that, as a result of the 
uncertainty engendered by today's decision, all confidential \ 
communications of any ex-President could be subject to sei-
zure over his objection, as he leaves the inaugural stand on 
,January 20. 
And Presidential communications will undoubtedly be im-
peded by the recognition that there is a substantial proba-
bility of public disclosure of material seized under this Act, 
which, by today's decision , is a constitutional blueprint for 
future Acts. First, the Act on its face requires that 100-odd 
government -archivists study and review Presidential papers, 
· heretofore accessible only with the specific consent of the 
President. Second, the Act requires that public access is to 
be granted by future regulations consistent with "the need 
to provide public access to those materials which have general 
historical significance . ... " Section 104 (a)(6). Either of 
these pyovisions is sufficient to detract markedly from the 
ca1~dor of communications to and from the President. 
In brushing ,aside the fact that the archivists are em-
powered to review the papers, the Court concludes that the 
archivists will be "discrete." Ante, at 23. But there is no-
,. 
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foundation for the Court's assumption that there will be no 
leaks. Any reviews that the archivists have made of Presi-
dential papers in the past have been done only after au-
thorization by the President, and after the President has had 
an opportunity to cull the most sensitive documents. It 
strikes me as extremely· naive, and I dare say that this 
view will be shared by a large number of potential confidants 
of future Presidents, to suppose that ·each and every one 
of the archivists who might participate in a similar screening 
by virtue of a future Act would remain completely sUent 
with respect to those portions of the Presidential papers which 
are extremely newsworthy. The Solicitor General, supporting 
the constitutionality of the Act, candidly conceded as much 
in oral argument: 
"Question: ... I now ask you a question that may 
sound frivolous, but do you think if a hundred people 
know anything of great interest in the city of Wash-
ington, it will remain a secret? 
" f Laughter] . 
"McCree: 'MR. JusTICE PowELL, I have heard that if 
two people have heard it, it will not.'" Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 46. 
It borders on the absurd for the Court to cite our recent 
decision in Whalen v. Roe, - U. S. -, as a precedent 
for the proposition that government officials will invariably 
honor provisions in a law dedicated to the preservation of 
privacy. It is quite doubtful, at least to my mind, that 
columnists or investigative reporters will be avidly searching 
for what doctor prescribed what drug for what patient in 
the State of New York, which was the information required 
to be furnished in Whalen v. Roe. But with respect to the 
advice received by a President, or the instructions given by 
him , on highly sensitive matters of great historical signifi-
cance, the case is quite the opposite. Hence, at the minimum, 
today's decision upholding the constitutionality of this Act, 
75-1605-DISSENT (A) 
NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES 11 
mandating review by archivists, will engender the expectation 
that future confidential communications to the President may 
be subject to leaks or public disclosure without his consent. 
In addition to this review by archivists, Presidential papers 
may now be seized and shown to the public if they are of 
"general historical significance." The Court attempts to 
avoid this problem with the wishful expectation that the 
regulations regarding public access, when promulgated, will 
be narrowly drawn. However, this assumes that a Presiden-
tial advisor will speak candidly based upon this same wishful 
assumption that the regulations, when ultimately issued and 
interpreted, will protect his confidences. But the current Act 
is over two and one-half years old and no binding regula-
tions have yet been promulgated. And it is anyone's guess 
as to how long it will take before such ambiguous terms 
as "historical significance" are definitively interpreted, and 
as to whether some future administrator as yet unknown 
might issue a broader definition. Thus, the public access re-
quired by this Act will at the very least engender substan-
tial uncertainty regarding whether future confidential com-
munications will, in fact, remain confidential. 
The critical factor in all of this is not that confidential 
material might be disclosed, since the President himself might 
choose to "go public" with it. The critical factor is that the 
determination as to whether to disclose is wrested by the 
Act from the President. When one speaks in confidence to 
a President, he necessarily relies upon the President's discre-
tion not to disclose the sensitive. The President similarly 
relies on the discretion of a subordinate when instructing 
him. Thus it is no answer to suggest, as does the Court, 
a'llte, at 22, that the expectation of confidentiality has al-
ways been limited because Presidential papers have in the 
past been turned over to Presidential libraries or otherwise 
subsequently disclosed. In those cases, ultimate reliance w~ 
11pon the discretion of the President to cull the sensitive 
•. 
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before disclosure. But when, as is the case under this Act, 
the decision whether to disclose nn-+r~T~ resides in the 
President. communication will in itably e r tra.ined. 
The Court, as does MR. Jus CE PowELL, eeks to diminish · 
the impact of this Act on the ffice of the resident by virtue 
of the fact that neither Preside.,..___.,_.,...,, nor President Carter 
support appellant's claim. Ante, at 13, 19. It is quite true 
that President Ford signed the Act into law. and that the 
Solicitor General, representing President Carter, supports its 
constitutionality. While we must give due rega.rd to the fact 
that these Presidents have not opposed the Act. we must also 
give due regard to the unusual political forces that have contrib~ 
uted to making this situation "unique." Ante, at 4 (MR. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring). MR. JUSTICE POWELL refers to 
the stance of the current executive as "dispositive," ante, at 
-. and the Court places great emphasis upon it. I think 
this analysis is mistaken. 
The current occupant of the Presidency cannot by signing 
into law a bill passed by Congress waive the claim of a succes-
sor President that the Act violates the separation of powers. 
We so held in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926). 
And only last Term we unanimously held in Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U. S. 1 (1976), that persons with no connection to the 
Executive Branch of the Government may attack the consti-
tutiona.Iity of a law signed by the President on the ground 
that it invaded authority reserved for the Executive Branch 
under the prniciple of tl separation of powers. This princi-
ple, perhaps the most fu 1da.mental in our constitutional 
framework. ma 10t be 'g11 d away by the temporary incum-
bant of the o ce which it as designed to protect. 
MR. JusT CE PowELL's iew that the incumbent President 
must join t e challenge f the ex-President places Preside11-
t ial commu111 tions· · 1 limbo, since advisors, at the time of 
the> communicat1011. cannot know who the sucessor will be or 
w!lat his stance will be regarding seizure by Congress of his 
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predecessor's papers. Since the advisors cannot be sure that 
the President to whom they are communicating can ·protect 
their confidences, communication will be inhibited. MR. 
JUSTICE PowELL's view. requiring an ex-President to depend 
upon his successor blinks at political and historical reality. 
The tripartite system of government established by the Con-
stitution has on more than one occasion bred political hostility 
not merely between Congress and a lame duck President, but 
between the latter and his successor. ·To substantiate this 
view one need only recall the relationship at the time of the 
transfer to the reins of power from -John Adams to Thomas 
Jefferson, from James Buchanan to Abraham Lincoln, from 
Herbert Hoover to Fra.nklin Roosevelt, and from Harry 
Truman to Dwight Eisenhower. Thus while the Court's deci-
sion is an invitation for a hostile Congress to legislate against 
an unpopular lame duck President. MR. JusTICE PowELL's 
tJosi'tion places the ultimate disposition of a challenge to sucli 
legislation in the hands of what history has shown may be a 
hostile incom'ing President. I cannot believe that the Con-
stitution countenances this result. One may ascribe no such 
motives to Congress and the successor Presidents in this case, 
without nevertheless harboring a fear that they may play a 
· part in some succeeding case. 
The shadow that today's decision casts upon the daily 
operation of the Office of the President during his entire 
four-year term sharply differentiates it from our · previous 
separation of powers decisions, which have dealt with much 
more specific amr limitation intrusions. These cases have:-
focused upon unique aspects of the operation of a particular · 
branch of government·. rather than upo1r an intrusio11; such as" 
the present one. that permeates the entire decisionmalcing·· 
process of the Office of the President For example, in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U~ S. 579' 
(1952) (the "Steel"Seizure Cases"), this·Court helcf that the· 
President coulil not by Executive ord_er· seize s~eP mills_ iii~ 
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order to prevent a work stoppage when Congress had provided 
other methods for dealing with such an eventuality. In 
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), the Court struck 
down the 1867 Tenure of Office Act which had attempted to 
restrict the President's power to remove Postmasters without 
congressional approval. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 
( 1976), the Court struck down Congress' attempt to vest the 
power to appoint members of the Federal Election Commis-
sion in persons other than the President. 
To say that these cases dealt with discrete instances of 
governmental action is by no means to disparage their im-
portance in the development of our constitutional law. But 
is does contrast them quite sharply with the issue involved 
in the present case. To uphold the "Presidential Recordings 
and Materials Preservation Act" is not simply to sustain 
or invalidate a particular instance of the exercise of govern~ 
mental power by Congress or by the President; it has the 
much more far reaching effect of significantly hampering 
the President, during his entire term of office, in his ability 
to gather the necessary information to perform the countless 
discrete acts which are the prerogative of his office under 
Art. II of the Constitution. 
C 
It thus appears to me indisputable that this Act is a 
significant intrusion into the operations of the Presidency. 
T do not think that this severe dampening of free communi~ 
cation to and from the President may be discounted by the 
Court's adoption of a novel "balancing" test for determining 
whether it is constitutional.7 I agree with the Court that the 
7 As a matter of original inquir~·, it might plausibly be claimed that t.!10 
concrrn:; C"xpre;:,;ed by the Fr:1mrrs of the Com,titution during their debates, 
,incl similar rxpre~,;ions found i11 the Federali,;t Paper;;, by no means 
n•q11ire 1hr ro 11 <" l11:;io11 that the ,Judicin.1 Branch is thEl ultimate arbiter of 
ll' hNher 011r branch has tran"grrssc·d upon powers constitutionally reserved 
1,0 ,111othr.r, It rould havr been plnu~ibly m,1int t1 ined that the Framcrl:: 
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three branches of government need not be airtight, ante, at 
15, and that the separate branches are not intended to operate 
with absolute independence, United States v. Nixon, 418 
U. S. 683, 707 (1974). But I find no support in the Consti-
tution or in our cases for the Court's pronouncement that 
the operations of the Office of the President may be severely 
impeded by Congress simply because Congress had a good 
reason for doing so. 
Surely if ever there were a case for "balancing," and 
giving weight to the asserted "national interest" to sustain 
governmental action, it was in the Steel Seizure Cases, supra. 
There the challenged Presidential proclamation recited, with-
thought that the Constitution it.-sC'lf had armed each branch with ;;ufficient 
political weapon,.; to f<'nd off intrusions by :mother which would violate 
11or nf'cp:;.,:ity for judicial invalidation of such intru:;ion. But tha.t is not 
no neces:sit.y for judicial invalidation of such intrusion. But that is 11ot 
tlw way th<' law ha:s devrloped in this Court. 
.lfarlmry v. Madison, - Crnnch 137 (1803), not on]~- established the 
au1 hority of this Court to hold a.n Act of Congress unconstitutional, but, 
t h1~ particular r·ou:-tit utional 4urstion which it decided wai-; e.:'sPntially a 
"separat.ion of powPrs" i:ssuP: whether Congress was empowered under thP 
Constitution to expand the original jurisdiction conferred upon this Court 
hy Article Ill of the Con~titution. 
Any argument that Marbury is limit~d to cases involving the powers of 
th<' Judicial Brnnch and that the Court had no power to intervene i11 any 
di;;pute rrlating to ;;eparntion of power,, between the otJier two branches 
has been rejectPd in Myers v. United States, supra; Humpreys Executor v. 
United States, - lJ. S. - (19-) and Buckley v. Valeo, supra. In so 
doing, tlwse casf's ar<' rntirely consi;;t.ent with the following language from 
United States v. Nixon: 
"In the performa.nC<' of a-,;signecl constitutional duties each branch of 
llw GovC'rnmC'nt must inifo,lly interpret t.he Com;titution, and the inter-
pretation of its power,; by an~' branch is duC' great. respect from thP at.hers. 
Thf' Pm,iident',; coim,;l'l, HI' WP have notPd, read;; the Con;;tit.ution as 
vroviding an ab~oh1te privilrge of confidentiality for all Pre,:idential com-
nmnicatiom;, :Vlany dPci;;ion,; of this Court, howevPr, have unequivoeally 
reaffirmed th<' holding of Marbusy v. Madison, 1 Craneh 137 (1803), that 
' I i]t is emphatically the provinre and dut.y of the judicial department to 
.,.iy wlw.t- th<' law i;; .' J,t., at 177." 41S 0. S., at. 703. 
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out contradiction by its challengers, that "American fighting 
men and fighting men of other nations of the United States 
are now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of ag-
gresion in Korea"; that "the weapons and other materials 
needed by our armed forces and by those joined with us 
in the defense of the free world are produced to a great 
extent in this country, and steel is an indispensable compo-
nent of substantially all of such weapons and materials"; 
and that a work stoppa.ge in the steel industry "would im-
mediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and 
those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add 
to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and air men 
engaged in combat in the field." 343 U. S., at 590. Al-
though the "legislative" actions by the President could have 
been qui~kly overriden by an act of Congress, id., at 677, this 
Court struck down the executive order as violative of the 
separation of powers principle with nary a mention of the 
national interest to be fostered by what could have been 
characterized as a relatively minimal and temporary intru-
sion upon the role of Congress. The analysis was simple and 
straightffrward: Congress had exclusive authority to legis-
late; thf President's Executive order was an exercise of 
legislativ~ power that impinged upon that authority of Con-
gress, an'd was therefore unconstitutional. Id., at 588-589. 
See also fuckley v. Valeo, supra.0 
I thin~ that not only the Executive Branch of the Federal 
Govermr1ent, but the Legislative and Judicial Branches as 
well, wil~ come to regret this day when the Court has upheld 
an Act of Congress that trenches so significantly on the func-
tioning qf the Office of the Presidency. I dissent. 
° For the reasons set forth by THE CHIEF J Ui:,'l'ICE , ante, at, 9-10, it is 
d ear that the circumstances in United States v. Nixon, supra, involving a 
narrow request for specified documents in connection with a criminal 
p rosecution , provide no support for the Court's use of a balancing test 
in a case 1 ~uch as this where the seizure is a broad and undifferentiated 
intrusion into the daily 01)erat ions of the Office of the President. 
